The Language Nazi strikes again.
Substack latest.
The Language Nazi strikes again.
Substack latest.
I decided to insert a brief critique of London Ed into one of the intentionality chapters of my book in progress. Here it is:
One mistake to avoid is the conflation of object-directedness with object-dependence. D. E. Buckner speaks of an “. . . illusion that has captured the imagination of philosophers for at least a hundred years: intentionality, sometimes called object-dependence, a supposed unmediated relationship between thought and reality . . . .” (Reference and Identity in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Scriptures: The Same God? Rowman and Littlefield, 2020, p. 195) Apart from his eliminativism about intentionality, Buckner is doubly mistaken in his characterization of it. No one except Buckner has, to my knowledge, characterized intentionality in general from Brentano on down as object-dependence, but it is standard, especially among analytic philosophers, to characterize it in terms of object-directedness. As George Molnar puts it,
The fundamental feature of an intentional state or property is that it is directed to something beyond itself . . . All mental states and processes have an internal reference to an object. The identity of the intentional state is defined in terms of this intentional object. . . . Since intentionality constitutes the identity of mental phenomena, it follows that the nexus between the mental state or process in question and its intentional object is non-contingent. (Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, Oxford, 2003, p. 62, second and third emphases added.)
Molnar goes on to make the usual points that the intentional object may or may not exist and that intentional objects are property-indeterminate (Ibid.) Given this intentionality 'boilerplate,' it should be clear that object-directedness and object-dependence are distinct notions that pull in opposite directions. Given that the nexus of act and intentional object is non-contingent, the identity of the act and its directedness does not depend on an external object. An object-directed thought need not be object-dependent in the sense of requiring an external thing for its identity. If I am thinking of Lucifer, I have a definite object in mind, an object to which my thought is directed. But of course, having an object in mind is no guarantee of its existence 'outside' the mind. The Lucifer-thought is what it is whether or not its intentional object is real. The thought does not depend on a real object for its identity or its directedness. The directedness of the thought is intrinsic to it and not supplied by a relation to a thing in the external world. This is why Brentano denies that intentionality is a relation, strictly speaking, but only something relation-like. Relations, standardly understood, require for their obtaining the real existence of all of their relata; many of our acts of thinking, however, are directed at objects that do not exist, and this without prejudice to the identity of these acts. This is not to deny that there may be some object-dependent thoughts, where an object is a real thing in nature. Perhaps it is the case that (some) meanings “ain't in the head” (H. Putnam) but are in the external world in roughly the way the meaning of the demonstrative 'this' is exhausted by the real thing to which it refers on a particular occasion of its use; intentionality theory, however, in both the phenomenological and analytic traditions has had from the outset a decidedly internalist bias, where internalism is the view that the individuation of mental items depends entirely on factors internal to the subject and not on any factors external to the subject as on externalism. This should come as no surprise since phenomenology is philosophy from the first-person point of view.
Buckner's first mistake is to interpret intentionality along the lines of an externalist model when this model makes hash of what the main thinkers have maintained, including Brentano, Husserl and Chisholm. His second mistake is his claim that the intentional nexus is unmediated or direct, a conceit belied by Husserl's doctrine of the noema.
Sir Douglas Quartet, Mendocino, 1969. This one goes out to Mendocino Joe.
Eric Burdon and the Animals, Monterey. This one goes out to Monterey Tom.
Eagles, Hotel California. Some of finest guitar-slinging of the '70s.
Creedence Clearwater Revival, Lodi
GG Kettel, San Francisco Bay Blues. Ferrara, Italy, 2007
Scott Mackenzie, San Francisco
Johnny Bond, Hot Rod Lincoln. San Pedro, Grapevine Hill.
Doors, L. A. Woman
Beach Boys, California Girls
Mamas and Papas, California Dreamin'
Dave Bagwill comments (4 July):
Bill, listening to that Beach Boys tune tonight brought back a vivid memory.Back when I lived in the Bay Area, and the Oakland A's were winning lots of ball games – Catfish Hunter, Sal Bando, Reggie Jackson (who made a throw from deep right field, at the fence, on a line to third base -on the base, in fact – catching a runner who had tagged at second base), Rick Monday et. al. – I attended a Saturday afternoon double-header with a friend from the bank.It was a perfect day for baseball, and the stands were sold out; it felt great, until the first music pumped out of that stupendous sound system – and then it felt even better. 'California Girls' started playing, and just the first two or three beats was enough to electrify the crowd into a spontaneous rising and a thunderous roar of happiness.It was just great to be an American, and that song was a huge part of the 'gestalt' = weather, a ball game, hot dogs, friendship, the flag, a sense of security and fellowship. And Sal Bando hit two home runs in the first game.
John Heil, From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford 2003, pp. vii-viii:
. . . the paradigmatic Australian trait: ontological seriousness. You are ontologically serious if you are guided by the thought that the ontological implications of philosophical claims are paramount. The attitude most naturally expresses itself in an allegiance to a truth-maker principle: when an assertion about the world is true, something about the world makes it true.
Such an attitude could be contrasted to the idea that, in pursuing philosophical questions, we must start with language and work our way outwards. My belief is that this attitude is responsible for the sterile nature of much contemporary analytical philosophy. If you start with language and try to work your way outwards, you will never get outside language. In that case, descriptions of the world, or 'stories', go proxy for the world. Perhaps there is something about the Australian continent that discourages this kind of 'hands-off' philosophizing.
The above partially explains why Edward Buckner, my main sparring partner for many years, and I are ever at loggerheads. I am ontologically serious in Heil's sense, and Buckner is not. It regularly seems to me that he is pushing some sort of linguistic idealism. I have never been able to get him to understand the truth-maker principle. Perhaps there is something about the British Isles . . . .
And then there is David Brightly, also an Englishman. On Possibility, a discussion with Mr. Brightly, brings out some of the differences in approach of dwellers in fog and desert dwellers.
It teaches humility.
K. V. writes,
I am a first year Jesuit novice of the USA Midwest province. I'm from Cincinnati, OH. I have interests in philosophy. I know Thomism well. My hope is to do metaphysics and philosophical logic within the analytic tradition.I saw that you wrote a paper on external relations and Bradley's Regress. Can I ask you a couple questions regarding external relations? Do you think that first order logic is ontologically committed to external relations? Also, if all relations are external, would this entail a sort of bare particularism about objects? In other words, would all necessary properties be conceived of as something added, rather than as the essence?
Now consider the triadic between relation that relates the members of the ordered triple <coaster, cup, desk>. This relation is also external. The terms (relata) of the relation can exist and have the intrinsic properties they have whether or not they stand in the relation.
A-Internal Relations. If a relation is not external, then it is non-external. One sort of non-external relation is an A-internal relation, where ‘A’ honors David M. Armstrong:
Two or more particulars are internally related if and only if there exist properties of the particulars which logically necessitate that the relation holds. (Universals and Scientific Realism, II, 85)
Consider two balls, A and B. Each has the property of being red all over. Just in virtue of each being red, A and B stand in the same color as relation. Each ball's being (the same shade of) red logically suffices for them to stand in the relation in question. This relation is internal in that the non-obtaining of the relation at a later time or in a different possible world would induce an intrinsic change in one or both of the balls. In other words, the two balls could not cease to be the same color as one another unless one or both of the balls changed color. But the two balls could cease to be ten feet from each other without changing in any intrinsic or non-relational respect. Spatial relations are clear examples of external relations.
A-internal relations can be said to be founded relations in that they are founded in intrinsic (non-relational) properties of the relata. Thus the relational fact of A’s being the same color as B decomposes into a conjunction of two non-relational facts: A’s being red & B’s being red. These non-relational facts are independent of each other in the sense that each can obtain without the other obtaining. A-internal relations reduce to their monadic foundations. They are thus an "ontological free lunch" in Armstrong's cute phrase. They do not add to the ontological inventory. They are no "addition to being." So if every relation were A-internal, then the category of Relation, as an irreducible category of entities, would be empty.
B-internal relations. To say that two or more particulars are B-internally related, where ‘B’ honors Bradley and Blanshard, is to say that there is no possible world in which the particulars exist but do not stand in the relation in question. Thus two B-internally related particulars cannot exist without each other. Each is essential to the other. Here is an example. Set S has five members essentially (as opposed to accidentally) , while set T has seven members essentially. These essential properties of S and T found the relation larger than (has a greater cardinality than) that obtains between them. Although there are possible worlds in which neither set exists, there is no possible world in which both sets exist but fail to stand in the relation in question. So S and T are B-internally related.
In sum, external relations are not founded in the non-relational properties of their relata. A-internal relations are founded in accidental non-relational properties of their relata. B-internal relations are founded in essential non-relational properties of their relata.
A question for you: It seems like I'm one of the alt-right "tribalists" you take yourself to disagree with. (Correct me if I'm wrong.) But do we really disagree? Let me try to clarify my position a little.I'd be very happy to live in a society where race and other tribal markers don't matter much. They could be a purely personal or social kind of thing with no political meaning.On the other hand, when I look around and see how non-white (etc.) tribalism is being weaponized against white people, and specifically white-Euro-Christian men, it seems to me that we have no practical option other than consciously identifying as the tribe under attack. It's largely a defensive thing. We are being attacked as white people, or white men, so it's not enough to just call ourselves "Americans" or "Canadians" or whatever. Those civic identities have already been deconstructed or rejected by the people who hate us and seek power over us. They just don't care. And others like us are not going to be motivated by appeals to these more abstract categories when their enemies are attacking them for being white, and male.So it's in this (weird) context that I think white men should be conscious and proud of their "tribal" identity, as a healthy and empowering response to the hateful tribalism of others. In a different context I wouldn't advocate this kind of tribalism. Against a society that says it's shameful and immoral to be a white man–which, let's be frank, is what they're really saying–we should affirm that there's nothing wrong with us, that we like ourselves and won't apologize for being who we are.Do you disagree?
Herewith, some notes and commentary. Double quotation marks are used for quoting, single for sneering, mentioning, etc.
The first truth is that "cognitive ability" is differently distributed among the groups under examination: American whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians. The second is that these groups "have different rates of violent crime." (ix) These propositions are indeed truths. But why discuss these incendiary matters? Because "We are engaged in a struggle for America's soul." (x) We are indeed, and the stakes are high.
The first chapter is entitled "The American Creed Imperiled" and covers pp. 1-8.
America's soul is her founding ideals, the American creed, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Among the ideals: liberty, equality, democracy, individualism, human rights, the rule of law, and private property. I would add limited government to the list and insist that private property is the foundation and sine qua non of individual liberty, which of course entails opposition to totalitarian schemes such as socialism and communism.
But the founding ideals were a long time in achieving. On 28 August 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his famous 'I have a dream' speech that "evoked the American creed from start to finish." (2) The next year brought the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was signed into law by Lyndon B. Johnson. "The act had to be a good and necessary thing. As a college junior at the time, I certainly thought so." (3)
But the 1964 Act drove a "philosophical wedge . . . between those who wanted strict adherence to the ideal of treating people as individuals, equal before the law, and those who advocated group-based policies as a way to achieve social justice." (3-4) But what's with the "social"? What's wrong with plain old 'justice'? How could justice not be social? Could old man Murray be unaware that 'social justice' is a leftist code-phrase?
The wedge was driven deeper.
Group-based policies proliferated and by the end of the 20th century 'American creed' had fallen into desuetude and the thing itself had been repudiated altogether to be replaced by intersectionality, critical race theory, and a "bastardized vision of socialism." (4) The new ideology came to dominate "the left wing of the Democratic Party." Question for Murray: Is there a right wing? Who belongs to it?
The label that sums up all the newfangled Unsinn is 'identity politics.' "The core premise of identity politics is that individuals are inescapably defined by the groups into which they were born — principally (but not exclusively) by race and sex — and that this understanding must shape our politics." (5, emphasis in original) The American creed is thereby "turned on its head." Treating people as individuals becomes immoral because it ignores racism and sexism. Racism is systemic and white privilege omnipresent. The power of the state not only may be used, but must be used to treat people of color preferentially.
It took him a while, but Murray came to see that left-wing identity politics is "toxic." (6) I would add that the same goes for the identity politics of the alternative right. Be that as it may. The topic is Murray. He finds identity politics "toxic" because "It is based on the premise that all groups are equal in the ways that shape economic, social, and political outcomes for groups and that therefore all differences in group outcomes are artificial and indefensible." (6) Murray goes on to say that the premise is "factually wrong." "Hence this book about cognitive ability and criminal behavior."
Here is the way I would present the fundamentally fallacious leftist identity-political reasoning:
1) We are all equal in the ways Murray mentions. We are equal in interests, aptitudes, intelligence, work habits, criminality, etc. But
2) There is no equality of outcome.
3) The only possible explanation of this is systemic racism and sexism and unearned white privilege. Therefore
4) It is morally acceptable to use the power of the state to equalize the inequalities. And individual liberties be damned.
The main problem with the argument, of course, is that (1) is provably false.
Unfortunately, Murray backpedals out of fear of being misunderstood and, I would guess, fear of being labelled a nasty racist and white supremacist. He assures us:
I am not talking about racial superiority or inferiority, but about differences in group averages and overlapping distributions. Differences in averages do not affect the abilities of any individual. They should not affect our approach, positively or negatively, to any person we meet. (6)
No? Take the third sentence. If Murray is convinced that blacks as a group are more criminally prone than whites as a group, and he encounters a black person whom he does not know, then it would be highly irrational of him NOT to allow that conviction of his to affect his approach to the black person. Suppose Murray is walking down a street and a number of black youths are approaching him, while on the other side of the street coming in his direction are a number of white Mormon youths. Would it not be highly irrational of Murray to remain on the black side of the street?
Now look at the first sentence. Obviously Murray is talking about racial superiority/inferiority if he argues that Asians as a group are better at math that blacks as a group. "Come on, man!" as Joey B. would say.
To Murray I say: you will be called a racist and a white supremacist no matter what you say. So man up and don't try to curry favor with our political enemies.
………………………….
A reader comments:
I was reading your post about Murray and thinking over your example toward the end about the group of black youths on the street. Years back I read an example almost exactly like this in a philosophy paper, except that the author was careful not to include any racial description of the "teenagers" in the story. (Maybe in the same way that newspapers like to call a black criminal an "area man" or "local youth".)According to the author, he couldn't help but cross the street on the basis of his "prejudiced" belief that a group of "scowling" teenagers dressed like gangbangers represents some kind of danger. He later feels ashamed of his belief that they "pose a danger" because, after all, "I do not know them" and "they could be harmless". The belief was "epistemically ungrounded".Isn't that amazing? You'd think anyone would have to agree that in this situation it's obviously rational to believe that a bunch of young men "pose a danger" and rational to act on your assessment of danger by simply crossing the street. But NO. Here we have a senior distinguished philosopher just asserting for no particular reason that his belief and behavior was not rational. And he even thinks it was immoral or something. Anyway, he claims to be ashamed.So there may be no getting through to these people. Or maybe they know what they're saying is ridiculous but they're so desperate to appear "good" that you can't have an honest conversation with them about even the blindingly obvious.
It may be too late to make America great again. Where is the glory that was Rome?
In the course of our discursive operations we often encounter circularity. Clarity will be served if we distinguish different types of circularity. I count three types. We could label them definitional, argumentative, and explanatory.
A. The life of the mind often includes the framing of definitions. Now one constraint on a good definition is that it not be circular. A circular definition is one in which the term to be defined (the definiendum) or a cognate thereof occurs in the defining phrase (the definiens). 'A triangle is a plane figure having a triangular shape,' though plainly true, is circular. 'The extension of a term is the set of items to which the term applies' is an example of a non-circular definition.
Ibram X. Kendi, the race 'theorist' currently much-loved by the 'woke,' was recently asked to define 'racism.' He came out with this brilliancy: “A collection of racist policies that lead to racial inequity that are substantiated by racist ideas." Video here.
B. Sometimes we argue. We attempt to support a proposition p by adducing other propositions as reasons for accepting p. Now one constraint on a good argument is that it not be circular. A circular argument in is one in which the conclusion appears among the premises, sometimes nakedly, other times clothed for decency's sake in different verbal dress. Supply your own examples.
C. Sometimes we explain. What is it for an individual x to exist? Suppose you say that for x to exist is for some property to be instantiated. One variation on this theme is to say that for Socrates to exist is for the haecceity property Socrateity to be instantiated. This counts as a metaphysical explanation, and a circular one to boot. For if Socrateity is instantiated, then it is is instantiated by Socrates who must exist to stand in the instantiation relation. The account moves in a circle, an explanatory circle of embarrassingly short diameter.
Suppose someone says that for x to exist is for x to be identical to something or other. They could mean this merely as an equivalence, in which case I have no objection. But if they are shooting for a explanation of existence in terms of identity-with-something-or-other, then they move in an explanatory circle. For if x exists in virtue of its identity with some y, then y must exist, and you have moved in an explanatory circle.
Some philosophers argue that philosophers ought not be in the business of explanation. I beg to differ. But that is a large metaphilosophical topic unto itself.
The following goes deeper into the issues involved in my Substack article Patriotism and Jingoism. I respond to comments from 'Jacques' from November 2015. My responses are in blue.
……………………….
I read your blog every day. Quite apart from the high level philosophizing, it's a rare bit of political sanity and rationality and decency. Academic philosophy is now thoroughly controlled by the most evil and insane factions of the Left. It's good to know that real philosophy, and real political philosophy in particular, is still alive in the hearts and minds of some individual people, even though the philosophical institutions are dead or hopelessly corrupt. Thank you!
BV: You're very welcome. I am happy to have you as a reader and correspondent. While academic philosophy is not thoroughly controlled by the Left, not yet anyway, you are not far from the truth.
But I do have a quibble about your recent post on patriotism, where you write:
"… As Socrates explains in Plato's Crito, we are what we are because of the laws. Our country and its laws have overseen our nurturance, our education, and the forming of our characters. We owe a debt of gratitude to our country, its laws, those who have worked to maintain and defend it, and especially those who have died in its defense."
This argument (if it's valid) must have a suppressed premise. The premise must be something like the following: "It is good that we are what we are", or "Some of the features of our characters that are due to our country and its laws are features for which we should be grateful".
BV: Right, my argument is an enthymeme and those tacit assumptions are in play; without them the argument is invalid.
Of course, the inference would only be valid given some further assumptions, e.g., that our country and its laws have not also caused us to have other features that are so bad or regrettable that, all things considered, it would be reasonable to wish that our characters hadn't been shaped by our country and its laws in any way.
BV: I agree.
But in any case, I don't think that these suppressed premises are true. Not if they are meant to support the conclusion that, in general, patriotism is good–let alone that, in general, it is a virtue.
If my character was shaped by my experiences growing up in Maoist China, say, then it seems entirely possible that most or all of the features of myself that I came to have as a result of those experiences are bad. Or they might be features that just have no particular value or disvalue. At any rate there seems to be no reason to expect that, for any arbitrary person whose character was formed by any arbitrary country or legal system, the relevant features will be such that, on balance, this person ought to be grateful for whatever it was that caused him to have these features. To be sure, those who were lucky to have been formed within good countries or good legal institutions should probably be patriotic, for the kind of reason that Socrates gave; but this is not to say that patriotism in general is a duty or a virtue or even a good thing in any respect.
BV: Your critique up to this point is a good one and I accept it. I take you to be saying that I have not given a good argument for the thesis that in general patriotism is a good thing. For whether it is good or not will depend on the particular patria, the particular country, and its laws, institutions, and traditions. Presumably, citizens of North Korea, Cuba, Nazi Germany, and the USSR ought not be or ought not have been patriotic. But much depends on what the object of patriotism is. What exactly is that which one loves and is loyal to when one is patriotic? More on this below.
I would suggest that there is no basis for healthy patriotism beyond the fact that my country is MY country. The reason why I should have some loyalty to my country, or love for it, is just that it is mine. Not that, in being mine, it has shaped my character. Not that its laws are better than others, or that they encode certain 'propositions' which a rational being should believe, or anything like that. But if this is right, the proper object of healthy patriotism is not a country in the sense that you seem to have in mind, i.e., a government or set of political or legal arrangements or traditions. Because that kind of thing is not really mine, in any deep sense, and because that kind of thing is not something I can love or feel loyalty towards. So if this suggestion is right, the proper object is my 'country' in the sense of the concrete land and people, not the state or its laws. [emphasis added by BV.] (And this distinction seems especially important nowadays. You would not want to confuse the real America that Americans may properly love with the weird, sick, soft-totalitarian state that now occupies America.)
BV: You rightly appreciate that a proper discussion of this topic requires a careful specification of the object of patriotic love/loyalty. You say it is "the concrete land and people, not the state and its laws." Suppose I grant that for the nonce. Why should I love/be loyal to my country just because it is mine? That is not obvious, indeed it strikes me as false. I take you to be making two separate claims. The first is that one should display some patriotism toward one's country. This first claim is a presupposition of "The reason why I should have some loyalty to my country, or love for it, is just that it is mine." The second claim is that the only reason for so doing is that the country is one's own.
But do you really want to endorse the first claim? Even if country = "concrete land and people," there are possible and perhaps also actual countries such that you wouldn't want to endorse the first claim. As for the second, if you endorse it, will you also say that the only reason you should be loyal to your spouse, your parents, your siblings, your children, your friends, your clan, your neighborhood, your gang, and so on is because they are yours? Should you be true to your school only because it is the one you attend?
The above doesn't sound right. That a friend is my friend is not the only possible legitimate reason for my being loyal to him, assuming it is a legitimate reason at all. A second legitimate reason is that when I was in trouble he helped me. (And so on.) That my country (concrete land and people) is my country is not the only possible reason for my loving it and being loyal to it; other legitimate reasons are that the land is beautiful – "purple mountain majesties from sea to shining sea" — and that the people are self-reliant, hard-working, frugal, liberty-loving, etc., although how many of these people does one encounter theses days?
You write, "The reason why I should have some loyalty to my country, or love for it, is just that it is mine." Do you intend the 'just' to express a biconditional relation? Are you proposing
1. One should have some loyalty for one's country or love for it if and only if it is one's own country
or
2. If one should have some loyalty for one's own country or love for it, then it is one's own country?
Is my country's being mine a necessary and sufficient condition of my legitimate patriotism, or only a necessary condition thereof? On a charitable reading, you are affirming (2).
What is a Country?
If patriotism is love of and loyalty to one's country, then we need to know what a country is. First of all, a country will involve
a. A geographical area, a land mass, with more or less definite boundaries or borders.
But this is not sufficient since presumably a country without people is no country in the sense of 'country' relevant to a definition of 'patriotism.' A backpacker may love the unpopulated backcountry of a wilderness area but such love of a chunk of the earth and its flora and (non-human) fauna is not patriotic love. So we add
b. Having a (human) population.
Are (a) and (b) jointly sufficient? I don't think so. Suppose you have a land mass upon which are dumped all sorts of different people of different races and religions, speaking hundreds of different languages, with wildly different habits and values and mores. That would not be a country in a sense relevant to a definition of 'patriotism.' It seems we must add
c. Sharing a common culture which will involve such elements as a common language, religion, tradition, history, 'national narrative,' heritage, a basic common understanding of what is right and wrong, a codification of this basic common understanding in law, and what all else.
I should think that each of (a), (b), and (c) are necessary to have a country. 'Jacques' apparently disagrees. He seems to be saying above that (a) and (b) are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. I say they are individually necessary but not jointly sufficient. I say further that the three conditions just specified are not jointly sufficient either, or not obviously jointly sufficient. For if the basic common understanding of right and wrong naturally evolves toward a codification and detailed articulation in written laws, then we are well on the way to 'the political.'
And isn't it obvious, or at least plausible, that if a country cannot exist without geographical borders, that these borders cannot be merely geographical in nature, but must also be political as well?
Take the Rio Grande. It is obviously not a social construct. It is a natural feature of the earth. But the southern border of the USA, its border with Mexico, is a social or socio-political construct. It is 'conventional' not 'natural.' The southern border might not have been the Rio Grande. But as things are, a river serves as the southern border.
My point is that, while a border must be naturally or physically realized by a river, or a coastline, or the crest of a mountain range, or by a wall or a fence (an electronic 'fence' would do) or whatever, borders are also political entities. Thus the Rio Grande is both a natural feature of the earth but also a political entity. And so what I want to say is that nothing can count as a country in the sense of 'country' relevant to a definition of 'patriotism' if it is not a political entity. Two countries bordering on each other cannot border on each other unless both are political entities.
Can I argue this out rigorously? I don't know. Let me take a stab at it.
A country is a continuant: it remains numerically the same over the period of time, however short, during which it exists. And while a country can gain or lose territory without prejudice to its diachronic numerical identity, it will cease to exist if it loses all its territory, or lets itself be invaded by foreigners to such an extent that its characteristic culture is destroyed (see point (c) above). So a country must defend its border if it wishes to stay in existence. But for the USA to defend its southern border is not for it to defend a river. It is to prevent non-citizens from crossing illegally into a country of which they are not a citizen. Am I begging the question? Perhaps. I'll have to think about it some more.
In any case it seems intuitively obvious to me that we need
d. Under the jurisdiction of a government.
But it is important to distinguish between a government and a particular administration of a government such as the Reagan administration or the Obama administration (regime?). Consider the bumper sticker:
What does 'government' mean here? It means either the current administration or some administrations, but presumably not every administration. It cannot mean the institutional structure, with its enabling documents such as the Constitution, which structure outlasts particular administrations. That is shown by the American flag above. What does it signify? Not the Nixon admin or the Obama admin. It signifies the ideals and values of America and the people who uphold them. Which values? Liberty and justice are named in the Pledge of Allegiance. But not social justice, or material equality (equality of outcome or result).
The person who would display a bumper sticker like the above does not fear the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence or the institutional structure of the USA or the values and ideals it enshrines. Take a gander at this sticker:
Someone who displays this supports the U. S. Constitution and the Second Amendment thereto in particular. What he fears is not the U. S. government in its institutional structure; what he fears are gun-grabbing administrations. What he fears are lawless, hate-America, gun-grabbing, liberty-infringing, race-baiting leftists like Barack Obama and Eric Holder and Hillary Clinton.
In sum, I suggest that an adequate definition of 'country' must involve all of (a)-(d) supra. But this is a very difficult topic and I am no expert in political philosophy.
A meditation for Flag Day, 2021.
Substack latest.
Originally posted in April 2005 at my first blog, and then reposted in October 2009 on this site. Time for a repost! Pasta matters! All 'races' thereof: capellini, vermicelli, spaghetti, linguine, fettucine, bucatini, rigatoni, mostaccioli . . . .
……………………………
The following are the Seven Deadly Sins pertaining to the cooking and eating of pasta. Infractions may incur a visit from my New Jersey cousin Vinnie and his pals Smith and Wesson.
1. Using too small of a pot. A capacious pot is essential for the proper cooking of pasta. For most purposes I use an 8 quart pot. When I make my famous lasagne, however, out comes the monster 16 quart job.
2. Insufficient water. Be sure the pot is filled three-quarters full. With a big pot, there is little chance of a boil-over. But in case of the latter, a little olive oil added to the water will quell any uprising.
3. Adding the pasta before the water is boiling. Wifey once broke this rule. I instructed her to add the pasta when the water boiled. She claims she did, and that led to a discussion of the meaning of ‘boiling.’ I hereby lay it down that water is not boiling unless it is ROILING and JUMPING. To put it a bit more scientifically, pure water at sea-level is not boiling until it is at 212 degrees Fahrenheit. Since our tap water is pretty good, I use it, not wanting to burden my reverse osmosis purification system.
4. Breaking the pasta before putting it in the pot. This criminal act is particularly repellent to the true connoisseur, and a sure sign of a pasta greenhorn. It defeats the whole purpose of the eating of (long) pasta, a tactile experience that requires the twirling of the strands around the fork, and, therefore, unbroken strands. Deadly sin #4 usually follows upon sin # 1, as drinking upon gambling.
5. Overcooking the pasta. Pasta must never be overcooked. It is to be prepared al dente. That’s Italian for to the tooth, meaning that the pasta should put up a bit of resistance to the tooth that bites into it. It should be cooked just beyond crunchy. The pleasure of pasta consumption is largely tactile: the stuff by its lonesome does not have much taste.
6. Failing to properly drain the pasta before the addition of sauce. The result of this is a disgusting dilution of the sauce. Proper drainage requires the proper tool, the colander. Invest in a good one made of stainless steel. Plastic is for wimps. And if you try to drain pasta using the pot top, then you mark yourself as a bonehead of the first magnitude and may scald yourself in the process.
7. Chopping pasta on the plate. When I see people do this, I am tempted to make like al-Zarqawi and engage in an Islamo-fascist act. Let’s say you are eating capellini, ‘angel hair.’ (This is the quickest cooking of the long pastas.) There it is on the large white plate, richly sauced, anointed with a bit of extra virgin olive oil — why buy any other kind? — besprinkled with fresh hand-grated Pecorino Romano or Parmigiana Reggiano, (not something out of a cardboard cylinder), artistically set off with a small amount of finely chopped parsley, and awaiting your attention. It is a thing of beauty. So what does a bonehead do? He starts chopping it up.
Learn how to do it right. Take some strands in the fork tines, twirl, and you should end up with a ball of pasta at the end of your fork. Practice makes perfect. Now enjoy the tactile delight along with a glass of Dago red.
Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous, December 1990, p. 662:
. . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words, for every F(x) either F[x/i] or ~F[x/i] holds. The Tertium Non Datur is the hallmark of existence or reality. This is entirely in the Meinong-Twardowski tradition.
In other words, existence is complete determinateness or completeness: Necessarily, for any x, x exists if and only if x is complete, i.e., satisfies the property version of the Law of Excluded Middle (tertium non datur). Now I have long maintained that whatever exists is complete, but I have never been tempted by the thesis that whatever is complete exists. By my lights, there has to be more to existence than completeness. If I am right, existence cannot be reduced to, or identified with, completeness.
Reader Grigory Aleksin just now reports that the late Dale Jacquette to whom I pay tribute here has a similar view:
Definition of Existence:" For any object O, O exists, has being or is an entity, if and only if O has a maximally consistent property combination."Definition of a Maximally Consistent Property Combination:" A property combination PC for any logically possible object O is maximally consistent if and only if, for any logically possible extraontological property F, either F is in PC or non-F (the complement of F) is in PC, but not both"Thus he holds that:" A combinatorial ontology holds that existence is nothing more or [nor] less than completeness and consistency, or what is also called maximal consistency. The definition, properly understood and applied, provides a unified analysis of the concept of being for all entities, including existent objects, actual states of affairs and the actual world. ""An extraontological property, as the name implies, is a property that by itself does not entail anything about an object’s ontic status, and that is not instantiated unless the relevant property combination is maximally consistent. To maintain that existence does not characterize any object says, in short form, that the object’s property combination is maximally consistent with no predicational gaps only if, for any extraontological property or property complement, the combination includes either the extraontological property or its complement, but not both."