Not by my lights. But then I might be a dim bulb. 

For Alan Rhoda,

Presentism is the metaphysical thesis that whatever exists, exists now, in the present. The past is no more.  The future is not yet.  Either something exists now, or it does not exist, period. 

This is my understanding of presentism as well. Rhoda goes on to claim that presentism is "arguably the common sense position."  I beg to differ. 

It is certainly common sense that the past is no more and the future is not yet.  These are analytic truths understood by anyone who understands English.  They are beyond the reach of reasonable controversy, stating as they do that the past and the future are not present.  But presentism is a substantive metaphysical thesis well within the realm of reasonable controversy.  It is a platitude that what no longer exists does not now exist.  But there is nothing platitudinous about 'What no longer exists does not exist at all, or does not exist period, or does not exist simpliciter.'  That is a theoretical  claim of metaphysics about time and existence that is neither supported nor disqualified by common sense and the Moorean data comprising it.  The presentist is making a claim about the nature of the existence of that which exists.  He is claiming that the existence of what exists either is identical to, or necessarily equivalent to, temporal presentness.  Is it not just common sense that common sense takes no stand on any such high-flying metaphysical thesis?

In the four sentences that begin his article, Rhoda has two platitudes sandwiched between two metaphysical claims.  This gives the impression that the metaphysical claims are supported by the platitudes.  My point is that the platitudes, though consistent with the metaphysical theory, give it no aid and comfort.

Compare the problem of universals:  It is a Moorean fact that my coffee cup is blue and that I see the blueness at the cup.  But this datum neither supports nor disqualifies the metaphysical theory that blueness is a universal, nor does it either support or disqualify the competing metaphysical theory that the blueness is a particular, a trope.  Neither common sense, nor ordinary language analysis, nor phenomenology can resolve the dispute.  Dialectical considerations must be brought to bear. It is common sense that things have properties.  That they are, common sense is equipped to establish; what they are, however, common sense leaves wide open.

It is the same in the philosophy of time. Dialectical considerations must be brought to bear. JFK existed. It is true now that he existed. Indeed, it is true now that he actually existed.  If there are merely possible past individuals, JFK is not one of them: he is an actual past individual.  What's more, JFK really existed: he existed outside of people's minds.  He was never imaginary or purely fictional.  If you meditate carefully on these points you should be able to appreciate how dubious, if not preposterous, is the claim that only what exists now exists simpliciter.  The past is not nothing; the past was.

The case against presentism is strong.  In fact, I hold that presentism cannot be true. Must I then be an 'eternalist'?  Why? Both positions might be untenable. And this could be case even if they are logical contradictories.  We would then be up against an aporia in the strict sense. But I don't go that far now.

Consider the gladiatorial combats in Rome. They are a thing of the past.  That is a truism. They are no longer occurring. That too is a truism. But to say, with the presentist, that what no longer occurs is nothing at all, is not truistic but highly dubious if not preposterous.  Or will you tell me that the historians of ancient Rome have no subject matter?  On the other hand, the battles are not still going on, the besotted Romans drunk with blood lust are not still roaring, the gladiators are not still expiring in anguish.  So in what sense are the gladiators, their doings and sufferings actual?  How can anything wholly past be actual?  How can an event such as a beheading, whose mode of being is to occur, and thus elapse over time, occur tenselessly or timelessly?

This is but a sketch of the intricacies of the dialectic that envelops the presentist and the eternalist. The 'present' point is that common sense plays no role in deciding between them. In particular, and pace my friend Alan Rhoda, presentism cannot rightfully draw upon the support of common sense.