Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

  • Reader Asks: What Should I Read?

    Nathaniel T. writes,

    In the new year, I'm committing to some more regular reading habits. 
     
    What serious books would you recommend to someone outside academia who has about half an hour uninterrupted in the morning to read, three times a week? How about a list that would last that person a year? 
     
    Here are some additional parameters that might aid in your selection:
     
    I went to St. John's College in Annapolis, so I've read many of the "greats" in whole or in part, at least once. I have kept up some serious reading since my graduation in 2012, just irregularly. 
    I already pray and read the New Testament and spiritual reading daily. 
     
    Thanks for your insight and writing!
     
    The best advice I could give anyone  with your background who is committed to the life of the mind is to buy and study a copy of A. G. Sertillanges, O. P., The Intellectual Life: Its Spirit, Conditions, Methods. He explains how to proceed.  It is a classic. He draws upon Aquinas and upon Alphonse Gratry, of whom C. S. Peirce had a very high opinion. So I also recommend Gratry's Logic if you can find a copy. Reference here.
     
    I hesitate to offer a list of books on particular topics given the constraints on your time.  But here are a couple that are  short, very clear, and unusually thought-provoking: Athanasius of Alexandria, On the Incarnation (make sure to get the Sea Harp Press edition which contains an introduction by C. S. Lewis); Romano Guardini, Jesus Christus (anything by Guardini is worth reading).
     
    If perchance you are interested mystical theology, and have already read the great Spanish mystics, Juan de la Cruz and Teresa de Avila, and have the stamina for a long slog, then I recommend Augustin Poulain, The Graces of Interior Prayer: A Treatise on Mystical Theology. Reference and notes here.
     
    For more suggestions see my Bibliophilia category.
     
    Combox open if anyone has any recommendations.
     
    By the way, has St. John's College, Annapolis gone 'woke'?  
    Bill Vallicella

    5 responses to “Reader Asks: What Should I Read?”

  • Questions about Global Warming

    Crisis or hoax? How much of which? At the top of the Stack.

    ……………..

    Ed Buckner writes,

    I can help with your first three questions.

    1. Is global warming (GW) occurring?

    2. If yes to (1), is it naturally irreversible, or is it likely to reverse itself on its own? And if irreversible, how would you know that?

    3. If GW is occurring, and will not reverse itself on its own, to what extent is it anthropogenic, i.e., caused by human activity, and what are the human causes?

    To the first, undeniably yes. The science is that as the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has a physical effect that causes temperature to rise, all other things being equal. Note the rider: things are generally not equal, as there are other (well known) effects on climate. This also answers your third question. Yes, the warming caused by CO2 is man-made.

    BV: You did not answer my third question. I asked to what extent is GW man-made. A priori, from the armchair, we know that if there is GW — if the Earth's atmosphere, land masses and oceans are in the aggregate getting warmer and warmer over time –  then GW cannot be wholly anthropogenic and also that human activity cannot have zero effect on it.  The empirical question for the climatologists is: how much of the GW is due to human activity?  The answer to this question has serious repercussions for policy decisions.  I suspect, though I do not claim to know, that the percentage of GW due to human activity — carbon emissions and what all else — is not high enough to justify the draconian "Green New Deal " measures of the GW alarmists.  The onus probandi, I should think, is on them to prove otherwise.

    Is the science settled with respect to the empirical question I have posed? Has consensus been reached among competent climatologists?  That is not a rhetorical question. I would really like to know,

    You write, "Yes, the warming caused by CO2 is man-made."  I didn't ask that question. I didn't ask what causes the warming. I asked, given that GW is occurring, about the extent to which the causes — whatever they are — are man-made. Not that I deny that CO2 plays a role.  But as you know, CO2 is also produced naturally, and some of the warming produced by naturally occurrent CO2 is precisely not man-made.  

    So here is another empirical question: How much of the CO2 in the atmosphere originates naturally and how much from human activity? Has scientific consensus been reached on this question?

    However, there is other stuff you must know. First, the known physics does not explain the predicted rises in temperature. The predicted rises are based on speculation to do with water vapour ‘positive feedback’.

    Second, ‘global warming’ is ambiguous between cause and effect. We know a bit about the forcing, less about the water vapour possible cause. Regarding effect, we only have temperature measurement to go by, and the records are not long term enough. I have looked at Antarctic data and there is no evidence of any change, except at the limb of the Antarctic peninsula, which is coastal and affected by the sea. Also, the peninsula is some way from the Pole, and is naturally quite warm.

    BV: Very interesting. So you are saying that the water vapor caused by GW causes more GW?

    Third, and this addresses your question about reversibility: for every amount of CO2 in the atmosphere there corresponds an equilibrium temperature. Were all CO2 emission to halt, the atmosphere would take a while to establish that equilibrium, then remain there, so long as the CO2 concentration remained constant (which it won’t, as it will tend to fall).

    Fourth, and global warmists tend to avoid this fact like the plague, the rise in temperature is logarithmic to the CO2 concentration. If the concentration doubles, equilibrium temperature goes up x degrees. If it doubles again, another x degrees. And so on. So a lot of the scare stories show linear charts of concentration, not logarithmic, which is somewhat misleading.

    Fifth, and here I agree somewhat with the warmists, while the effect of warming can be continuous with no step changes, there is a well-known step change that occurs when ice melts. With an average of 1/10 degree below freezing point, the ice will not tend to melt. With the same amount above, it will eventually melt. So Antarctica would melt if its average temperature were a tiny amount above freezing point. But that won’t happen because Antarctica is huge and most of it close enough to the Pole that temperatures are way way below freezing.

    Hope that helps.

    BV: It does indeed, and thanks very much. The fourth and fifth points add to my understanding of the topic. The fifth is particularly interesting since it raises the logico-philosophical question of the metabasis eis allo genos, the shift into another genus, the somersault from a quantitative change into a qualitative one.

    By the way Ed, since you are an historian of logic, do you have a list of sources on the metabasis eis allo genos?  I first encountered a reference to it in Kierkegaard. Does Trendelenburg say anything about it? Must go back to Aristotle. Medievals had to have addressed it.

    One more question: if the issue is global warming, why the talk of climate change? That move involves an ascent from the species to the genus.  Obviously the global climate can change by getting hotter and by getting cooler.

    Can you answer me this one, Ed?  (Knowing me, you know that I suspect wokeassed chicanery at work.)

    COMBOX now open.

    Bill Vallicella

    10 responses to “Questions about Global Warming”

  • Latin or Anglo-Saxon?

    Well-written advice on writing well from Brand Blanshard.

    Bill Vallicella

  • ‘Spirituality’ and ‘Religion’

    What explains the bien-pensant substitution of the first word for the second? I give three reasons.

    Substack latest.

    Bill Vallicella

  • Detachment and Renunciation

    The Notebooks of Paul Brunton, Volume Two, The Quest, p. 130, #242:

    Detachment from the world is an absolute necessity for the man who seeks authentic inner peace, and not its imagined counterfeit. But renouncement of the world is not necessary to any except those who have an inborn natural vocation for the monkish life.

    It is not easy, but one can be in the world but not of the world. Paradoxically, however, the monastic life is an easier way to detachment. To live a life of monkish virtue in a monastery is relatively easy; to do so in the world, hard.  This is why monasteries were established in the first place.

    Bill Vallicella

  • Against Philosophical Dismissal

    To dismiss Hegel is as bad as to dismiss Donald Davidson. On second thought, it is far worse. For you cannot understand Marx without understanding Hegel, and you cannot understand the current culturally Marxist, 'woke' mess we are in without understanding Marx and his successors. Davidson & Co. can be safely ignored if it is the latter understanding you are after.

    Ideas, whether true or false, whether rationally defensible or indefensible, have social and cultural consequences. Short-sighted folk dismiss philosophy as so much hot air. But when the 'air' of such Luftmenschen as Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche drifts down from the ivory towers and the garrets and influences the climate on the ground, then things can get 'hot' in a different sense.

    Bill Vallicella

  • Four Ways to Vote

    1) There is voting proper, with a ballot at the polling place. It won't do much if any good except at the local level. And even there it won't do any good if proper procedures are not followed, something that cannot be taken for granted these days.

    2) There is 'voting with your feet.' Sick of crime in New York? Sick of the fools with power whose policies insure that there will be crime and ever more crime? Move to Florida.

    3) There is 'voting by social cancellation.' Have any of your friends 'gone woke'? Politely inform them that their willful self-enstupidation deprives them of the privilege of your friendship. Why should they get the benefit of interaction with someone sane, reasonable, mentally awake, and morally straight?

    4) There is 'voting with your wallet.' This alone is most effective and for reasons I needn't state. In second place comes (2), and in third (3). (1) comes in last.

    "The first shall be last and the last shall be first" to adapt a scriptural saying.

    Bill Vallicella

  • The Relative Unreality of Social Transactions

    An excerpt from  a journal entry dated 21 July 1985 followed by a comment.

    There is often little or no personal reality in human relationships. They are often nothing more than formulaic transactions. When I saw C.T.K. on Friday I told him, sincerely, that he looked good, healthy. He felt obliged to return the compliment — he couldn't just graciously accept it; he had to interpret it as the opening move in a social transaction.

    I would like to think that it is possible to instantiate social roles, playing them, as we must, but without being played by them, that is, without allowing oneself to succumb to the illusion of being identical to them.

    It may be that some people are social-transactional, and thus pure social surface all the way down. In such people there appears to be no person beneath the personae, nothing below the masks, poses, roles, no spiritual substance. Social interaction has lifted them above the merely animalic, and so they count as human in one sense, but they have never glimpsed the possibility of a further step from the merely social to the truly individual.

    The project of radical self-individuation is beyond their ken.  I had a colleague like that, a man stuck at the level of ego-games and oneupsmanship.  In a 'conversation' with him I never had the sense that any communication was taking place.  So it came as no surprise when, in one of our 'conversations,' he asserted that a person is just the sum-total of his social roles. Nor was it a surprise  when I learned that he was working toward a second Ph. D. in sociology!  

    Bill Vallicella

  • Simone Weil on False Gods

    Over at Substack. If you haven't made the acquaintance of Simone Weil, may I introduce you?

    Weil Simone

    Bill Vallicella

  • Creation out of Nothing or out of Mere Possibles?

    I wrote:

    On an Avicennian scheme, creation is actualization of the merely possible.  If so, God does not create ex nihilo, but ex possibilitate. He doesn't create out of nothing; he creates out of possibles. This does not comport well with divine sovereignty. If God is sovereign, he is sovereign over all orders, including the order of the merely possible.  On the Avicennian scheme God is constrained by the ontologically prior order of mere possibles. 

    I get this understanding of Avicenna from Gilson and Wilhelmsen. F. D. Wilhelmsen (1923-1996) must have been a successful teacher: he has a knack for witty and graphic comparisons.  To wit:

    Avicenna's God might be compared to the Queen of England, to a figurehead monarch.  No law in England has validity unless it bears the Queen's signature.  Until that moment the law is merely "possibly a law."  But Parliament writes the laws and the Queen signs them automatically.  Avicenna's order of pure essence is the Parliament of Being.  Avicenna's God gives the royal signature of existence; but this God, like England's majesty, is stripped of all real power and liberty of action.  (The Paradoxical Structure of Existence, Preserving Christian Publications, 1995, p. 43.  First published in 1970 by U. of Dallas Press.)

    The Gilsonian-Wilhelmsenian line is that God's role in creation is merely to give existence to pure essences which, in themselves, do not exist, either in things or in minds, and which are 'already there' and 'waiting' for actualization

     Khalil Andani, Islamic Neoplatonist, responds: 

    You said God for Ibn Sina does not create ex nihilo but creates from preexisting possibilities. I do not think this is truly the case. Possibilia as distinct essences do not pre-exist in God's Essence. Rather, in the very act of creation, God conceives the possibles as the effect of His Essence and they manifest as ideas or natural universals in the First Intellect. Yes, Ibn Sina sees creation as eternal and necessary – all of the Islamic Neoplatonists do – but we still see it as creation ex-nihilo because there is no uncreated form or matter within God that God merely manipulates or transforms. We still characterise God's eternal origination of the First Intellect as a creation ex-nihilo because the Intellect depends upon God for its existence even though it is eternal and timeless.

    The idea, I take it, is that God's creating of the material world in in fact ex nihilo inasmuch as God creates ex nihilo the First Intellect which is the repository of the pure possibles. So, pace Gilson and Wilhelmsen, God is sovereign over both orders, the order of existing essences and that of pure essences. The rub, of course, is that on this Neoplatonic emanationist scheme, God creates ex nihilo by the necessity of his nature, and so it is at least arguable that God, though not constrained by pure essences, is constrained by his nature, a nature which entails the impossibility of his not creating.

    I suppose the response to this would be to say that, since God is not required to create by anything external to him, what I called a constraint is not really a constraint.  

    Bill Vallicella

    5 responses to “Creation out of Nothing or out of Mere Possibles?”

  • One Man’s Pedantry . . .

    . . . is another man's precision.

    Bill Vallicella

  • Of ‘Blind Review’ and Pandora’s Box

    Tony Flood sent me here for the latest outrage at Stanford.

    But this crapola is old hat. On April Fool's Day, 2014, I worked myself into a fine lather over it. The latter manifested itself as a rant that is now available for your delectation at the top of my (Sub)stack. You will enjoy it.

    As I wrote to Tony this morning after receiving his message:

    Synchronicity City!

    I was just reviewing an old post of mine on this very topic!  This is nothing new, Tony. I shall upload my old rant to Substack.

    The deeper I meditate, the more synchronicity. Post hoc ergo propter hoc? I am of course properly skeptical of Jung and his ideas.  Doubt is the engine of inquiry as I have said too many times.
     
    Will respond to your other points and queries later.
    Bill Vallicella

  • A Sketch of Armstrong’s Naturalism

    And some reasons to question it. 

    Top of the (Sub)stack.

    ………………………

    Expositing Armstrong, I wrote
     
    The exclusion of so-called abstract entities or abstract objects such as mathematical sets, unexemplified universals, and numbers from the roster of the real is because of their lack  of causal power.  What causal role could they play? 
     
    And then I quoted Armstrong:  "And if they play no causal role it is hard to see how we can have good reasons for thinking that they exist." (2)

    Woland's Cat objects:

    This reasoning is missing a step, I think. Abstract entities do exist when they are contemplated by a mind: assuming minds are 'real' (i.e. part of organisms, which are part of the space-time continuum of reality), then mathematical sets etc. become real when represented in the mind. 

    How would Armstrong reply?  As follows. To exist is to exist extra-mentally. That is the only way anything can exist. If so, there cannot be two or more ways or modes of existing.   He here follows, as other Australian philosophers do, his and their teacher John Anderson. Hence there is no such way of existing as existing intra-mentally, in the mind. Whatever I do when I think about something, I do not, in thinking about it, or contemplating it, confer upon it existence-in-the mind.  

    The following are candidate abstract entities: the number 7, the set {7}, the proposition expressed by '7 is prime,' the property of being prime.  To say that they are abstract is to say that they are not in space or in time, and that they are 'causally inert,' which is to say that they do not enter into causal relations with anything: they neither cause nor are caused.  Armstrong rejects the whole lot of them.  Their existence is ruled out by his metaphysical naturalism according to which reality is exhausted by the space-time system and its contents.  They don't exist outside the mind and, since that is the only way anything can exist, they don't exist inside the mind either.

    So what am I thinking about then I think of {Max the cat, Manny the cat}?  Sets or "classes supervene on their members — that is to say, once you are given the members, their class adds nothing ontologically, is no addition of being." (Sketch, 8)  But then what am I thinking about when I think about the intersection of two disjoint sets? A set theorist will say: the null set, { }!  You will also recall that in set theory, the null set is a subset of every set, and a member of every power set.   Don't confuse subset and member as Armstrong does on p. 8, n. 1.

    This presents a bit of a problem for Armstrong. He cannot say that the null set  supervenes on its members since it doesn't have any.  So of course he bites the bullet: he rejects the existence of the null set. "It would be a strange addition to space-time!" (p. 8., n. 1)  The more I think about this, the more problematic it seems. If there is no null set, then there are no power sets.  And if there is no null set, why should we think that there are unit sets or singletons such as {Quine} or {Max}? What is the difference between Max and the set whose sole member is him?  If Max's singleton supervenes on him, then there is no singleton!  If there are no singletons, then there is no intersection of {Max, Manny} and {Max, Maya}!

    What would Woland's Cat say about that?

    Memo to self: Re-read  the section "Mysterious Singletons" in David Lewis, Parts of Classes. And blog it! You are not spreading yourself thin enough!

    Bill Vallicella

  • Notes on Avicenna: Essence, Existence, and Creation

    Avicenna-3112421686Time was when the Islamic world could boast world-class philosophers. The Persian Ibn Sina (980-1037 anno domini) was one of them. He is known in the West as Avicenna.  Translated into Latin, his works had a major influence on the philosophy of the 12th and 13th centuries and beyond. De Ente et Essentia of Thomas Aquinas is a well-known text that shows the Persian's influence.  In this entry I will discuss some of Avicenna's  positions in metaphysics as I understand them. My understanding is based on close study of Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, and Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical Structure of Existence. Comments and corrections solicited. That Avicenna anticipates Alexius von Meinong is an idea I arrived at independently. (The exposition of this anticipation belongs in a separate post.)

    1) Wilhelmsen credits Avicenna with raising a new question in philosophy: "How is existence related to the order of nature or essence?" (PSE, 40; cf. BSP, 40 ff.) What motivates the new question is the conviction that the world of beings is a world of creatures that owe their existence to a creator. If the Being or existence (esse) of a being (ens) is its being-created-and-sustained-by-God, then there must be a real distinction (distinctio realis) between existence and essence in the creature.  To exist is then not to be the same (Plato) or to be a substance (Aristotle). An existing thing is thus in some way 'composed' of essence and existence. Avicenna thus upholds a real distinction between essence and existence. (Is he the first to do so in the history of philosophy? I'm really asking!)  I myself understand the distinctio realis along the following lines. (Someone who knows Avicenna's texts can comment on how closely my understanding, which is fairly close to that of Aquinas, matches Avicenna's.) 

    About anything whatsoever, including God,  we can ask two different questions: What is it? (Quid sit?) and Is it? (An sit?)  In a contingent being (ens), the distinction between what the thing is (wide essence, quiddity) and its existence (esse) is real, meaning that the distinction pertains to the thing (res) itself apart from our modes of considering it. 'Real' in this context does NOT mean that in a contingent existent such as my cat Max Black there are two things, one res being the essence, the other res being the existence. That is supposedly what Giles of Rome held, not what Aquinas or I hold. I am going to assume that Avicenna did not anticipate Giles of Rome.

    Analogy: my head and my eyeglasses are really distinct in the Giles-of-Rome way: head and glasses can each exist on its own apart from the other. But the convexity and concavity of a particular lens cannot exist on their own apart from each other. And yet the convexity-concavity distinction is real, not projected by us.  The real distinction that I espouse is like the distinction between the particular convexity and the particular concavity in a particular lens. 'Like,' not 'the same as.' The real distinction between essence and existence in a contingent being such as an optical lens is sui generis: there is no adequate model for it. We acquire some understanding of the sui generis distinction only by analogy from mundane examples. 

    2) A second Avicennian innovation is a distinction between modes of Being (esse) or modes of existence, different ways for an item to be or exist.   (That there are different ways of existing or different modes of Being  is a notion fiercely resisted by most contemporary analytic philosophers, but I am of the opinion that the MOB doctrine — to give it a cute name — can be plausibly defended quite apart from Avicenna's particular views. See Holes and Their Mode of Being and the entries in my modes of being category. See also "Existence: Two Dogmas of Analysis" in Novotny and Novak, eds., in Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics, Routledge 2014, pp. 45-75. One of the dogmas of analysis is that there are no modes of being.) The second innovation presupposes the first, the real distinction. The latter allows us to focus on the existence of the thing without conflating it with its essence or quiddity. We find this conflation in Aristotle for whom there is no difference between an F and an existing F, a man and an existing man, say. For Aristotle, then, there is no difference between Milo and existing Milo. Once one grasps the difference between the existence/existing of Milo and Milo, one can go on to ask how something like Milo exists, in what specific way he exists.  In the case of God and Socrates we surely want to say that God exists necessarily whereas Socrates exists contingently. Now it is not obvious, but it can be plausibly argued that this modal-logical  difference — typically spelled out nowadays in analytic precincts by saying that God exists in all possible worlds whereas Socrates exists in some but not all possible worlds — is rooted in an ontological difference between two ways (modes) of existing.  If that is right, then it is not the case that God and Socrates exist in the same way, pace such luminaries as Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen and their numerous acolytes. (See my A Paradigm Theory of Existence, Kluwer Philosophical Studies Series #89, 2002, Chapter One, Section 4, "Contingency and Necessity as Modes of Existence," p. 22 f.) Back to the Persian.

    3) For Avicenna, there are two modes of existence; there are two ways for one and the same essence/nature to exist/be. The one way is universally in mente; the other is singularly in re. Thus one and the same essence (humanity) exists singularly in the man, Milo, and in the man Socrates, and so on, and universally in the mind of anyone who knows Milo or Socrates or any man to be a man. The first mode could be called esse reale, the second esse intentionale. So if essence is really distinct from existence, then essence is really distinct both from intramental (esse intentionale) existence and extramental existence (esse reale).

    4) Given (3), it follows that an essence in  itself is neither mental nor extramental, neither universal (repeatable) nor singular (unrepeatable), neither one nor many, neither abstract nor concrete, neither predicable nor impredicable, and — mirabile dictu — neither existent nor nonexistent. The essence in itself is thus a third item, a tertium quid. (It looks very much like a Meinongian Sosein jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein! But Meinong goes on the 'back burner' for now.)  

    In sum, there are two ways for an Avicennian essence or nature to exist: either in things outside the mind, or else in the mind, and one way for an essence to be (not exist), and that is to be absolutely or indifferently, or if you prefer, amphibiously (either on the dry land of the real, or in the water of mind).  It is here that the dialectic becomes tricky and 'aporetic.' For what I take Avicenna to be saying is that the essence or nature absolutely considered, i.e., considered in its neutrality or indifference to both intramental and extramental existence,  is in itself a non-existing mind-independent item.  That is to say: the essence an sich, the essence as a modally indifferent tertium quid, is not an artifact or product of our considering.  Its absoluteness and indifference does not derive from our absolute considering;  our considering is an absolute considering because that which is being considered IS (not exists) absolutely. Get it? 

    Now to exist is to be actual, whether in minds or in things. So the essence or nature in itself which exists neither in minds nor in things, is metaphysically prior to actuality and is therefore a pure possibility. "It follows that pure nature is pure possibility for being in some order. Therefore the possible is prior to the actual in an absolute sense." (Wilhelmsen, 41) Gilson puts it like this: in Avicenna's world, "essences always remain, in themselves, pure possibles, and no wonder, since the very essence of essence is possibility." (BSP, 82)

    5) It follows from (4) that essentia as pure possibility is no longer internally tied to esse as etymology would suggest inasmuch as essences in themselves are what they are whether or not they exist in either of the two modes in which they exist. Avicenna thus drives a wedge between essence and existence in such a way that existence can only accede to essences and is insofar forth only accidental to them. Existence 'happens' to them while they on their part remain indifferent to existence.  

    6) You will recall that for Aristotle, accidents receive their being from (primary) substances (prote ousiai) and are nothing without them.  Thus if A is an Aristotelian accident, then A cannot exist apart from some substance or other, and indeed cannot exist apart from the very substance S of which it happens to be the accident. The Islamic thinker takes the Greek's substance-accident distinction and puts it to use in a highly creative way. Whereas accidents for Aristotle derive their being from the substances of which they are the accidents, the Being (esse) of creatures is reduced by Avicenna to an accident of essences which, in themselves, as pure possibles, are beyond existence and nonexistence.

    7) (6) entails interesting consequences for the notion of divine creation.  On an Avicennian scheme, creation is actualization of the merely possible.  If so, God does not create ex nihilo, but ex possibilitate. He doesn't create out of nothing; he creates out of possibles. This does not comport well with divine sovereignty. If God is sovereign, he is sovereign over all orders, including the order of the merely possible.  On the Avicennian scheme God is constrained by the ontologically prior order of mere possibles. He is therefore not free. Or at least he is no free in the libertarian sense of 'free.'

    8) We have landed in a curious dialectical predicament.  On the one hand, we need the real distinction to make sense of divine creation ex nihilo.   The pagan philosophers didn't have it or need it, because their systems were not informed by divine revelation.  Aristotle's God is not a creator but merely a prime mover. His primary substances exist just in virtue of being the substances they are. For Aristotle, for a primary substance S of kind K to exist is just for S to be a member of K.  For Socrates to exist is just for Socrates to be a man. Hence there is no need for a real distinction between Socrates and his existence.  On the other hand, the Avicennian scheme, which needs the real distinction, fails to safeguard the absolute sovereignty and freedom of God and fails to capture the radicality of creatio ex nihilo. The reason, again, is that Avicenna's God creates, not out of nothing, but out of possibilities.  He is thus not a creator in the strict sense, but a mere actualizer of mere possibles that ARE independently of his will. (Cf. BSP, 83)

    Bill Vallicella

    4 responses to “Notes on Avicenna: Essence, Existence, and Creation”

  • Death as a Boon to the Spiritual

    I read the Sufi mystic Rūmī  (1207-1273) when I lived in Turkey, 1995-1996. Here is an entry from my Turkish journal written on Christmas Eve morning, 1995. The following quotation is from The Masnavi.

    Death is in reality a boon to the spiritual, and it is only fools who cry, "Would that this world might endure forever, and that there were no such thing as death."

    Sufism is the mystical branch of Islam. Our Sufi is making two claims. One is that death is the door to eternal life. The other is that only the fool fails to perceive the profoundly unsatisfactory character of this life. You are not a fool if you deny the first, though you may be wrong; you are a fool if you deny the second. To want to live on indefinitely in this world as it is is a clear indicator of spiritual blindness.

    So I say, "Up or out!" What do I mean?

    Academic tenure is sometimes described as 'up or out.' You either gain tenure, within a limited probationary period, or you must leave. I tend to think of life like that: either up or out, either promotion to a Higher Life or annihilation. I wouldn't want an indefinitely prolonged stay in this vale of probation.

    In plain English: I wouldn't want to live forever in this world. Thus for metaphysical reasons alone I have no interest in cryogenic or cryonic life extension. Up or out!

    It would be interesting to delve into some of the issues surrounding cryonics and the trans-humanist fantasies that subserve this hare-brained scheme. The possibilities of fraud and foul play seem endless.  Some controversies reported here.   But for now I will merely note that Alcor is located in Scottsdale, Arizona. The infernal Valle del Sol would not be my first choice for such an operation. One hopes that they have good backup in case of a power outage.

    Bill Vallicella

Latest Comments

  1. https://www.thefp.com/p/charles-fain-lehman-dont-tolerate-disorder-charlie-kirk-iryna-zarutska?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

  3. Hey Bill, Got it now, thanks for clarifying. I hope you have a nice Sunday. May God bless you!

  4. Vini, Good comments. Your command of the English language is impressive. In my penultimate paragraph I wrote, “Hence their hatred…

  5. Just a little correction, since I wrote somewhat hastily. I meant to say enemies of the truth (not from the…

  6. You touched on very, very important points, Bill. First, I agree that people nowadays simply want to believe whatever the…

  8. https://barsoom.substack.com/p/peace-has-been-murdered-and-dialogue?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=841240&post_id=173321322&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1dw7zg&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

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