Here (under 5 minutes).
'Coded' as used by Dr. Long in this video clip is medical jargon. For a patient to 'code' is for the patient to suffer cardiac arrest.
It is a mistake to think that if an episode of experiencing is real, then the intentional object of that episode of experiencing is also real. The question I want to pose is whether Dr. Long is making that mistake. But first I must explain the mistake and why it really is a mistake.
Consider a perceptual illusion. I am returning from a long hike at twilight. I am tired and the light is bad. Suddenly I 'see' a rattlesnake. I shout out to my partner and I stop marching forward. But it turns out that what I saw was a twisted tree root. This is a typical case of a visual perceptual illusion. (There are also auditory, olfactory, tactile, and gustatory illusions.)
What I initially 'saw' is what I am calling the intentional object. The intentional object, the object intended, is distinct from the act (occurrent episode) of consciousness directed upon the intentional object. Act and intentional object are obviously distinct; but that is not to say that the one can exist without the other: they are, necessarily, correlates of one another. No act without an intentional object, no intentional object without an act.
Now not all episodes of consciousness are object-directed, or consciousnesses of something (the 'of' to be read as an objective genitive). But some conscious states of a person are object-directed. These mental states exhibit what philosophers call 'intentionality.' (Bear in mind that 'intentionality' as here used is a term of art, a terminus technicus, not to be confused with more specific ordinary-language uses of 'intend' and 'intentionality.') Intentionality, then, is object-directedness. One must not assume, however, that every object of an intentional mental state exists. Some intentional objects exist and some do not.
Philosophers before and after Franz Brentano have repeatedly pointed out that the intentional object of (subjective genitive) an object-directed state of consciousness may or may not exist. Intentionality, we may say, has the 'non-inference property.' From 'S is conscious of an F,' one cannot validly infer, 'there exists an x such that x is an F.' For example, if I am imagining, or hallucinating, or dreaming, or simply thinking about a centaur, it does not follow that there exists a centaur that I am imagining, or hallucinating, or dreaming, or simply thinking about.
In my hiking example, the snake I 'saw' did not exist. But there is no denying that (i) something appeared to me, something that caused me to shout out and stop hiking, and that (ii) what appeared to me did not have the properties of a tree root — else I would not have shouted out and stopped moving. I have no fear of tree roots. The intentional object had, or rather appeared to have, the properties of a rattlesnake. So in this case, the correlate of the act, the intentional object, did not exist. And this without prejudice to the reality of the act.
If we agree that to be real = to exist extra-mentally ('outside' the mind), then in my example, the visual experience was real but its intentional object was not.
Suppose now that a person 'codes.' He suffers cardiac arrest. Oxygenated blood does not reach his brain, and in consequence his EEG flatlines, which indicates that brain activity has ceased and that the patient is 'brain dead.' Suppose that at that very moment he has an NDE. An NDE is an occurrent episode of experiencing which is, moreover, intentional or object-directed. The typical intentional object or objects of NDEs include such items as a tunnel, lights, angels, dead ancestors, and the the heavenly realm as described in Long's video, and as described in innumerable similar accounts of NDEs. But from the occurrence and thus the reality of the near-death experiencing it does not follow that the heavenly realm and its contents are also real. Their status might be merely intentional, and thus not real, and this despite their being extremely vivid.
Yes or no? This is the question I am raising.
Is it logically consistent with the patient's having of that near-death experience that he not survive his bodily death as an individual person who 'goes to heaven'? Yes it is. That he had a real experience is not in question. The patient was near death, but he was alive when he had the experience. He is here to answer our questions. The patient is honest, and if anyone knows whether he had an NDE, he does. He is the authority; he enjoys 'privileged access' to his mental states.
But unless one confuses intentio and intentum, act and object, experiencing and the experienced-qua-experienced, one has to admit that the reality of the experiencing does not guarantee the reality of heaven or of angels or of dead/disembodied souls or one's survival of one's bodily death.
For it could be — it is epistemically possible that — it is like this. When a patient's EEG flatlines, and he does not recover, but actually dies, then his NDE, if he had one, is his last experience, even if it turns out to be an experience as of heaven. Perhaps at the moment of dying, but while still alive, he 'sees' his beloved dead wife approach him, and he 'sees' her reach out to him, and he 'sees' himself reach out to her, but he does not see her or himself, where 'see' is being used as a 'verb of success.' ('See' is being used as a verb of success if and only if 'S sees x' is so used as to entail 'X exists.' When 'S sees x' is used without this entailment, what we have is a phenomenological use of 'see.' Note that both uses are literal. The phenomenological use is not figurative. Admittedly, the point being made in this parenthesis needs defense in a separate post.)
If this epistemic possibility cannot be ruled out, then there is no proof of an afterlife from NDEs. In that case we cannot be objectively certain that our man 'went to heaven'; we must countenance the possibility that he simply ceased to exist as an individual person.
Finally, can Dr. Long be taxed with having committed the mistake of confusing the reality of the experiencing with the reality of the experienced-qua-experienced? I think he can. The video shows that he is certain that there is a heaven to which we go after death, and that the existence of this heaven is proven by the very large number of NDEs that have been reported by honest people. But he is not entitled to this certainty, and he hasn't proven anything.
Am I denying that we survive our bodily deaths as individual persons? No! My point is merely that we cannot prove that we do on the basis of NDEs. There is no rationally coercive argument from the reality of NDEs to the reality of an afterlife in which we continue to exist as individual persons.
