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We have seen that and how Lowe reduces property change to existential change. The latter is the change that occurs when something comes into existence and passes out of existence.  What of the reverse reduction, the reduction of existential change to property change?  What are its prospects?   Could we say that when an individual substance (an individual, for short) comes to exist it does so by acquiring the property of existence, and that when it passes out of existence it loses this property? This notion is fraught with difficulties which I will not rehearse. Lowe, like many philosophers, rejects the idea that existence is a first-level property, a property of individuals.

So what then is it for an object to exist, if not to possess the property of existing? Some philosophers would answer: It is for it to be the case that something is (identical with) that object. The contention, in other words, is that . . . 'E!a' ('a exists') is equivalent in meaning to '∃x(x = a).' ("How Real is Substantial Change," The Monist, vol. 89, no. 3 (2006), pp. 275-293, 277)

I deny that the expressions have the same meaning, but I cheerfully accept their logical equivalence. (Logical equivalence is equivalence across all broadly logically possible worlds. It is the necessitation of material equivalence.) I concede that, for example,

1) Necessarily, Max exists iff Max is identical to something.

'Something' here is elliptical for 'something or other.'  The idea is not that each thing that exists exists iff it is identical to some one thing; that would lead straightaway to an intolerable monism. The idea is that each thing exists iff it is self-identical.  Unless one is a Meinongian, one will accept as true all biconditionals of the form of (1).   Lowe continues:

One way to express this idea is to say that the predicate 'exists' in fact expresses or denotes a second-level property, that is, a property of first-level properties: to wit, the property of having at least one instance. Thus, it may be said, 'a exists' expresses the thought that the property of being identical with a has at least one instance . . . . (277)

There are at least two problems with this view that Lowe sees and that I have mentioned many times before. First, there are no haecceity properties.  For example, there is no such property as Socrateity, the property of being identical with Socrates.  Second, even if there is the property, identity-with-a, a's existence cannot be explained by saying that the haecceity property has an instance. This is because identity-with-a, or a-ness, cannot have an instance unless the instance exists.  One moves in an explanatory circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one maintains that for a to exist is for a-ness to be instantiated when a-ness cannot be instantiated unless a exists. I therefore agree with Lowe:

. . . the notion of an object's existing seems to be more basic than that of a (first-level) property's having an instance, whence the former notion cannot really be explained in terms of the latter. (277)

Seems? Nay, 'tis! The upshot for Lowe and me is that existence can be neither a first-level nor a second-level property.  Lowe concludes that existence is not a property at all. A property, whether it is a universal or a trope (mode), is an entity within the totality of entities. But neither existence nor identity "figure in an ontological inventory of the entities that reality as a whole comprehends." (278)  So existence is not one of the things that exists. Existence does not exist, as it would if it were a property. Existence is not a property, but a concept, a "formal ontological concept." Such concepts do not "pick out beings or entities of any sort." (278)  What's more, existence is a "primitive" and "indefinable" concept.  It cannot be analyzed in terms of more basic concepts.

But now trouble looms.  I quoted Lowe above: "what then is it for an object to exist?" An excellent question! He rightly rejects two answers. The first is that an object exists in virtue of possessing the first-level property of existence. The second is that an object exists in virtue of the instantiation of its haecceity property. Lowe concludes that existence is not something that exists in reality, an item that would have to be listed in an adequate ontological inventory.  Objects exist, but existence does not exist. So he says that existence is a concept, and indeed a "primitive" and "indefinable" one.

But if existence is indefinable, then it cannot be explicated in terms of temporal presentness, which is plainly what Lowe is attempting to do.  Every presentism maintains, at least with respect to items in time, that only temporally present items exist simpliciter.  For Lowe, the items include objects and their tropes, but not times and events.  But no matter: he answers his own question by maintaining that for an object to exist is for an object to be temporally present.

But if existence is not a property, then neither is temporal presentness.  Temporal presentness is time itself. For what is past is nothing, having been annihilated, and what is future is also nothing, not having been created. Time, in turn, is temporal passage. Temporal passage is real, objective, mind-independent. Temporal passage "consists in the continual coming into and going out of existence of entities . . . ." ("Presentism and Relativity," 137)  Lowe insists more than once that the italicized phrases be taken seriously and literally: what passes out of existence is absolutely annihilated.  The wholly past is nothing.

Well, what is this existence into which things come and out of which they go? It cannot be a concept. It cannot be subjective. It is not something we add to the world; it is the world itself in its temporal reality. Existence, existing, is some sort of metaphysical process, an ongoing upsurge of the Now and of Being, a continual Presencing that combines the temporal sense of 'presence' with the existential sense.   This seems to be the root metaphor that underlies Lowe's presentist vision of time and existence: a continual upsurge of presencing.  Of course, sober analyst that he is, Lowe would not use such romantic language as I am now using, language reminscent of a Continental philosopher like Sartre.

So, while existence is not an existent among existents, existence in the end does exist as this primal Presencing.  There is a structural similarity with the view I arrived at in my A Paradigm Theory of Existence (Kluwer, 2002): both Lowe and I think of existence in its difference from existence as a paradigm Existent. In the end, existence exists for both of us, but not as a property or any existent among existents. It is logically and ontologically prior to the Quinian inventory.

In general, no. For you may be foolish or ignorant or otherwise incompetent with respect to the subject matter under discussion. Or you may be morally defective: a bully, a blowhard, a bullshitter, a quibbler, a sophist. But suppose none of these predicates attach to you.  Suppose you are my moral and intellectual peer, and what's more, a competent practitioner in the discipline or sub-discipline which is home to the thesis we are disputing. Thus we are both competent, and we are equally competent. And suppose I believe you to be as intellectually honest and as competent as I am.

Suppose further that I have given careful thought to my thesis and have advanced it in respectable, peer-reviewed journals.

If you disagree with me, does this fact supply a good reason for me to question my thesis?  Ought I question it? Or would I be justified in ignoring your disagreement?

We note that this is a meta-question that sires a meta-disagreement.  This meta-disagreement is between the Conciliationist and the Steadfaster.

I am a Conciliationist. Or at least that is my natural tendency.  Thus I tend to think that your disagreement with me (given the stipulations above) ought to give me pause. It ought to cause me to re-examine my view and be open to the possibility of either rejecting it or withholding assent from it.  It ought to undermine my epistemic self-confidence. I tend to think that I would be intellectually amiss, and less than intellectually honest, were I simply to dismiss your disagreement. I tend to think that I would be unjustifiably privileging my own point of view, preferring it to yours simply because is is mine. This seems wrong to me given that we are trying to arrive at the objective and impersonal truth.  Truth cannot be mine or yours.

The Steadfaster, however, stands fast in the face of disagreement. Whereas the Conciliationist allows the fact of disagreement to undermine his epistemic self-confidence, the Steadfaster takes the fact of disagreement to undermine his prior conviction that his interlocutor is as morally and intellectually capable as he initially thought he was. So when you disagree with me, I question whether I am right. But if  you are a Steadfaster, then, when I disagree with you, you question my competence, rationality, probity, etc.

But now a puzzle arises. If I am a Conciliationist, then my position would seem to require that I question my Conciliationism due to the fact that the Steadfaster disagrees with me on the meta-issue.   (Assume that the Steadfaster is as morally and intellectually well-endowed as I am and that I believe him to be such.)

It seems that the consistent Conciliationist cannot be steadfast in his Conciliationism given that there are Steadfasters out there who are, and whom he believes to be, his moral and intellectual equals.  So what should our Conciliationist do? Should he:

• Suspend judgment and neither affirm nor deny Conciliationism?
• Make an exception for the Conciliationist thesis itself by steadfastly adhering to it at the meta-level while remaining otherwise a Conciliationist?
• Reject Conciliationism and become a Steadfaster?
• Do something else?

1) Divide all entities into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes, the temporal and the atemporal. Temporal entities are 'in time,' while atemporal entities are not 'in time.' Caesar's crossing the Rubicon is in time; 7's being prime is not in time. 

2) Here are some temporal words: past, present, future, before, after, later, earlier, simultaneous.  We can define 'in time' as follows.  An item is in time iff a temporal word can be meaningfully predicated of it. Otherwise it is not in time. My definition is circular, but innocuously so. It is like the following which is also circular: X is possible =df X exists in at least one possible world.

"But doesn't 6 come after 5?" Yes in the normal order of counting. Counting, however, is a temporal process. The numbers themselves are not in time. 

"If a thing changes, then it is in time. The number 9 changed from being Tom's favorite number to being Tom's second favorite number. So numbers are in time."  But that's a mere Cambridge change; it doesn't count. 

3) Atemporal entities tenselessly exist and tenselessly have properties.  Everything timeless is tenseless. 

4) But can a temporal item tenselessly exist? This is the question we need to discuss. Mr Brightly in an earlier thread says No. Caesar is a wholly past individual, and obviously to be classified as temporal rather an atemporal. On Brightly's presentism, JC existed, but is now nothing. We of course agree that JC is no longer temporally present. He is a wholly past individual.  But I maintain that there is a sense in which he exists nonetheless.  I gave an argument earlier in response to Brightly.  Here is a new one.

ARGUMENT FROM THE UNIVOCITY OF 'EXIST(S)'

a) Both temporal and atemporal items exist.

b) Whatever exists exists in the same sense and in the same way: there are no different modes of existence such that timeless items exist in one way and time-bound items in another. 'Exist(s)' is univocal across all applications.

c) Atemporal items exist tenselessly.  Therefore:

d) Temporal items exist tenselessly. Therefore:

e) Julius Caesar and all wholly past items exist tenselessly despite being wholly past.

COMMENT

The main idea is that existence, by its very nature, is tenseless.  To exist is to exist tenselessly.  If so, then pastness, presentness, and futurity are purely temporal properties which, by themselves, imply nothing about existence. It follows that existence cannot be identified with temporal presentness.  Accordingly:

Dinosaurs existed but do not still exist just in case dinosaurs exist (tenselessly) AND they are wholly past.

Horses exist (present-tense) just in case horses exist (tenselessly) AND some of them are present.

Martian colonies will exist just in case Martian colonies exist (tenselessly) AND they are wholly future.

The idea is that existence is time-independent. When a thing exists has no bearing on whether it exists. 

Think of a spotlight that successively illuminates events in McTaggart's B-series (events ordered by the B-relations, i.e., earlier than, later than, simultaneous with.)  The events and the times at which they occur are all equally real, equally existent, and their existence is tenseless.  An illuminated event is a temporally present event.  So the spotlight once shone on the event of my birth rendering it present. But the spotlight moved on such that my birth became wholly past, but not nonexistent.

UPSHOT

I am not endorsing the above argument, nor am I endorsing the Spotlight Theory of Time.  My point against Brightly is that there is no contradiction in thinking of a temporal item as tenselessly existing.  The trick is to realize that existence needn't be thought of as time-dependent — even in the case of items in time.

Here

Would that I could avoid this political stuff.  But I cannot in good conscience retreat into my inner citadel and let my country be destroyed — the country that makes it possible for me to cultivate the garden of solitude, retreat into my inner citadel, and pursue pure theory for its own sake.

Political discourse is unavoidably polemical. The zoon politikon must needs be a zoon polemikon. 'Polemical’ is from the Greek polemos, war, strife. According to Heraclitus of Ephesus, strife is the father of all: polemos panton men pater esti . . . (Fr. 53) I don't know about the 'all,' but strife  is certainly at the root of politics.  Politics is polemical because it is a form of warfare: the point is to defeat the opponent and remove him from power, whether or not one can rationally persuade him of what one takes to be the truth. It is practical rather than theoretical in that the aim is to implement what one takes to be the truth rather than contemplate it.  What one takes to be the truth: that is the problem in a nutshell.  Conservatives and leftists disagree fundamentally and non-negotiably.  

Implementation of what one takes to be the truth, however, requires that one get one’s hands on the levers of power. Von Clausewitz held that war is politics pursued by other means. But what could be called the Converse Clausewitz principle holds equally: politics is war pursued by other means.

David Horowitz, commenting on "Politics is war conducted by other means," writes:

In political warfare you do not just fight to prevail in an argument, but rather to destroy the enemy's fighting ability.  Republicans often seem to regard political combats as they would a debate before the Oxford Political Union, as though winning depended on rational arguments and carefully articulated principles.  But the audience of politics is not made up of Oxford dons, and the rules are entirely different.

You have only thirty seconds to make your point.  Even if you had time to develop an argument, the audience you need to reach (the undecided and those in the middle who are not paying much attention) would not get it.  Your words would go over some of their heads and the rest would not even hear them (or quickly forget) amidst the bustle and pressure of everyday life.  Worse, while you are making your argument the other side has already painted you as a mean-spirited, borderline racist controlled by religious zealots, securely in the pockets of the rich.  Nobody who sees you in this way is going to listen to you in any case.  You are politically dead.

Politics is war.  Don't forget it. ("The Art of Political War" in Left Illusions: An 
Intellectual Odyssey Spence 2003, pp. 349-350)

The first sense I mention only to set aside. Timeless entities, if there are any, exist tenselessly and have their intrinsic properties  and some of their relational properties tenselessly.  The 'exists' in '7 exists' is tenseless, and so is the 'is' in '7 is prime.' And please note that the tenselessness is not a result of a de-tensing operation or an abstraction from tense: the tenseless terms are inherently tenseless because the entity in question is inherently timeless.  So far, no problem.  Talk of tenselessness with respect to timeless entities, if any,  is wholly intelligible.

Problems arise when we ask whether temporal objects, items in time, can be intelligibly described as tenselessly existing or tenselessly propertied.   Is it intelligible to say that Boethius tenselessly exists and is tenselessly a philosopher?  In one sense it is; but the  sense in which it is gives no aid and comfort to presentism.  That is what I will rehearse in this post. 

TENSELESSNESS AS DISJUNCTIVE OMNITEMPORALITY

We consider the disjunctively omnitemporal sense according to which 'x tenselessly exists' means 'x existed or x exists or x will exist' where each disjunct is tensed, and 'x is tenselessly F' means that 'x was F or x is F or x will be F' where each disjunct is tensed. This sense of 'tenseless' is not properly tenseless: tensed expressions must be used to formulate it. But while improper, it is has the virtue of being wholly intelligible. Thus Julius Caesar tenselessly exists in the disjunctively omnitemporal sense in that he either existed, or exists (present tense), or will exist. He tenselessly exists because the first of these tensed disjuncts is true. When we say that he tenselessly exists we are simply abstracting from when he existed. We are leaving the 'when' out of consideration. We are not thereby attributing to the man some non-disjunctive property of tenseless existence, whatever that might be.

And similarly with 'Julius Caesar is a Roman emperor.' We all understand the sentence to be true despite Caesar's having ceased to exist long ago. We take the sentence to be tenselessly true because we read the copula in the disjunctively omnitemporal sense.  The same goes for 'Hume is an empiricist,' a sentence one might find in a history of philosophy. Although Hume does not now exist, we can say, intelligibly, that he IS an empiricist because we are using 'is' in a disjunctive omnitemporal way.  

DOES DISJUNCTIVELY OMNITEMPORAL TENSELESSNESS HELP US UNDERSTAND THE PRESENTIST V. ETERNALIST DEBATE?

Unfortunately, it doesn't.  The presentist tells us that only present items exist, whereas the eternalist says that past, present, and future items all exist.  To engage each other they have to be using 'exist' in the same sense: their disagreement is predicated upon an agreement as to the sense of 'exists.' Now  it it is clear that this cannot be the present-tensed sense of 'exists.'   Nor can it be the timelessly tenseless sense of 'exists.'  And not the disjunctively omnitemporal sense either.  Why not?

Everyone agrees that Boethius no longer exists. But 'no longer exists' can be understood in two ways. The eternalist (B-eternalist) holds that what no longer exists exists all right, but in the past. The presentist, however, holds that what no longer exists does not exist.  For the eternalist, Boethius tenselessly exists.  For the presentist, Boethius does not tenselessly exist. Therefore, for the presentist, it is not the case that Boethius either did exist or does exist or will exist.  But this is plainly false, since Boethius did exist. Therefore, the sense of 'exists' that allows presentist and eternalist to engage each other cannot be the disjunctively omnitemporal sense of 'tenseless.'

So what the hell sense of 'tenseless' is it?  

More later. It's Saturday night. Time for a stiff one and Uncle Wild Bill's Saturday Night at the Oldies.

Go to my Facebook page for linkage and commentary on the passing scene.

It is a stereotype without foundation in reality that all stereotypes lack a foundation in reality.

Here at Maverick Philosopher: Strictly Philosophical

The Dems are a species of necrophiliac: they love dead voters. Not only that, they have the power to 'raise' them.

In the Judeo-Christian tradition, man and man alone among living things has a higher origin and a higher destiny. Made in the image and likeness of God, and the only creature so made, he comes from God and is called to return to God for his ultimate felicity and fulfillment. He is, to be sure, an animal, but one called to theosis and thus an animal qualitatively different from every other type of animal. 

In that now languishing tradition, man had a calling, a vocation.

But God is dead, culturally speaking, at least among the the elites of the West, and since 1859 the qualitative superiority of the human animal is no longer much believed in. Man is back among the animals, 'in series' with them, just another product of evolution, whose origin is measly and whose destiny is extinction.  Man on a naturalist construal is at best quantitatively superior to his non-human progenitors.

Read the whole thing at MavPhil StrictPhil.

Peter Geach on the Real Distinction I

Here:

Horowitz destroys the argument for reparations, and in a second chapter, he challenges the victimization logic that offers white racism as the excuse for any "underperformance" by the black community.  There is no one alive today who held any slaves or personally was a slave.  Many black Americans in the country today have no ancestors in America who were slaves.  A majority of Americans are descended from people who came to the United States after the Civil War and bear no guilt for the ugly practice in one region of the United States two centuries ago.  Those who are descended from people who lived in the states that did not join the Confederacy have 400,000 dead Union soldiers, plus many hundreds of thousands injured, as their sacrifice to liberating the slaves and preserving the Union.  Reparations for Japanese-Americans in the United States or Holocaust survivors in Europe were paid to people who had themselves lived through specific horrors or criminal behavior by governments.  Must all Americans today pay for something that ended over 150 years ago and for which a bloody war was fought?  Are all African-Americans equally entitled to compensation for something that impacted some of their ancestors seven generations back?

The victimization theme – that white racism is solely responsible for the economic situation of black Americans, their higher crime rates and poor academic performance, eliminates any agency for individuals to beat the odds or take advantage of the increased opportunities that are now available, including trillions spent on social welfare programs over the past half-century, much of that designed to address the needs of African-Americans.  These programs include affirmative action admissions to universities and similar approaches to hiring by corporations and other firms.  Martin Luther King was aware that racism and discrimination were present in 1960s America, as was segregation in large parts of the country, but he believed that these should not be an excuse for black American behavior that only worsened their plight.  Charlatans and race-hustlers like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton have dominated the civil rights movement since King's death, always pushing the white racism bogeyman, while those more in line with King's legacy, including Jason Riley, Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell, and Glen Loury, are ignored or condemned as sell-outs.  Arguing that cultural norms within a community can be damaging to the success of future generations is simply a forbidden theme – witness the recent campaign against University of Pennsylvania law professor Amy Wax.

"A torch song is a sentimental love song, typically one in which the singer laments an unrequited or lost love, where one party is either oblivious to the existence of the other, or where one party has moved on." (Wikipedia)

Sarah Vaughn, Broken Hearted Melody.  Nostalgic video. Fine understated guitar work.

Timi Yuro, Hurt.  When I first heard her back in '61, I thought she had to be black. She's not black, but of Italian extraction: Rosemarie Timotea Auro. 

Billie Holliday, The Very Thought of You

Roy Orbison, In Dreams. "The best voice in the business," said E. P.  See how many of the sidemen you can identify.

Peggy Lee, Oh You Crazy Moon. 

Ketty Lester, Love Letters.  

Etta James, At Last

Lenny Welch, Since I Fell For You

Elvis Presley, I Can't Help Falling in Love with You

Kay Starr, Stormy Weather

Julie London, When I Fall in Love

Gogi Grant, The Wayward Wind. I've enjoyed this song since I was six years old. Ill take Lady Gogi over Lady Gaga any day.

Not a torch song, but the video is cute: 

Jay and the Americans, Come a Little Bit Closer

UPDATE (11/5)

Ed contributes:

You posted a very fine 1938 recording of ‘The Very Thought Of You’ by Billie Holiday. If I am not mistaken, the sax is Lester Young (‘prez’), who Kerouac worshipped, and who supposedly gave young Jack (in 1943) his first taste of the wacky baccy. See this.

There is a London connection here. The song was written by Ray Noble, and first recorded (with Al Bowlly, vocal) in London April 21, 1934. Noble was born in Brighton in 1903, studied at the Royal Academy of Music, and become one of the great British band leaders of the 1930s. He later moved to New York. His well-known ‘Cherokee’ was an obsession of Charlie ‘Bird’ Parker, who made it the basis of his 1945 composition Ko-Ko. As I am sure you know.

Your musical catholicity amazes me, Ed. Rare is the hombre who can dig both Hank Williams and Charlie Parker, not to mention Robert Johnson and Robert Schumann.

Judy Collins, Cravings: How I Conquered Food, Doubleday 2017, pp. 112-113:

. . . and writing Albert Grossmann that no, I did not want to join a trio of women he was bent on calling the Brown-Eyed Girls. He had put Peter, Paul and Mary together, telling me that I was the fallback choice if Mary hadn't worked out. Albert saw how I was struggling and didn't think I could make it on my own, hence the trio idea. It was to be me, Judy Henske and Jo Mapes. He told me he would get me brown contacts, his idea of a joke — Henske had brown eyes and Mapes and I would have to get brown contacts. I had agreed hastily — after all, he had made Peter, Paul and Mary into an international franchise. Now I changed my yes to a no. I would go it on my own, no matter what. I was going to do it my way or die trying.

Way to go, Judy. You pulled it off and beat your addictions as well.

Judy Collins, Both Sides Now.  Wonderful. My favorite version, however, is that of Dave van Ronk and the Hudson Dusters.

Judy Collins, Someday Soon

Judy Collins, Amazing Grace

Judy Henske, High Flying Bird

Judy Henske, Any Day Now

Judy Henske, Till the Real Thing Comes Along

Jo Mapes, You Were on My Mind. Beautiful, but takes a little getting used to if you are coming at it from the We Five hit version. Ian Sylvia have a great version. 

Jo Mapes, No One to Talk My Troubles To