Category: Truth
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Feser on Vallicella on Feser on the Truth-Maker Objection to Presentism
I argued in my first critical installment that Edward Feser in his stimulating new book, Aristotle's Revenge, does not appreciate the force of the truth-maker objection to presentism in the philosophy of time. Ed's response to me is here. I thank Ed for his response. Herewith, my counter-response. So, as I say, I don’t think the…
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Is the Past Wholly Determinate? Edward Feser’s Presentism, Part III
This is the third in a series. Part I here; Part II here. On the principle of bivalence, every proposition is either true, or if not true, then false. Given that bivalence holds for what presently exists, it is difficult to see how it could fail to hold for what did exist. Why should the…
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Truth-Bearers and Truth-Makers: Disjoint Classes?
Wesley C. writes, Today I read your critique of Feser on presentism. I am curious about something you said: A truth-bearer cannot serve as a truth-maker. If that's right, how would you handle obvious truths that are about propositions. Take the following: "The proposition that Humphreys Peak is the tallest in Arizona is true…
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A Reader Proposes a Puzzle
This from Cyrus: Suppose there is a possible world in which only God exists. Further suppose that that world is actual instead of this one. Further suppose divine simplicity. What is the truthmaker for the proposition “God exists, and nothing more” in that world? If God alone exists, and God is simple, then there are…
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A Critique of Edward Feser’s Defense of Presentism, Part I
Ed Feser very kindly sent me a copy of his latest book, Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science (Editiones Scholasticae, 2019). As I noted in my journal: Synchronicity. Feser's latest book, with its section on time and its defense of presentism, has arrived at just the right time — as I…
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Truth and Falsity from a Deflationary Point of View
The following equivalence is taken by many to support the deflationary thesis that truth has no substantive nature, a nature that could justify a substantive theory along correspondentist, or coherentist, or pragmatic, or other lines. For example, someone who maintains that truth is rational acceptability at the ideal (Peircean) limit of inquiry is advancing a…
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Excluded Middle, Presentism, Truth-Maker: An Aporetic Triad
Suppose we acquiesce in the conflation of Excluded Middle and Bivalence. The conflation is not unreasonable. Now try this trio on for size: Excluded Middle: Every proposition is either true, or if not true, then false.Presentism: Only what exists at present, exists.Truth-Maker: Every contingent truth has a truth-maker. The limbs of the triad are individually…
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Excluded Middle, Bivalence, and Disquotation
LEM: For every p, p v ~p. BV: Every proposition is either true or false. These principles are obviously not identical. Excluded Middle is syntactic principle, a law of logic, whereas Bivalence is a semantic principle. The first says nothing about truth or falsity. The second does. (See Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard…
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A New and Improved Argument for the Necessity of Something
Previous versions were long-winded. Herewith, an approach to the lapidary. 1) If nothing exists, then something exists. 2) If something exists, then something exists.3) Either nothing exists or something exists. Therefore4) Necessarily, something exists. The argument is valid. The second two premises are tautologies. The conclusion is interesting, to put it mildly: it is equivalent…
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Assertion and Truth In Itself
The Ostrich reports that he gave up on my transcendental argument from assertion to truth when he came to this paragraph: To further unpack the concept of assertion, we note that whatever is asserted is asserted to be true independently of one's asserting it. Of course, it does not follow from one's asserting that p…
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A Transcendental Argument from Assertion to Truth
We start with a fact: we make assertions. The fact is actual, so it must be possible. What are the conditions of its possibility? What has to be the case for assertion to be possible? I will argue that there has to be truth for assertion to be possible. We proceed by unpacking the concept…
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Misgivings About Deflationary Theories of Truth
1. From my survey of the literature, there are four main types of truth theory being discussed: substantive theories, nihilist (for want of a better label) theories, deflationary theories, and identity theories. Let me say just a little about the first two main types and then move on to deflationism. 2. Substantive theories maintain that…
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If Nothing Exists, is it True that Nothing Exists? Well Yes, but Then . . .
Here is a puzzle for London Ed and anyone else who finds it interesting. It is very simple, an aporetic dyad. To warm up, note that if snow is white, then it is true that snow is white. This seems quite unexceptionable, a nice, solid, datanic starting point. It generalizes, of course: for any proposition…
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Robert Spaemann Dies at 91
Professor Robert Spaemann, Philosopher and Advocate of the Traditional Mass, Dies at 91. (HT: Kai Frederik Lorentzen) See also, Philosophie und Glaube: Vom Tod von Robert Spaemann. Excerpt: Gott als Grundlage aller Wahrheitsansprüche Gottesglaube ist weder Bedingung für wahre Urteile noch für Gewissensüberzeugungen. Aber da die Existenz Gottes der ontologische Grund beider und in ihnen…
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Nietzsche, Truth, Power, and the Left
According to Victor Davis Hanson, the following is one of the tenets of contemporary leftism as represented by the Democrat Party: Truth is not universal, but individualized. [Christine Blasey] Ford’s “truth” is as valid as the “Truth,” given that competing narratives are adjudicated only by access to power. Ford is a victim, therefore her truth…