Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Trinity and Incarnation

  • More on One Person-Two Natures: Response to Timothy Pawl

    A recent argument of mine questioning the coherent conceivability of the one person-two natures doctrine of Chalcedonian Christology begins with the premise 1. If N is a nature of substance s, then s cannot exist without having N.  Natures are essential to the things that have them.  In possible worlds jargon: If N is a…

  • Is it Coherently Conceivable that One Person Have Two Natures?

    For Shaun Deegan, who 'inspired' a sloppy prototype of the following argument hashed out over Sunday breakfast at a Mesa, Arizona hash house. ……………. The Question More precisely:  is it coherently conceivable that one person, the Second Person of the Trinity, the Word of God, the Logos, have both an individual divine nature and an…

  • Bare Particulars versus Aristotelian Substances

    In this entry I will attempt to explain the difference between a bare particular and an Aristotelian primary substance.  A subsequent post will consider whether this difference is theologically relevant, in particular, whether it is relevant to the theology of the Incarnation. What is a Particular? Particulars in the sense relevant to understanding 'bare particular'…

  • Substance, Supposit, Incarnation, Trinity, and the Heresy of Nestorius

    I need to answer three questions.  This post addresses only the first. 1. What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)? 2. Is there any non-theological basis for this distinction?  3. If the answer to (2) is negative, is the addition of suppposita to one's Aristotelian ontology  a case of…

  • Christology, Reduplicatives, and Qua-Entities

    For Dave Bagwill, who is trying to understand the Chalcedonian definition. ……………. Consider this triad, and whether it is logically consistent: 1. The man Jesus = the 2nd Person of the Trinity.2. The 2nd Person of the Trinity exists necessarily.3. The man Jesus does not exist necessarily. Each of these propositions is one that a…

  • One Person, Two Natures

    A reader inquires, The Creed of Chalcedon (A.D 451) set forth the following dogma, among others: (my emphasis) ".. one and the same Christ ….to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being…

  • The Crucified God

    The Crucified God  is an outstanding weblog by my remarkable young friend, Steven Nemes.  Compare his Good Friday meditation on Moltmann with the Simone Weil passage I quoted in the immediately  preceding entry.

  • The Lost Early History of Unitarian Christian Theology

    A lecture by Dale Tuggy.

  • Incarnation, Substance, and Supposit

    I am still digesting the discussions in Prague.  In this post I present part of the rambling and over-long paper I delivered, beefed up somewhat, in an attempt to formulate more clearly my main points. The orthodox view of the Incarnation is that God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, the Word or…

  • SEP Trinity Entry Updated

    Dale Tuggy recently updated his article on the Trinity in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

  • Theology Wagging the Ontological Dog?

    Dennis M. writes, On Ockham and supposita: A little perplexity at the end, when you write that “[w]hat is curious here is how very specific theological doctrines are allowed to drive the general ontology.” One man’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens, I suppose, but if Ockham is trying to maintain theological orthodoxy it doesn’t…

  • What is the Difference Between a Substance and a Supposit?

    I need to answer three questions.  This post addresses the first. 1. What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)? 2. Is there any non-theological basis for this distinction?  3. If the answer to (2) is negative, is the addition of suppposita to one's Aristotelian ontology  a case of legitimate metaphysical…

  • Trying to Understand Ockham on Supposita in Light of the Incarnation

    I am presently working through Marilyn McCord Adams, "Aristotelian Substance and Supposits" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 79, 2005, 15-72).  The Czech scholastics and sometime MavPhil commenters Novak, Novotny, Vohanka, et al. have kindly invited me to read a paper at a conference on the Trinity in Prague this September and now I…

  • Good Friday: At the Mercy of a Little Piece of Iron

    Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, tr. Craufurd, Routledge 1995, p. 75: The infinite which is in man is at the mercy of a little piece of  iron; such is the human condition; space and time are the cause of  it. It is impossible to handle this piece of iron without suddenly reducing the infinite which…

  • Garrigou-Lagrange on Thomas on the Divine Persons as Subsistent Relations

    What follows is the whole of Chapter 16 of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought.  My critical comments are in blue. Chapter 16: The Divine Persons Person in general is a being which has intelligence and freedom. Its classic definition was given by Boethius: Person is an individual subject with an intellectual nature.…