Matthew 5:27-28 is a powerful verse I learned as a boy and have never forgotten. It struck me then and I continue to feel its impact. It is probably the source of my long-held conviction that not only deeds, but also thoughts and words are morally evaluable. Here is the verse:
27 You have heard that it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery.’ 28 But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.
I am not a theologian. What follows is an exercise in moral philosophy, not moral theology.
a) The first point I want to make is that the mere arisal of a lustful thought, whether or not accompanied by physical arousal in the form of an erection, say, is morally neutral. Spontaneous unbidden lustful thoughts, with or without physical manifestation, are natural occurrences in healthy human beings. No moral culpability attaches to such occurrences. This is level 0 of moral culpability.
b) But after the occurrence of the thought, its suppression is morally obligatory and its entertainment and elaboration morally impermissible. Thus one ought to practice self-censorship and put the lustful thought out of one’s mind. Why? Because thoughts and words are the seeds of deeds, and if lustful or otherwise evil, are likely to sprout into evil deeds. This is level 1.0 of moral culpability. Depending on the degree of the ‘hospitality’ of the entertainment one might want to distinguish levels 1.1, 1.2, and so on.
c) Thus taking pleasure in the lustful thought is morally impermissible even if no intention is formed to act on the thought either verbally, by saying something to the object of lust, or physically, by doing something to her by touching, fondling, groping, ‘making an advance,’ or something worse. Discharge of lustful thoughts and inclinations via masturbation leads to a separate but related topic which we can discuss later. We are still at level 1.0. This paragraph merely unpacks paragraph (b).
d) Morally worse than (c) is the deliberate decision to act on the lustful thought by forming the intention to commit adultery or rape. But to decide to do X is not the same as doing X. I might decide to tell a lie without telling a lie or decide to commit rape without committing rape. ‘Adultery in the heart’ is not adultery in the flesh. Nevertheless, the decision to commit adultery is morally censurable. We are now at level 2.0.
e) Side issue: How are rape and adultery related? Rape, by definition, is in every case non-consensual, whereas adultery is in most case consensual. In most cases, but not in every case. Three types of case: (i) rape without adultery where an unmarried person rapes an unmarried person; (ii) adultery without rape; (iii) rape with adultery where a married person rapes an unmarried or married person or an unmarried person rapes a married person. I should think that moral culpability is additive. So if an unmarried man rapes a married woman, that is worse than a rape by itself or an adulteration of her marriage by itself.
f) Now suppose I freely decide to commit adultery or freely decide to commit a rape, but ‘come to my senses’ and decide not to do either. The ‘adultery in the heart’ is and remains morally wrong, and the same goes for the ‘rape in the heart,’ but morally worse would be to follow through on either initial decision. It seems we are still at level 2.0. Or do I get moral credit for rescinding my decision?
g) A different case is one in which one does not ‘come to one’s senses,’ i.e., freely rescind one’s decision to do an evil deed, but is prevented by external forces or agents from raping or committing adultery or engaging in sex acts with underaged girls. Suppose the “Lolita Express” on which you are riding to Sin Central crashes killing all on board. Does the NT verse imply that the free decision to commit illicit sex acts will get one sent to hell as surely as the commission of the deeds would?
In this case one could plausibly claim that the ‘adultery in the heart’ is just as egregious, just as morally culpable, as the ‘adultery in the flesh.’ For although the free decision to commit adultery is not the same as the physical act of adultery, the physical deed would have followed from the decision were it not for the external prevention. But it is not entirely clear.
There is a distinction between the physical deed, adultery say, and its moral wrongfulness. Where does the wrongfulness reside? Is it present already in the prior free decision to do the deed whether or not the deed is done? I say it isn’t. Ed Farrell seems to be saying that it is. Can I argue my case? Well, the wrongfulness cannot hang in the air. If it is present in the deed, then the deed must exist, i.e., must have occurred. If. on the other hand, the wrongfulness is already present in the free decision, whether or not the deed is done, then the question is begged.
h) Level 3.0 is reached when on does the evil deed that one intended to do.
