Category: Scholasticism New and Old
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Defending the Distinctio Realis Against Anthony Kenny
This post defends the real distinction between essence and existence. For some background, see Geach on the Real Distinction I. In Aquinas on Being (Oxford 2002, p. 45), Anthony Kenny writes, "Peter's continuing to exist is the very same thing as Peter's continuing to possess his essence; if he ceases to exist, he ceases to…
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Incarnation, Substance, and Supposit
I am still digesting the discussions in Prague. In this post I present part of the rambling and over-long paper I delivered, beefed up somewhat, in an attempt to formulate more clearly my main points. The orthodox view of the Incarnation is that God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, the Word or…
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Some Favorable Citations of Suárez by Schopenhauer
During a delightful rural ramble outside Prague, I mentioned to Daniel Novotný that Arthur Schopenhauer had a high opinion of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Daniel said he had heard as much but wondered where Schopenhauer had indicated his high regard for the scholastic philosopher. Here are some passages, though I have the sense that I am…
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Avicenna’s God and the Queen of England
For a long time now I have been wanting to study Frederick D. Wilhelmsen's hard-to-find The Paradoxical Structure of Existence. Sunday I got lucky at Bookman's and found the obscure treatise for a measly six semolians. I've read the first five chapters and and they're good. There is a lack of analytical rigor here and there,…
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On Primary Substances and Accidental Unities
I asked genuinely, not rhetorically : What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)? The latter figures prominently in the philosophy of the School, as some call it, and I need to get clear about what supposits are, how they differ from primary substances, and whether there are any…
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What is the Difference Between a Substance and a Supposit?
I need to answer three questions. This post addresses the first. 1. What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)? 2. Is there any non-theological basis for this distinction? 3. If the answer to (2) is negative, is the addition of suppposita to one's Aristotelian ontology a case of legitimate metaphysical…
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Trying to Understand Ockham on Supposita in Light of the Incarnation
I am presently working through Marilyn McCord Adams, "Aristotelian Substance and Supposits" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 79, 2005, 15-72). The Czech scholastics and sometime MavPhil commenters Novak, Novotny, Vohanka, et al. have kindly invited me to read a paper at a conference on the Trinity in Prague this September and now I…
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Defining ‘Accident’
In a comment thread, I offered this definition of 'accident': D1. A is an accident of substance S =df (i) A is a particular; (ii) A is dependent for its existence and identity on S; (iii) A is predicable of S. A particular, by definition, is an unrepeatable item. So a substance and one of…
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On the Nature of Accidents: Objections and Replies
Lukas Novak comments and I respond. Bill, what follows is what I consider the most important objection against your theory. It seems to me that in order to keep the basic meaning of "universal" and "particular" the following definitions must be assumed: 1. A universal is that which is (truly) predicable of many particular instances. …
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Substance and Accident: The Aporetics of Inherence
1.If substance S exists and accident A exists, it does not follow that A inheres in S. An accident cannot exist without existing in some substance or other, but if A exists it does not follow that A exists in S. If redness is an accident, it cannot exist except in some substance; but if…
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Accidents of a Substance: Simple or Complex?
Dr. Novak is invited to tell me which of the following propositions he accepts, which he rejects, and why: 0. I have reservations about an ontology in terms of substances and accidents, but anyone who adopts such an ontology needs to provide a detailed theory of accidents. This post sketches a theory. It has roots in Aristotle,…
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Garrigou-Lagrange on Thomas on the Divine Persons as Subsistent Relations
What follows is the whole of Chapter 16 of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. My critical comments are in blue. Chapter 16: The Divine Persons Person in general is a being which has intelligence and freedom. Its classic definition was given by Boethius: Person is an individual subject with an intellectual nature.…
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Gilson and the Avicennian-Thomistic Common Natures Argument
Chapter III of Etienne Gilson's Being and Some Philosophers is highly relevant to my ongoing discussion of common natures. Gilson appears to endorse the classic argument for the doctrine of common natures in the following passage (for the larger context see here): Out of itself, animal is neither universal nor singular. Indeed, if, out of itself,…
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More on the Status of Thomistic Common Natures
This is proving to be a fascinating topic. Let's push on a bit further. Aquinas says that any given nature can be considered in three ways: in respect of the esse it has in concrete singulars; in respect of the esse it has in minds; absolutely, in the abstract, without reference to either mode of…
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Lukáš Novák on Common Natures
The following is a comment by Dr. Novak on an earlier post about Stanislav Sousedik's Thomist theory of predication. That post has scrolled off into archival oblivion, so I reproduce the comment here and add some comments in blue. …………………. What is, for me, most striking about Bill's troubles with Sousedík's elaboration of the Thomistic…