Hypocrisy and Pope Benedict

Is the Pope a hypocrite for protesting Islamic violence when the church he heads engaged in violence itself? To answer this question, we need to consider the nature of hypocrisy.

I once heard a radio advertisement by a group promoting a "drug-free America." A male voice announces that he is a hypocrite because he demands that his children not do what he once did, namely, use illegal drugs. The idea is that it is sometimes good to be a hypocrite.

Surely this ad demonstrates a misunderstanding of the concept of hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is a moral defect. But one who preaches abstinence and is abstinent is morally praiseworthy regardless of what he did in his youth. Indeed, his change of behavior redounds to his moral credit.

A hypocrite is not someone who fails to live up to the ideals he espouses, but one who does not attempt to live up to the ideals he espouses. An adequate definition of hypocrisy must allow for moral failure, otherwise all who espouse ideals would be hypocrites. An adequate definition must also allow for moral change. One who did not attempt to live up to the ideals he now espouses cannot be called a hypocrite; the term applies to one who does not attempt to live up to the ideals he now espouses.

If you see my point, you will appreciate that Pope Benedict cannot be called a hypocrite for condemning Islamic violence. But Karen Armstrong in a piece in the Guardian Unlimited disagrees:

The Muslims who have objected so vociferously to the Pope's denigration of Islam have accused him of "hypocrisy", pointing out that the Catholic church is ill-placed to condemn violent jihad when it has itself been guilty of unholy violence in crusades, persecutions and inquisitions and, under Pope Pius XII, tacitly condoned the Nazi Holocaust.

The context shows that Armstrong credits the accusation of hypocrisy. But what Armstrong fails to realize is that what the Church did in the far-off past, but no longer does, is quite irrelevant to the question whether it is hypocritical in condemning present-day Islamic violence.

There is another incoherence in Armstrong's piece that Dennis Prager noted. Armstrong condemns the Pope for hypocrisy given the Church's alleged failure to help the Jews during the Nazi Holocaust. But she also condemns him for criticizing Islamic violence which also threatens Jews.

There is something wrong here. Not long ago Jews were under threat from Nazis, now they are under threat from militant Muslims. If Armstrong is right to criticize the Church of Pius XII — a question I leave undecided — then consistency would seem to demand that she praise Benedict XVI for speaking in defense of the Jews.

What is Wrong and What is Right with Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion

One source of the appeal of ordinary language philosophy (OLP) is that it reinstates much of what was ruled out as cognitively meaningless by logical positivism (LP) but without rehabilitating the commitments of old-time metaphysics. In particular, OLP allows the reinstating of religious language. This post explains, with blogic brevity, how this works and what is wrong and what right with the resulting philosophy of religion. Since OLP can be understood only against the backdrop of LP, I begin with a brief review of LP.

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Religion and the Inculcation of Morality

Many of us internalized the ethical norms that guide our lives via our childhood religious training. We were taught the Ten Commandments, for example. We were not just taught about them, we were taught them.  We learned them by heart, and we took them to heart. This early training, far from being the child abuse that A. C. Grayling and other militant atheists think it is, had a very positive effect on us in forming our consciences and making of us the basically decent human beings we are. I am not saying that moral formation is possible only within a religion; I am saying that some religions do an excellent job of transmitting and inculcating life-guiding and life-enhancing ethical standards. (By the way, I use 'ethical' and 'moral' interchangeably, as I explain here.)

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Is Religious Instruction Child Abuse? Is Religion the Greatest Social Evil?

That religious instruction constitutes child abuse is another theme of contemporary militant atheists such as Richard Dawkins and A. C. Grayling. Consider the competing 'truths' taught by different faith-based schools, e.g. that Jesus is the Son of God, that he is not, etc. Grayling complains that

. . . in schools all over the country these antipathetic 'truths' are being force-fed to different groups of pupils, none of whom is in a position to assess their credibility or worth. This is a serious form of child abuse. It sows the seeds of apartheids capable of resulting, in their logical conclusion, in murder and war, as history sickeningly and ceaselessly proves. There is no greater social evil than religion. It is the cancer in the body of humanity. Human credulity and superstition, and the need for comforting fables, will never be extirpated, so religion will always exist, at least among the uneducated. The only way to manage the dangers it presents is to confine it entirely to the private sphere, and for the public domain to be blind to it in all but one respect: that by law no one's private beliefs should be allowed to cause a nuisance or any injury to anyone else. For whenever and wherever religion manifests itself in the public arena as an organised phenomenon, it is the most Satanic of all things. (A. C. Grayling, Life, Sex, and Ideas: The Good Life Without God, Oxford 2003, 34-35, emphasis added.)

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Modalities of Sin

Horace Jeffery Hodges asked me to comment on his post Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom.  Inasmuch as such commentary would require exegetical skills I do not possess, not to mention time I do not have — I am under the gun to finish an article for The Monist — I shall have to beg off.  Perhaps others can join in the discussion at Jeff's place.  But given my longstanding interest in matters modal, I was intrigued by the following quotation from Thomas Boston, courtesy of David C. Innes:

State of Innocence – posse peccare (able to sin)
State of Sin – non posse non peccare (not able not to sin)
State of Grace – posse non peccare (able not to sin)
State of Glory – non posse peccare (not able to sin)

Morality Private and Public: On Not Confusing Them

Socrates and Jesus are undoubtedly two of the greatest teachers of humanity. Socrates famously maintained that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it, and Jesus, according to MT 5:39, enjoins us to "Resist not the evildoer" and "Turn the other cheek." No one with any spiritual sensitivity can fail to be deeply impressed by these sayings. It is equally clear that no one with common sense can suppose that they can be applied in the public sphere.

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On the Misuse of Religious Language

A massage parlor is given the name Nirvana, the implication being that after a well-executed massage one will be in the eponymous state. This betrays a misunderstanding of Nirvana, no doubt, but that is not the main thing, which is the perverse tendency to attach a religious or spiritual significance to a merely sensuous state of relaxation.

Why can’t the hedonist just enjoy his sensory states without glorifying them? Equivalently, why can’t he admit that there is something beyond him without attempting to drag it down to his level? But no! He wants to have it both ways: he wants both sensuous indulgence and spirituality. He wants sensuality to be a spiritual experience and spirituality to be as easy of access as sensuous enjoyment.