Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Relativism

  • Assuming that God exists, could the atheist’s denial of God be reasonable?

    I say Yes to the title question; Greg Bahnsen, glossing Cornelius Van Til, says No.  Yet it should be clear even to the atheist that if the Christian God exists, it is 'reasonable' to believe in him. (Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis, P & R Publishing, 1998, p. 124, fn. 108,…

  • Wokery and the Double Denial

    Substack latest. It is not unreasonable to maintain that there is no God and that nature alone exists. But suppose you take it a step further and deny nature as well. Then you are in the precincts of 'woke' lunacy.  Call it the Double Denial. On the Double Denial, everything is a social construct, including…

  • Einstein, Relativity, and Relativism

    Substack latest.

  • Tulsi Gabbard Defends Objective Truth . . .

    . . . at a rally to end child mutilation. Gabbard's  three-minute address begins at 19:30 and runs until 22:42. "Without recognition that there is such a thing as truth, there are no boundaries in our society, which why we are where we are." That something so obvious needs to be stated explicitly shows how…

  • True For and True

    There are expressions that should be avoided by those who aim to think clearly and to promote clear thinking in others. Expressions of the form, ‘true for X’ are prime examples. In a logically sanitized world, the following would be verboten: ‘true for me,’ ‘true for you,’ ‘true for Jews,’ ‘true for Arabs,’ ‘true for…

  • Student Relativism

    From my first weblog, dated 28 September 2004: Student relativism  is not so much a philosophical theory as a form of psychic insulation. An outgrowth of adolescent rebelliousness, it says: "You can't teach me anything because truth is relative; we all have our own truths." Not being a philosophical theory, Student Relativism cannot be refuted…

  • A Relativist Cannot Rationally Object to the Imposition of One’s Values on Others

    Here, at MavPhil Strictly Philosophical

  • Narratives and the Left

    Leftists love narratives because a narrative needn't be true to be a narrative. Their assessment criteria are identity-tribal rather than logical.  A good narrative is a coherent  story that enhances the tribe's power. Whether true or false is not to the point, the point being power. Truth is not a leftist value. It is not…

  • Truth, Fallibilism, Objectivism, and Dogmatism

    It is important not to confuse the question of the fallibility of our cognitive faculties, including reason, with the question whether there is truth.  Truth is one thing, fallibility another. A fallibilist need not be a truth-denier.  One can be both a fallibilist and an upholder of truth.  What's more, one ought to be both…

  • One of the Ways Moral Relativism Defeats Itself

    Bruce Bawer in Death by Entitlement quotes an NYT commenter: One reader comment, a “Times Pick,” read, in part, as follows: “A great story and an admirable couple. But those who condemn their killers as evil probably fail to recognize that ISIS fighters see themselves as being on the side of good. For them, these…

  • Scott Adams’ Starting Point

    Here: For new readers of this blog, my starting point is the understanding that human brains did not evolve to show us reality. We aren’t that smart. Instead, our brains create little movies in our heads, and yours can be completely different from mine. We see that situation now. Half the country thinks President Trump…

  • Does Deflationism Rule Out Relativism?

    This post floats the suggestion that deflationism about truth is inconsistent with relativism about truth.  Not that one should be a deflationist.  But it would be interesting if deflationism entailed the nonrelativity of truth. There is a sense in which deflationary theories of truth deny the very existence of truth. For what these theories deny…

  • A Question About Alethic Relativism

    Vlastimil V. inquires: When someone says that (R) truth is relative, a) … what's the most clear way to understand R? I suppose he means something else than that people disagree, also something else than that truth is seldom certain. b) … what's the most clear way to criticize R? BV:  (R) is a substantive…

  • A Relativist Cannot Rationally Object to the Imposition of One’s Values on Others

    The following argument is sometimes heard. "Because values are relative, it is wrong to impose one's values on others." But if values are relative, and among my values is the value of instructing others in the right way to live, then surely I am justified in imposing my values on others. What better justification could…

  • Lies, Truth, Narratives, and Hillary

    Hillary Clinton we now know to be a liar beyond any shadow of a reasonable doubt.  A liar is one who habitually makes false statements with the intention of deceiving her audience.  This definition, however, presupposes the distinction between true and false statements.  Aphoristically:  no truth, no lies.  Hillary cannot be a liar unless there…