Category: Relations
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John Bigelow’s Lucretian Defense of Presentism, Part I, Set-Up
What follows in two parts is a critique of John Bigelow's Presentism and Properties. This installment is Part One. Bigelow begins by telling us that he is a presentist: "nothing exists which is not present." (35) He goes on to say that this was believed by everyone, including philosophers, until the 19th century. But this…
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Mark Sainsbury on Intentional Relations
Following A. N. Prior, Sainsbury sets up the problem of intentionality as follows: We are faced with a paradox: some intentional states are relational and some are not. But all intentional states are the same kind of thing, and things of the same kind are either all relational or all non-relational. (Intentional Relations, 327) Cast…
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Some Questions about Thinking, Relations, and Relational Expressions
Bill, you said by email earlier that the sentence “Jake is thinking of Zeus” would be true if Jake was indeed thinking of Zeus. BV: That's what I said, although I would put 'is' where you have 'was.' Is what I said a shocking thing to say? I have questions for you about the terms…
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Relations and Nonexistents
Consider the following two sentences: a) Lions are smaller than dragons.b) Mice are smaller than elephants. From this datanic base a puzzle emerges. 1) The data sentences are both true.2) 'Smaller than' has the same sense in both (a) and (b).3) In both (a) and (b), 'smaller than' has the same reference: it refers to…
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Working Draft: The Case Against Facts
Comments appreciated if you are en rapport with the subject matter. The Case Against Facts Arianna Betti, Against Facts, The MIT Press, 2015, pp. 296 + xxvii If Buridan's contribution to the bestiarum philosophorum was the ass, and David Armstrong's the ostrich, Arianna Betti's is the hedgehog bristling with spines. The hedgehog…
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Worship, Reference, and Existence: An Aporetic Triad
Each of the following three propositions strikes me as very reasonably maintained. But they cannot all be true. A. Worship Entails Reference: If S worships x, then S refers to x.B. Reference Entails Existence: If S refers to x, then x exists.C. Worship Does Not Entail Existence: It is not the case that if S…
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Caesar Is No More: The Aporetics of Reference to the Past
Here is London Ed's most recent version of his argument in his own words except for one word I added in brackets: 1. There is no such thing as Caesar any more. 2. The predicate 'there is no such thing as — any more' is satisfied by Caesar. 3. If a relation obtains [between] x…
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The Problems of Order and Unity and Their Difference
Last Thursday, Steven N. and I had a very enjoyable three-hour conversation with ASU philosophy emeritus Ted Guleserian on Tempe's Mill Avenue. We covered a lot of ground, but the most focused part of the discussion concerned the subject matter of this post. If I understood Guleserian correctly, he was questioning whether there is any…
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The Reference Relation: Internal or External?
What is (linguistic) reference? Is it a relation? Edward the Ockhamist assumes that it is and issues the following request: "To clarify, could I ask both you and Bill whether you think the reference relation is ‘internal’ or ‘external’?" Here is an inconsistent tetrad: 1. 'Frodo' refers to Frodo2. 'Frodo' exists while Frodo does not. 3. Reference…
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A Common Misunderstanding of So-Called Cambridge Changes
There are philosophers who think that 'Cambridge' changes and real changes are mutually exclusive. Thus they think that if a change is Cambridge, then it is not real. This is a mistake. Real changes are a proper subset of Cambridge changes. Consider an example. Hillary gets wind of some tomcat behavior on the part of…