Category: Propositions
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Eliminative Materialism: Can You Believe It?
In an earlier post, I provided a rough characterization of eliminative materialism (EM). Here is a more technical exposition for the stout of heart. If EM is true, then there are no beliefs. But what about the belief that EM is true, a belief that one would expect eliminative materialists to hold? If we exfoliate…
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The Metaphysics 101 Argument for Propositions
In his SEP entry on propositions, Matthew McGrath presents what he calls the 'Metaphysics 101' argument for propositions. Rather than quote him, I will put the argument in my own more detailed way. 1. With respect to any occurrent (as opposed to dispositional) belief, there is a distinction between the mental act of believing and…
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Brentano and Whether Propositions are Intrinsically Intentional
Franz Brentano, for whom intentionality is the mark of the mental, is committed to the thesis that all instances of (intrinsic) intentionality are instances of mentality. The last post in this series considered apparent counterexamples to this thesis. But there are others. Joseph Jedwab usefully pointed out in a comment on my old blog that…