Paradoxes of Illegal Immigration

Philosophers hate a contradiction, but love a paradox.  There are paradoxes everywhere, in the precincts of the most abstruse as well as in the precincts of the prosaic.  Here are eight paradoxes of illegal immigration suggested to me by Victor Davis Hanson.    The titles and formulations are my own.  For good measure, I add a ninth, of my own invention. 

The Paradox of Profiling.  Racial profiling is supposed to   be verboten.  And yet it is employed by American border guards when they nab and deport thousands of illegal border crossers.  Otherwise, how could they pick out illegals from citizens who are merely in the vicinity of the border?  How can what is permissible near the border be impermissible far from it in, say, Phoenix?  At what distance  does permissibility transmogrify into impermissibility?  If a border patrolman may profile why may not a highway patrolman? Is legal permissibility within a state indexed to spatiotemporal position and variable with variations in the latter?

The Paradox of Encroachment.  The Federal government sues the state of Arizona for upholding Federal immigration law on the ground that it is an encroachment upon Federal jurisdiction.  But sanctuary cities flout Federal law by not allowing the enforcement of Federal immigration statutes.  Clearly, impeding the enforcement of Federal laws is far worse than duplicating and perhaps interfering with Federal law enforcement efforts.  And yet the Feds go after Arizona while ignoring sanctuary cities.  Paradoxical, eh?

The Paradox of Blaming the Benefactor.  Millions flee Mexico for the U.S. because of the desirability of living and working here and the undesirability of living in a crime-ridden, corrupt, and impoverished country.  So what does Mexican president Felipe Calderon do?  Why, he criticizes the U.S. even though the U.S.  provides to his citizens what he and his government cannot! And what do many Mexicans do?  They wave the Mexican flag in a country whose laws they violate and from whose toleration they benefit.

The Paradox of Differential Sovereignty and Variable Border Violability.  Apparently, some states are more sovereign than others.  The U.S., for some reason, is less sovereign than  Mexico, which is highly intolerant of invaders from Central America.  Paradoxically, the violability of a border is a function of the countries between which the border falls.

The Paradox of Los Locos Gringos.  The gringos are crazy, and racist xenophobes to boot, inasmuch as 70% of them demand border security and support AZ SB 1070.  Why then do so many Mexicans want to live among the crazy gringos? 

The Paradox of Supporting While Stiffing the Working Stiff.  Liberals have traditionally been for the working man.  But by being soft on illegal immigration they help drive down the hourly wages of the working poor north of the Rio Grande.  (As I have said in other posts, there are liberal arguments against illegal immigration, and here are the makings of one.)

The Paradox of Penalizing the Legal while Tolerating the Illegal.   Legal immigrants face hurdles and long waits while illegals are tolerated.  But liberals are supposed to be big on fairness.  How fair is this?

The Paradox of Subsidizing a Country Whose Citizens Violate our Laws.  "America extends housing, food and education subsidies to illegal aliens in need. But Mexico receives more than $20 billion in American remittances a year — its second-highest source of foreign exchange, and almost all of it from its own nationals living in the United States."  So the U.S. takes care of illegal aliens from a failed state while subsidizing that state, making it more dependent, and less likely to clean up its act. 

The Paradox of the Reconquista.  Some Hispanics claim that the Southwest and California were 'stolen' from Mexico by the gringos.  Well, suppose that this vast chunk of real estate had not been 'stolen' and now belonged to Mexico.  Then it would be as screwed up as the rest of Mexico: as economically indigent, as politically corrupt, as crime-ridden, as drug-infested.  Illegal immigrants from southern Mexico would then, in that counterfactual scenario,  have farther to travel to get to the U.S., and there would be less of the U.S. for their use and enjoyment.  The U.S. would be able to take in fewer of them.  They would be worse off.  So if Mexico were to re-conquer the lands 'stolen' from it, then it would make itself worse off than it is now.  Gaining territory it would lose ground — if I may put paradoxically the Paradox of the Reconquista.

Exercise for the reader:  Find more paradoxes!

 

The Pinocchio ‘Paradox’

This curious bagatelle is wending its way through the World Wide WebPinocchio.  The cartoon is supposed to be paradoxical in some way.  The reader who brought it to my attention writes, "A friend and myself actually debated this at length over lunch, and I argued that at best it is a performative inconsistency.  I'm sure you have a more nuanced opinion on this silly meme!"   

Well, let's see.  The salient feature of Pinocchio is that his nose grows whenever he tells a lie.  From this one guesses that the paradox has something to do with lying.  Now a lie is not the same as a false statement; it is a false statement made with the intention to deceive  by someone who knows the truth.  (Or so I will assume for the space of this post.)  If this is what a lie is, then one cannot lie about matters that are not objectively the case and known to be such.  Suppose I predict that tomorrow morning, at 6 AM, my blood pressure will be 125/75, but my prediction turns out false: my blood pressure the next morning is 135/85.  No one who heard my prediction could claim that I lied when I made it even if I had the intention of deceiving my hearers.  For although I made (what turned out to be) a false statement with the intention to deceive, I had no way of knowing exactly what my blood pressure would be the next day. 

Similarly with 'My nose will grow now.'  This  sentence does not express an intention on Pinocchio's part to bring about a nose lengthening by the power of his will since presumably he never has such an intention.  The sentence is a future tense sentence which predicts what is about to happen.  'Now' does not refer to the time of utterance, but to a time right after it.  (If you argue that the presence of 'now' renders the sentence present tense, then the sentence is incoherent, and the 'paradox' cannot get off the ground.) 

It follows that Pinocchio cannot be lying.  Assuming the Law of Excluded Middle and Bivalence, what he says is either true or false.  Either way, no paradox arises that I can see.

But suppose Pinnochio utters the present tense sentence, 'My nose grows now' or 'My nose is growing now.'  Does this issue in paradox?

If  Pinocchio says 'My nose  grows now,' he is either lying or not.   If he is lying, then he is making a false statement, which implies that his nose does not grow now.  If he is not lying, then his statement is either true or false, which implies that either his nose does grow now or his nose does not grow now.  Therefore, either his nose does not grow now or his nose does grow now.  But that is wholly unproblematic. 

Therefore I fail to find any paradox here if a paradox is either a logical consistency or a performative inconsistency. 

What am I missing?  There is a 2010 Analysis article under this rubric.  But I don't have access to it at the moment, and I'm not sure the topic is exactly the same.

The Inconceivable

It is arguable that all religions and salvation-paths point to the Inconceivable and terminate in it if terminus they have. The Nibbana of the Pali Buddhists. The ontologically simple God of Thomas Aquinas. A theory of the Inconceivable would have to show that it is rationally admissible that there be something that cannot be grasped rationally. The theory would not be a grasping, but a pointing to the possibility of the Ungraspable. It would include a discursive refutation of all attempts at foreclosing on this possibility. The theory would deploy itself on the discursive plane, but the purpose of it would be to point one beyond the discursive plane, to make a place, as it were, for the possibility of the Transdiscursive.

But such a philosophical project is self-contradictory. If you say that the Inconceivable is possibly existent, then you exclude its necessary nonexistence. You make a determinate predication of the Inconceivable and therefore think it, conceive it, as having the property predicated. But then you fall into contradiction by affirming something of that of which nothing can be affirmed. There is no transcending the duality of thought if you are to think at all. A 'theory' that consists of a pointing to the Transdiscursive must needs be gibberish. The Real is exhausted by the discursively graspable. Outside it, nothing.

Is this a good objection or not?

Zeno’s Regressive Dichotomy and the ‘Calculus Solution’

The Regressive Dichotomy is one of Zeno's paradoxes of motion. How can I get from point A, where I am, to point B, where I want to be? It seems I can't get started.

A_______1/8_______1/4_______________1/2_________________________________ B

To get from A to B, I must go halfway. But to travel halfway, I must first traverse half of the halfway distance, and thus 1/4 of the total distance. But to do this I must move 1/8 of the total distance. And so on. The sequence of runs I must complete in order to reach my goal has the form of an infinite regress with no first term:

. . . 1/16, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 1.

Since there is no first term, I can't get started.

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