Category: Modal Matters
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Volition and Modality (Peter Lupu)
This is a guest post by Peter Lupu. Minor editing by BV. 1) In One Fallacy of Objectivism (henceforth, OFO) I gave an argument that a distinction Objectivists insist upon between “metaphysical” or natural-facts vs. volitional-facts logically presupposes the traditional modal distinction between contingent vs. necessary – a logical presupposition they vehemently deny. Three kinds of objections…
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Further Modal Concepts: Consistency, Inconsistency, Contradictoriness, and Entailment
I argued earlier that the validity of argument forms is a modal concept. But the same goes for consistency, inconsistency, contradictoriness, and entailment. Here are some definitions. 'Poss' abbreviates 'It is broadly-logically possible that ___.' 'Nec' abbreviates 'It is broadly-logically necessary that ___.' '~' and '&' are the familiar truth-functional connectives. 'BL' abbreviates 'broadly logically.'…
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The Difference Between Possibility and Contingency
Over lunch yesterday, Peter Lupu questioned my assertion that possibility and contingency are not the same. What chutzpah! So let me now try to prove to him that they are indeed not the same, though they are of course related. To put the point as simply and directly as I can, possibility and contingency are…
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Validity as a Modal Concept and a Modal Argument for the Nonexistence of God
'Modally Challenged' comments: I've run into this argument on several occasions and while the author(s) insist theists will accept the premises, it's more the validity I'd appreciate your take on. 1) If God is possible, then God is a necessary being. 2) If God is a necessary being, then unjustified evil is impossible.3) Unjustified evil…
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Necessity and Contingency Within the Sphere Not Affected by Human Volition
Harry Binswanger asks: ". . . within the sphere not affected by human volition (the "metaphysically given") what are the grounds for asserting a difference between necessity and contingency? Aren't all the events that proceed in accordance with physical law in the same boat?" This is large topic with several aspects. This post concentrates just one…
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Putting My Contingency Into English: Are There Legitimate Non-Epistemic Uses of ‘Might’?
I exist now. But my nonexistence now is possible. ('Now' picks out the same time in both of its occurrences.) 'Possible' in my second sentence is not intended epistemically. Surely it would be absurd were I to say, 'My nonexistence now is possible for all I know' or 'My nonexistence now is not ruled out by…
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One Fallacy of Objectivism
The following comment is by Peter Lupu. It deserves to be brought up from the nether reaches of the ComBox to the top of the page. Minor editing and highlighting in red by BV. One Fallacy of Objectivism 1) Objectivists seem to hold two theses: Thesis A: There is a fundamental conceptual distinction everyone does…
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Modalities of Sin
Horace Jeffery Hodges asked me to comment on his post Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. Inasmuch as such commentary would require exegetical skills I do not possess, not to mention time I do not have — I am under the gun to finish an article for The Monist — I shall have to beg off. …
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Imaginable, Conceivable, Possible: How Justify Modal Beliefs?
As I use them, 'imaginable' and 'conceivable' mean the following. Bear in mind that there is an element of stipulation and regimentation in what I am about to say. Bear in mind also that the following thoughts are tentative and exploratory, not to mention fragmentary. The topics are difficult and in any case this is only…
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Back to Parmenides: Binswanger’s Defense of Rand’s Block Universe
In response to Harry Binswanger, I wrote: My diagnosis of our disagreement is as follows. You think that what is causally necessitated (e.g. the lunar craters) is broadly-logically necessary (BL-necessary) whereas I think that what is causally necessitated is broadly-logically contingent. Because you think that what is causally necessitated is BL-necessary, you naturally think that…
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Epistemic/Doxastic Possibility
Recent forays into the metaphysics and epistemology of modality require us to be quite clear about the senses of 'possible,' necessary,' and the other modal words in play. In the contexts mentioned, these words are not being used epistemically or doxastically. Is Joan in her office? If I ask you, you might reply, "It's possible."…
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From Possibilities to Possible Worlds
1. One cannot do modal logic, let alone modal metaphysics, without both modal concepts and 'modal intuitions.' One has to start from a pre-thematic understanding of modal concepts such as possibility and necessity and how they are interrelated and also from certain prior convictions about what counts as possible and necessary. (The same is true in other disciplines…
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Is the Existence of God Entailed by Alternative Ways Natural Things Might Have Been?
This post is a sequel to Ayn Rand on Necessity, Contingency, and Dispositions. There we were examining this quotation: What do you mean by "necessity"? By "necessity," we mean that things are a certain way and had to be. I would maintain that the statement "Things are," when referring to non-man-made occurrences, is the synonym…
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Notes on Van Inwagen on Modal Epistemology
Herewith, some interpretive notes and critical comments on Peter van Inwagen's paper, "Modal Epistemology" (Philosopical Studies 92 (1998), pp. 67-84; reprinted in van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality, Cambridge UP, 2001, pp. 243-258.) 1. Van Inwagen describes his position as "modal scepticism" (245) but a better name for it would be 'mitigated modal scepticism' since he does…
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Harry Binswanger Defends Rand
I thank Dr. Binswanger for commenting on the post, Modal Confusion in Rand/Peikoff. His stimulating comments deserve to be brought to the top of the page. I have reproduced them verbatim below. I have intercalated my responses in blue. The ComBox is open, but the usual rules apply: be civil, address what is actually said, argue your points,…