Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Modal Matters

  • The Sense of Contingency and the Sense of Absurdity

    The parallel is fascinating and worth exploring. According to David Hume, "Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent." (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion)  I've long believed Hume to be right about this.  I would put it this way, trading Latin for plain Anglo-Saxon: Our minds are necessarily such that, no matter what…

  • Actualist and Presentist Ersatzism and Arguments Against Both

    For the actualist, the actual alone exists: the unactual, whether merely possible or impossible, does not exist.  The actualist is not pushing platitudes: he is not telling us that the actual alone is actual or that the merely possible is not actual.  'Merely possible' just means 'possible but not actual.' The actualist is saying something non-platitudinous, something…

  • Presentism and Actualism, Tenseless Existence and Amodal Existence

    John of the MavPhil commentariat drew our attention to the analogy between presentism and actualism.  An exfoliation of the analogy may prove fruitful.  Rough formulations of the two doctrines are as follows: P. Only the (temporally) present exists. A. Only the actual exists. Now one of the problems that has been worrying us is how…

  • McCann, God, and the Platonic Menagerie

    I am reviewing Hugh J. McCann's Creation and the Sovereignty of God (Indiana University Press, 2012) for American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.  What follows is an attempt to come to grips with Chapter Ten, "Creation and the Conceptual Order."  I will set out the problem as I see it, sketch McCann's solution, and then offer some…

  • Divine Creation, Possibility, and Actuality

    This from a reader: Your latest blog posts on the problem of existence prompted me to question you about one philosophical problem which keeps "nagging" me: – When we make plans for the future (e.g. when choosing out next move in chess), we analyze different possibilities. Until the moment we decide our move, each possibility…

  • Guns and Punitive Taxation

    Seldom Seen Slim points us to the latest anti-gun outrage:  The Cook County Board of Commissioners on Friday handily approved the county's 2013 budget, complete with some $40 million worth of new taxes on the sales of guns and cigarettes. [. . .] A previously proposed "violence tax" of a nickel per bullet sold in…

  • “Possible Tornado Touches Down in Brooklyn and Queens”

    Story here.  "Only a possible tornado?  It is the actual ones that worry me."  "Did you hear about Jack? He died of an apparent heart attack."  "Wow, hs heart must have been in terrible condition if all it took was an apparent heart attack to do him in." Bad jokes, no doubt, but they do…

  • The Modal Aporetics of Existential Generalization

    Consider this trio of propositions: 1. '~(∃x)(x = Venus)' is possibly true. 2. Existential Generalization warrants the inference of '(∃y)~(∃x)(x = y)' from  '~(∃x)(x = Venus).' 3. '(∃y)~(∃x)(x = y)' is logically self-contradictory, hence necessarily false. Solve the triad, either by showing that the limbs are (collectively) logically consistent or by rejecting one or more…

  • Existence and Contingency

    Let us return to the problem of contingency that I was belaboring in my last existence post.  Consider this reasoning: 1. (x)(x = x).  Principle of Identity: everything is self-identical2. Venus = Venus.  From (1) by Universal Instantiation (UI)3. (∃x)(x = Venus).  From (2) by Existential Generalization (EG)4. (1) is logically true, hence necessarily true.5.…

  • Could a Universe of Contingent Beings be Necessary?

    If everything in the universe is contingent, does it follow that the universe is contingent?  No it doesn't, and to think otherwise would be to commit the fallacy of composition.  If the parts of a whole have a certain property, it does not follow that the whole has that property.  But it is a simple…

  • My Existence and My Possible Nonexistence

    Leo Mollica made a good objection to my earlier argument, an objection I  need to sort out.  I exist, but I might not have existed.  How might a thin theorist translate this truth? On the thin theory, my existence is my identity-with-something.  It follows that my nonexistence is my diversity-from-everything, and my merely possible nonexistence is my diversity…

  • Differences Between Wishing and Hoping

    I wish, I wish, I wish in vainThat we could sit simply in that room againTen thousand dollars at the drop of a hatI'd give it all gladlyIf our lives could be like that. Bob Dylan's Dream Wishing and hoping are both intentional attitudes: they take an object.  One cannot just wish, or just hope,…

  • Logical Versus Metaphysical Modality

    A Pakistani reader inquires: This is a query which I hope you can answer. Is there such a distinction as 'logical contingency' vs 'metaphysical contingency', and 'logical necessity' vs 'metaphysical necessity'? And if there is, can you explain it? Thank you. A short answer first.  Yes, there are these distinctions.  They amount to a distinction…

  • Is Every Concrete Being Contingent?

    A reader experiences intellectual discomfort at the idea of a being that is both concrete and necessary.  He maintains that included in the very concept concrete being is that every such being is concrete.  To put it another way, his claim is that it is an analytic or conceptual truth that every concrete being is contingent.  But…

  • Jerry Coyne’s Modal Confusion

    In the course of studying Plantinga's new book, Where the Conflict Really Lies, I have encountered some surprisingly hostile web materials directed against Plantinga.  Some of this stuff is too scurrilous to refer to, and I won't.  Coyne's rants against Plantinga are somewhat milder but still unseemly for someone in the academic world.  Alvin Plantinga:…