Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Mind

  • Galen Strawson on Zombies and Whether ‘Physical’ is a Natural Kind Term

    1. What is a zombie?  You will have gathered that a zombie is a creature of philosophical fiction conjured up to render graphic a philosophical issue and to throw certain questions in the philosophy of mind into relief.    A zombie is a living being that is physically and behaviorally exactly like a living human being except that…

  • Does Matter Think?

    If matter (wholly material beings) could think, then matter would not  be matter as currently understood. Can abstracta think?  Sets count as abstracta.  Can a  set think?  Could the set of primes contemplate itself and think the thought, I am a set, and each of my members is a prime number?  Given what we know…

  • Galen Strawson Versus Nicholas Humphrey on Consciousness

    (This is a repost from February 2013 slightly emended, except for an addendum added today.  Reposts are the reruns of the blogosphere.  You don't watch a Twilight Zone or Seinfeld episode just once do you?)  ………………… A couple of days ago I had Nicholas Humphrey in my sights.  Or, to revert to the metaphor of that…

  • Eyes in the Mirror

    The eyes you see in the mirror when you look at yourself are not seeing eyes but seen eyes.  Strange but true:  your seeing eyes are and must remain invisible.

  • Mysterian Materialism and Mysterian Trinitarianism

    Here are some thoughts that may provoke a fruitful discussion with Vlastimil Vohanka on the topic of mysterianism in the philosophy of mind and in theology.  He kindly sent me his rich and stimulating paper, "Mysterianism about Consciousness and the Trinity."  The paper is available here along with other works of his.  His view is…

  • Which is Harder to Conceive?

    Which is harder to conceive, that something wholly immaterial could be alive or that something wholly material could be alive?

  • Some Philosophical Positions Valuable Only as Foils: Extreme Nominalism and Eliminative Materialism

    By a philosophical foil I mean a view or position that contrasts with other positions in such a way as to highlight the often superior qualities of the other positions.  Foils are useful for mapping the spaces of theories and as termini of theoretical spectra.  Consider the spectrum of positions stretching from extreme nominalism to…

  • Memory, Matter, Mind

    Memory loss points to the materiality of mind while memory's exercise points to its immateriality.  Mind is mysterious, but memorial mind is even more so, situated as it is at the crossroads of intentionality and time.

  • The Hard Problem Now a Play

    By Tom Stoppard.  Via Daniel McInerny via Tom Coleman. I have always thought the 'hard problem' vs. 'easy problem' distinction in the philosophy of mind to be rather silly.  See Intentionality Not a 'Hard Problem' for Physicalists?

  • Marcia Cavell Defends Colin McGinn Against the “Hysterical” Patricia Churchland

    Here, with a response by McGinn.  Merits the coveted MavPhil imprimatur and nihil obstat. In fairness to Churchland, it is her letter, not her, that Cavell calls "hysterical."  A politically incorrect word these days, I should think.  Isn't 'hysterical' etymologically related to the Latin and Greek words for womb?  According to the Online Etymology Dictionary:…

  • The Academic Philosophers of Consciousness

    Too many of the academic philosophers of consciousness are overly concerned with the paltriest aspects of consciousness, so-called qualia, and work their tails off trying to convince themselves and others that they are no threat to physicalism.  While man's nobility lies in the power of thought whereby he traverses all of time and existence, our…

  • Patricia Churchland versus Colin McGinn on Mysterianism

    It's a win for McGinn. Here's Churchland: The view for which McGinn is known is a jejune prediction, namely that science cannot ever solve the problem of how the brain produces consciousness. On what does he base his prediction? Flimsy stuff. First, he is pretty sure our brain is not up to the job. Why…

  • Must Singular Thoughts be Object-Dependent?

    What follows are some ideas from London Ed about a book he is writing.  He solicits comments.  Mine are in blue. The logical form thing was entertaining but rather off-topic re the fictional names thing. On which, Peter requested some more.  Let’s step right back. I want to kick off the book with an observation…

  • John Searle Interviewed

    This shot of the old philosopher by the fire with his shootin' ahrn nicely complements some of the combative things he says in the Zan Boag interview at NewPhilosopher.  (HT: Karl White.) For example, "I don’t read much philosophy, it upsets me when I read the nonsense written by my contemporaries, the theory of extended…

  • Christian Physicalism?

    J. P. Moreland is against it.  Me too.  More generally, I oppose any amalgamation of classical theism and materialism about the mind.  (See my "Could a Classical Theist be a Physicalist?" Faith and Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1998, pp. 160-180.) Here are some  excerpts from Moreland's piece: Christianity is a dualist, interactionist religion…