Category: Metaphilosophy
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Reliably Inconclusive
Such is philosophical argumentation. Philosophers arrive at conclusions, but the conclusions they arrive at are inconclusive.
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Disagreement in Philosophy: Notes on Jiří Fuchs
That philosophers disagree is a fact about which there is little disagreement, even among philosophers. But what this widespread and deep disagreement signifies is a topic of major disagreement. One issue is whether or not the fact of disagreement supplies a good reason to doubt the possibility of philosophical knowledge. The contemporary Czech philosopher…
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Does Your Disagreement Give Me Good Reason to Question My Position?
In general, no. For you may be foolish or ignorant or otherwise incompetent with respect to the subject matter under discussion. Or you may be morally defective: a bully, a blowhard, a bullshitter, a quibbler, a sophist. But suppose none of these predicates attach to you. Suppose you are my moral and intellectual peer, and…
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Andrew M. Bailey’s Analytic Philosophy Generator and the ‘Scholasticism Charge’
The AnalPhilGen is a bit of humor from occasional MavPhil commenter Andrew Bailey. I generated the following using Bailey's 'device': It is a consequence of proper functionalism that polyadic predicates reduce to non-human consciousness. On the standard Kripkean modal semantics, trope theories supervene on something like Rawls' famous Difference Principle. Intuitively it seems obvious that both…
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A Quasi-Pyrrhonian Metaphilosophical Puzzle
Some of us are tempted by the metathesis (MT) that every substantive philosophical thesis is such that the arguments for it and the arguments against it are equally plausible and thus 'cancel out.' But the metathesis is itself a philosophical thesis. So if the metathesis is true, then every argument in support of it is…
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The Philosophy Paperboy
"This website publishes the latest contents from philosophy journals around the world." Anecdote. When I taught at Boston College in the '70s I had a nursing student in one of my classes. One day I made mention of a philosophy journal. Sweet Darci said, "You mean they have journals of this stuff?"
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David Chalmers and the Purely Theoretical Conception of Philosophy
John Horgan reports in Scientific American on a conversation with David Chalmers. (HT: the ever-helpful Dave Lull) There is some discussion of the so-called 'hard problem' in the philosophy of mind. The qualia-based objections are supposed to pose a 'hard' problem for defenders of physicalism. The implication is that the problems posed by intentionality are, if…
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When Politics Becomes Like Philosophy
In philosophy everything is up for grabs. Our politics are becoming like this. There is less and less on which we agree. We can't even agree that nations need enforceable and enforced borders! Widespread and deep-going lack of consensus in philosophy casts serious doubt on the cognitivity of the discipline, but is otherwise not that…
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The Self-Murder of Academic Philosophy?
Rod Dreher here exposes the latest lunacy in the precincts of mad-dog feminism. I have no objection to the main body of his post, but his opening sentence, written by a philosophy outsider, will give philosophy outsiders the wrong impression. Dreher asks, "Can somebody please tell me why anybody would choose to go into academic…
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Is There a Place for Polemics in Philosophy?
Our friend Vlastimil writes, I've just read you saying, "In philosophy it is very important that we be as civil and charitable as possible. There is no place for polemics in philosophy." Intriguing. No place, really? Can't a philosophy be wicked or obtuse? Yes, a philosophy can be wicked or obtuse. But what I said…
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Annoying Habits of Some Philosophers
They still annoy me.
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On Continental Philosophy: Response to a German Reader
The following from a German sociologist (my comments are in blue): Perhaps you know the old joke: Analytic philosophers think that continental philosophy is not sufficiently clear; continental philosophers think that analytic philosophy is not sufficient. Having just reread the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, I don't see Kant as an analytic philosopher. Hegel and Nietzsche certainly belong…
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Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?
An article by David J. Chalmers. (HT: Dave Lull) I read nine pages into it before I got bored. And this despite my fascination with metaphilosophy. So I went back to reading Klavan's memoir. I am now on p. 173 of this 'page-turner.' I am marking it up something fierce. Damn if it isn't good!…
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Scientism
I am tired of refuting this species of bushwa. Let somebody else do it. We humans naturally philosophize. But we don't naturally philosophize well. So when science journalists and scientists try their hands at it they often make a mess of it. (See my Scientism category for plenty of examples.) This is why there is…
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Circular Definitions, Arguments, and Explanations
In the course of our discursive operations we often encounter circularity. Clarity will be served if we distinguish different types of circularity. I count three types. We could label them definitional, argumentative, and explanatory. A. The life of the mind often includes the framing of definitions. Now one constraint on a good definition is that…