Category: Logica Utens

Some Definitions of ‘Global Warming’ Examined

Just what is global warming anyway?  On this page  you will find a page of  definitions.  This post will examine some of them.  This is important because one cannot intelligently discuss global warming, or anything else, until one knows exactly what one is talking about. 

Now one thing that should be obvious is that a genus cannot be defined in terms of a species thereof. And yet that is precisely what some of the definitions on the linked page do. For example,

Conservative Activism, the Left’s Incomprehension, and the Genetic Fallacy

'Conservative activism' has an oxymoronic ring to it.  Political activism does not come naturally to conservatives, as I point out in The Conservative Disadvantage.  But the times they are a 'changin' and so I concluded that piece by saying that  we now need to become active. "Not in the manner of the leftist who seeks meaning in activism for its own sake, but to defend ourselves and our values so that we can protect the private sphere from the Left's totalitarian encirclement.    The conservative values of liberty and self-reliance and fiscal responsibility are under massive assault by the Obama administration . . . ."

Leftists like to think that they own dissent, a conceit I demolish in Does the Left Own Dissent?  Truth is, they own dissent as little as they own activism.  But libs and leftists simply cannot credit conservative dissent.  They cannot take seriously what conservatives say, but must dismiss and psychologize.

Case in point, Michael Tomasky's Something New on the Mall.  To Tomasky's credit, he does not employ the derisive 'tea-bagger' epithet.  By the way, lefties ought to understand that they don't have proprietary rights in derision any more than they do in dissent.  So I suggest that if a leftist calls you a tea-bagger, return the compliment by calling him a scum-bagger.  A taste of his own medicine may do him some good, if not now, then later after he has grown up.

What struck me about Tomasky's lengthy piece is that there is not a hint of an admission that any of the points brought up by the conservative protesters have any merit.  Nor is there any attempt to rebut these points.  Instead we get a lengthy explanation of "how astroturfing works."  The derisive 'astroturf' is supposed to suggest that the protests are not genuine 'grass roots' expressions of populist  opposition to, among other things, fiscal recklessness, but have been artificially created and orchestrated by powerful 'corporate' interests:

This conservative protest movement, though, has three powerful forces supporting it: bottomless amounts of corporate money; an ideologically dedicated press, radio, and cable television apparatus eager to tout its existence; and elected officials who are willing to embrace it publicly and whose votes in support of the movement's positions can be absolutely relied upon.

But none of that is true of the progressive movement?  Substitute 'progressive movement' for 'conservative protest movement' in the above quotation and the result is actually closer to the truth.  More importantly, attempts by leftists to ferret out the underlying causes and motives of conservative positions border on the genetic fallacy.

The genetic fallacy is committed by those who fail to appreciate that questions about the truth or falsity, or rational acceptability or unacceptability, of a proposition are logically independent of questions about the origin or genesis of someone's believing the proposition.  Whether a proposition is true or false, or posseses some cognate epistemic property, is independent of any role that the believing of said proposition might play in the believer's mental economy. Thus if S's believing that p is comforting to S, it does not follow that p is false, or that S has no good reason for accepting that p. Similarly, if S's believing that p is painful to S, it does not follow that p is true, or that S has a good reason for accepting that p. And if you come to believe that 'Cash for Clunkers' is a policy that is both morally and economically objectionable because of arguments you heard  presented on a conservative talk show, it does not follow from the fact that your believing had that origin that the content of your belief is false or rationally insupportable.

 

If Religions Contradict Each Other, Does it Follow that No Religion is True?

This from a piece in guardian.co.uk:

According to the Pew survey, 85% of humanity is religious in some way, and that's probably a low estimate, since nobody knows the true figures about China. This doesn't mean that religion is true (it can't, because religions contradict each other), but that there are strong cognitive and motivational factors that give religions an evolutionary advantage in the market of ideas. A scientific worldview is cognitively and emotionally more difficult, and hence at a disadvantage.

This passage cries out for logico-philosophical analysis.  One of the claims that the author is making is that religion cannot be true because religions contradict each other.  What this presumably means is that no religion can be true because every religion contradicts every other religion.  If so, we are being offered the following argument:  (1) Every  religion contradicts every other other religion; therefore, (2) no religion is true.  I grant the premise arguendo.    In any case, it is plausible.  To supply an example, Christians affirm what both Jews and Muslims deny, namely, that Jesus of Nazareth is God incarnate.  So there is no question but that some religions contradict other religions in respect of some doctrinal propositions.  (But it is also true that some religions agree with other religions in respect of some doctrinal propositions.  For example, the three Abrahamic religions all agree on the proposition that God exists, and on plenty of others.) 

Generalizing, we can say that every religion  contradicts every other religion in the sense that no two religions share all the same central doctrinal commitments.  (I will refine this in a moment.) So even though Christianity  and Islam agree that there is but one God, they disagree on whether this one God is triune. And although Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christians agree on much, they disagree on the filioque.  To make this a bit more precise, I suggest the following definition:

Religion R contradicts religion R* =df there is some central doctrinal proposition p which is affirmed by the adherents of R but denied by the adherents of R* or vice versa.

If this is what we mean by one religion contradicting another, then most religions contradict most other religions.  But consider a religion that affirms the existence of an immortal soul and another that takes no position on this question — neither affirming nor denying an immortal soul — on the ground that worrying about this doctrinal point merely distracts one from the unum necessarium, namely, working out one's salvation with diligence.  Assume further that these two religions are otherwise completely alike as to doctrine.  These two religions do not contradict each other by the above definition.

So one may wonder about the truth of (1).  For the sake of argument, however, let's grant it. Our main question is whether (2) follows from (1).  It obviously does not.  Consider Christianity and Islam.  They contradict each other by the definition I just gave.   But it doesn't follow that both are false.  For it could be that one is true and the other false.

Our author has committed an egregious logical blunder.  The logical mistake is not confined to the context of religon.  Suppose you and I disagree on any sort of point at all.  Suppose you affirm that anthropogenic global warming is taking place and I deny it.  It does not follow from our disagreement that we are both wrong.  What follows is that one of us is right and the other wrong.  This follows from the Law of Non-Contradiction according to which, necessarily, one member of a pair of contradictory propositions is true and the other not true.

The rest of the article is equally pisspoor as you may discover for yourself.

On the Correct Usage of ‘Infers’ and ‘Implies’

Within the space of a few days, I caught two TV pundits and an otherwise competent writer misusing 'infer.' Why do people have such a  difficult time with the distinction between inference and implication?  I will try to explain the matter as simply as I can.

The test to determine whether a use of 'infer' is correct is whether or not the thing said to be inferring is a mind. If it is a mind, then the use is correct; if it is not a mind, then the use is incorrect.  Some examples:

  • The author's citations infer that Serling drew inspiration from a diverse group of authors and philosophers. This use of 'infer' is incorrect because a citation is not a mind, and so cannot engage in any such mental operation as inference. 'Imply' would be correct.
  • Seeing Tom's car in front of Sally's house, Bill inferred that Tom was visiting Sally. Correct. It is correct because the thing doing the inferring, Bill, is an entity capable of the mental operation of drawing a conclusion from one or more premises.
  • Pelosi's 'astroturf' remark inferred that protesters at town hall meetings are organized agitators. Incorrect. A remark is the content of a remarking; it is something that a person says. What a person says is not a mind but a proposition, and a proposition, not being a mind, cannot infer anything. 'Implied' would be correct.
  • Pelosi implied that town hall protesters are organized agitators when she made her 'astroturf' comment. This is a correct use of 'implied.' But note that 'imply' has two main uses. One is the strictly logical use according to which implication is a relation between propositions. The other is the nonlogical use according to which implication is a relation between a person (or a mind) and a proposition. Pelosi implied that the protesters are organized in the sense that she suggested that this is so. In most cases one can substitute 'suggests' for 'implies' when the latter is employed nonlogically.
  • Are you implying that I'm a liar? This is a correct use of 'implying.' The word is being used in the nonlogical sense just explained. One can replace the question salva significatione with 'Are you suggesting that I'm a liar?'
  • Are you inferring that I am a liar? This is also correct inasmuch as the addressee may indeed be inferring that the speaker is a liar. The addressee may be concluding from the speaker's shifty eyes and other 'body language' that he is not telling the truth.
  • What you said infers that I'm a liar. This is incorrect because what a person said cannot engage in any mental operations such as the operation of drawing a conclusion from a premise. 'Implies' would be correct. 'Implies' would then be being used to express a relation between two propositions.

In sum, inference is the mental operation of drawing a conclusion from one or more premises.  Only minds can infer.  So uses of 'infer' and cognates are correct only  in application to minds.  Any use of 'infer' that implies that a nonmind can engage in inference is incorrect.  So the following is incorrect: Any use of 'infer' that infers that a nonmind can engage in inference is incorrect.    Implication in its strictly logical sense in a relation between propositions.  Hence the slogan: Only minds infer; only propositions imply.

Unfortunately for the slogan, the water is muddied by the fact that 'implies' has the two distinct uses lately explained.  So here is a more accurate slogan: Only minds infer; only propositions logically imply, though persons can conversationally imply.

Does Zeno Affirm What He Denies?

Andrew Ushenko in a Mind article from 1946, "Zeno's Paradoxes," distinguishes five putative ways of refuting Zeno's paradoxes: logical, mathematical, mathematico-physical, physical, and philosophical. Ushenko points out that two logical refutations fail. This post examines one of them. This is of particular interest since a reader floated a similar suggestion. Ushenko states the objection and then answers it cogently:

"Zeno's statement of the conditions of the race [of Achilles and the Tortoise], for example, of the condition that A moves faster than T, is equivalent to the assumption that motion exists, and therefore contradicts his own conclusion that motion is an illusion. Hence Zeno is inconsistent with himself." The falsehood of this accusation can be easily demonstrated. Of course, we must grant that Zeno begins with the assumption that there is motion, and concludes that there is no motion. But this procedure means only that he asserts, on the basis of his "proof", that If there is motion, then there is no motion. And, of course, the underscored conditional statement is true if, and only if, there is no such thing as motion.

Ushenko's reply to the objection is correct. Propositions of the form p –> ~p (where the arrow stands for the Philonian conditional) are none of them contradictory.  They are equivalent to propositions of the form ~p v ~p which in turn are equivalent to propositions of the form ~p.  It follows that If there is motion, then there is no motion  is  equivalent to There is no motion.

Consider an analogy. Someone argues on Anselmian grounds that (1) if God exists, then God exists necessarily; but for Humean reasons (2) nothing exists necessarily; ergo (3) if God exists, then God does not exist. There is no logical contradiction here, since the arguer is not affirming the existence of God; he is reasoning from the assumption that God exists, an assumption he does not affirm. Similarly, Zeno is not affirming the existence of motion; he is reasoning from the assumption that motion exists, an assumption he does not affirm.

Questions: Their Raising and Their Begging

To raise a question is not to beg a question. 'Raise a question' and 'beg a question' ought not be used interchangeably on pain of occluding a distinction essential to clear thought. To raise a question is just to pose it, to bring it before one's mind or before one's audience for consideration. To beg a question, however, is not to pose a question but to reason in a way that presupposes what one needs to prove.

 Suppose A poses the question, Does Allah exist? B responds by saying that Allah does exist because his existence is attested in the Koran which Allah revealed to Muhammad. In this example, A raises a question, while B begs the question raised by A. The question is whether or not Allah exists; B's response begs the question by presupposing that Allah does exist. For Allah could not reveal anything to Muhammad unless Allah exists.

The phrase 'beg the question' is not as transparent as might be hoped. The Latin, petitio principii, is better: begging of the principle. Perhaps the simplest way to express the fallacy in English is by calling it circular reasoning. If I argue that The Los Angeles Times displays liberal bias because its reportage and editorializing show a left-of-center slant, then I reason in a circle, or beg the question. Fans of Greek may prefer hysteron proteron, literally, the later earlier. That is, what is logically posterior, namely, the conclusion, is taken to be logically prior, a premise.

Punchline: Never use 'beg the question' unless you are referring to an informal fallacy in reasoning. If you are raising, asking, posing a question, then say that. Do your bit to preserve our alma mater, the English language. Honor thy mother! Matrix of our thoughts, she is deeper and higher than our thoughts, their sacred Enabler.

Of course, I am but a vox clamantis in deserto.  The battle has already been lost.  So why do I write things like the above?  Because I am a natural-born scribbler who takes pleasure in these largely pointless exercises.

Against Terminological Mischief: ‘Negative Atheism’ and ‘Negative Nominalism’

This from the seemingly reputable site, Investigating Atheism:

More recently, atheists have argued that atheism only denotes a lack of theistic belief, rather than the active denial or claims of certainty it is often associated with.

I'm having a hard time seeing what point there could be in arguing that "atheism only denotes a lack of theistic belief."  Note first that atheism cannot be identified with the lack of theistic belief, i.e., the mere absence of the belief that God exists, for that would imply that cabbages and tire irons are atheists.  Note second that it won't do to say that atheism is the lack of theistic belief in persons, for there are persons incapable of forming beliefs.  Charitably interpreted, then, the idea must be that atheism is the lack of theistic belief in persons capable of forming and maintaining beliefs.

Continue reading “Against Terminological Mischief: ‘Negative Atheism’ and ‘Negative Nominalism’”

The Definition of ‘Atheist’ and the Burden of Proof

Some define atheism in terms of the absence of the belief that God exists.  This won't do, obviously, since then we would have to count cabbages and sparkplugs as atheists given the absence in these humble entities of the belief that God exists.  But the following could be proffered with some show of plausibility: An atheist is a person whose psychological makeup is such as to permit his standing in the propositional atttude of belief toward the proposition that God exists, but who as a matter of fact does not stand in this relation, nor is disposed to stand in this relation were he to be queried about the existence of God.  Note that it does not suffice to say that an atheist is a person in whom the belief that God exists is lacking for then the neonatal and the senile would count as atheists, which is  surely  a bit of a stretch.

Continue reading “The Definition of ‘Atheist’ and the Burden of Proof”

Why Be Consistent? Three Types of Consistency

A reader inquires:

This idea of the necessity to be consistent seems to be the logician's "absolute," as though being inconsistent was the most painful accusation one could endure. [. . .] What rule of life says that one must be absolutely consistent in how one evaluates truth? It is good to argue from first principles but it can also lead one down a rat hole.

Before we can discuss whether one ought to be consistent, we need to know which type of consistency is at issue. There are at least three types of consistency that people often confuse and that need to be kept distinct. I'll call them 'logical,' 'pragmatic,' and 'diachronic.' But it doesn't matter how we label them as long as we keep them separate.

Continue reading “Why Be Consistent? Three Types of Consistency”

The No True Scotsman or No True Atheist Fallacy

In logic, a fallacy is not a false belief but a pattern of reasoning that is both typical and in some way specious. Specious reasoning, by the very etymology of the term, appears correct but is not. Thus a fallacy is not just any old mistake in reasoning, but a recurrent mistake that is seductive. A taxonomy of fallacies is useful insofar as it helps prevent one from seducing oneself and being seduced by others.

Continue reading “The No True Scotsman or No True Atheist Fallacy”

Peikoff on the Supernatural

Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Meridian 1993, p. 31:

"Supernatural," etymologically, means that which is above or beyond nature.  "Nature," in turn denotes existence viewed friom a certain perspective. Nature is existence regarded as a system of interconnected entities governed by law; it is the universe of entities acting and interacting in accordance with their identities.  What then is a "super-nature"?  It would have to be a form of existence beyond existence; a thing beyond entities; a something beyond identity.

The idea of the "supernatural" is an assault on everything man knows about reality.  It is a contradiction of every essential of a rational metaphysics.  It represents a rejection of the basic axioms of philosophy . . . .

Is this a good argument? That alone is the question.


Continue reading “Peikoff on the Supernatural”

Would Schopenhauer Allow Comments?

Schopenhauer If Schopenhauer were a blogger, would he allow comments on his weblog, The Scowl of Minerva?

I say no, and adduce as evidence the following passage that concludes his Art of Controversy, a delightful essay found in his Nachlass, but left untitled by the master:

As a sharpening of wits, controversy is often, indeed, of mutual advantage, in order to correct one's thoughts and awaken new views. But in learning and in mental power both disputants must be tolerably equal: If one of them lacks learning, he will fail to understand the other, as he is not on the same level with his antagonist. If he lacks mental power, he will be embittered, and led into dishonest tricks, and end by being rude.

The only safe rule, therefore, is that which Aristotle mentions in the last chapter of his Topica: not to dispute with the first person you meet, but only with those of your acquaintance of whom you know that they possess sufficient intelligence and self-respect not to advance absurdities; to appeal to reason and not to authority, and to listen to reason and yield to it; and, finally, to cherish truth, to be willing to accept reason even from an opponent, and to be just enough to bear being proved to be in the wrong, should truth lie with him. From this it follows that scarcely one man in a hundred is worth your disputing with him. You may let the remainder say what they please, for every one is at liberty to be a fool – desipere est jus gentium. Remember what Voltaire says: La paix vaut encore mieux que la verite. Remember also an Arabian proverb which tells us that on the tree of silence there hangs its fruit, which is peace.

Here is the same passage in the German original:

Das Disputieren ist als Reibung der Köpfe allerdings oft von gegenseitigem Nutzen, zur Berichtigung der eignen Gedanken und auch zur Erzeugung neuer Ansichten. Allein beide Disputanten müssen an Gelehrsamkeit und an Geist ziemlich gleichstehn. Fehlt es Einem an der ersten, so versteht er nicht Alles, ist nicht au niveau. Fehlt es ihm am zweiten, so wird die dadurch herbeigeführte Erbitterung ihn zu Unredlichkeiten und Kniffen [oder] zu Grobheit verleiten.

Die einzig sichere Gegenregel ist daher die, welche schon Aristoteles im letzten Kapitel der Topica gibt: Nicht mit dem Ersten dem Besten zu disputieren; sondern allein mit solchen, die man kennt, und von denen man weiß, daß sie Verstand genug haben, nicht gar zu Absurdes vorzubringen und dadurch beschämt werden zu müssen; und um mit Gründen zu disputieren und nicht mit Machtsprüchen, und um auf Gründe zu hören und darauf einzugehn; und endlich, daß sie die Wahrheit schätzen, gute Gründe gern hören, auch aus dem Munde des Gegners, und Billigkeit genug haben, um es ertragen zu können, Unrecht zu behalten, wenn die Wahrheit auf der andern Seite liegt. Daraus folgt, daß unter Hundert kaum Einer ist, der wert ist, daß man mit ihm disputiert. Die Übrigen lasse man reden, was sie wollen, denn desipere est juris gentium, und man bedenke, was Voltaire sagt: La paix vaut encore mieux que la vérité; und ein arabischer Spruch ist: »Am Baume des Schweigens hängt seine Frucht der Friede.«