Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Logica Docens

  • The Two Opposites of ‘Nothing’

    It is interesting  that 'nothing' has two opposites.  One is 'something.'  Call it the logical opposite.  The other is 'being.'  Call it the ontological opposite.  Logically, 'nothing' and 'something' are interdefinable: D1. Nothing is F =df It is not the case that something is F D2. Something is F =df it is not the case that nothing…

  • From the Laws of Logic to the Existence of God

    James N. Anderson and Greg Welty have published a paper entitled The Lord of Non-Contradiction:  An Argument for God from Logic. Having worked out similar arguments in unpublished manuscripts, I am very sympathetic to the project of arguing from the existence of necessary truths to the necessary existence of divine mind.  Here is a quick sketch of…

  • The Inconclusiveness of Argument

    He who can follow an argument will also know how not to be led by it.

  • Quantificational Uses of ‘Crap’

    Crap, diddlysquat, squat, shit, jackshit, jack. Crap and cognates as universal quantifiers.  It is indeed curious that words for excrement can assume this logical role. 'No one owes you crap' = 'No one owes you anything' = 'Nothing is such that anyone owes it to you' = 'Everything is such that no one owes it…

  • The Strange World of Simone Weil: God Does and Does Not Exist

    In the chapter "Atheism as a Purification" in Gravity and Grace (Routledge 1995, tr. Emma Craufurd from the French, first pub. in 1947), the first entry reads as follows: A case of contradictories which are true.  God exists: God does not exist.  Where is the problem?  I am quite sure that there is a God…

  • Reification and Hypostatization

    My tendency has long been to use 'reification' and 'hypostatization' interchangeably.  But a remark by E. J. Lowe has caused me to see the error of my ways.  He writes, "Reification is not the same as hypostatisation, but is merely the acknowledgement of some putative entity's real existence." ("Essence and Ontology," in Novak et al.…

  • Gilson and the Avicennian-Thomistic Common Natures Argument

    Chapter III of Etienne Gilson's Being and Some Philosophers is highly relevant to my ongoing discussion of common natures.    Gilson appears to endorse the classic argument for the doctrine of common natures in the following passage (for the larger context see here):  Out of itself, animal is neither universal nor singular.  Indeed, if, out of itself,…

  • More Fun With Existential Generalization

    Intuitively, if something is identical to Venus, it follows that something is identical to something.  In the notation of MPL, the following is a correct application of the inference rule, Existential Generalization (EG): 1. (∃x)(x = Venus)2. (∃y)(∃x)(x = y) 1, EG (1) is contingently true: true, but possibly false.  (2), however, is necessarily true.  Ought we…

  • The Modal Aporetics of Existential Generalization

    Consider this trio of propositions: 1. '~(∃x)(x = Venus)' is possibly true. 2. Existential Generalization warrants the inference of '(∃y)~(∃x)(x = y)' from  '~(∃x)(x = Venus).' 3. '(∃y)~(∃x)(x = y)' is logically self-contradictory, hence necessarily false. Solve the triad, either by showing that the limbs are (collectively) logically consistent or by rejecting one or more…

  • Are the Laws of Logic Empirical Generalizations?

    London Ed raises the question whether logic is empirical.   That puts me in mind of  the old idea of John Stuart Mill and others that the laws of logic are empirical generalizations from what we do and do not perceive. Thus we never perceive rain and its absence in the same place at the same time.…

  • Asserting and Arguing: Analysis of an Example and Response to Novak

    In my earlier posts on this topic here and here I did not analyze an example.  I make good that deficit now.  Suppose a person asserts that abortion is morally wrong.  Insofar forth, a bare assertion which is likely  to elicit the bare counter-assertion, 'Abortion is not morally wrong.'  What can be gratuitously asserted may be…

  • Abbreviations, Place-Holders, and Logical Form

    It is one thing to abbreviate an argument, another to depict its logical form. Let us consider the following argument composed in what might be called 'canonical English': 1. If God created some contingent beings, then he created all contingent beings.2. God created all contingent beings.—–3. God created some contingent beings. The above  is an…

  • More on Asserting and Arguing

    James Anderson comments astutely via e-mail: I have a worry about your post Asserting and Arguing. You seem to affirm all of the following: (1) An assertion is a mere assertion unless argued.(2) Mere assertions are gratuitous.(3) The premises of arguments are assertions.(4) One cannot argue for every premise of every argument. This is an…

  • Asserting and Arguing

    Mere assertions remain gratuitous until supported by arguments. Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.  That which is gratuitously assertible is gratuitously deniable.  Thus one is right to demand arguments from those who make assertions.  It is worth pointing out, however, that  the difference between making an assertion and giving an argument is not absolute. Since no argument  can prove its…

  • Logical Versus Metaphysical Modality

    A Pakistani reader inquires: This is a query which I hope you can answer. Is there such a distinction as 'logical contingency' vs 'metaphysical contingency', and 'logical necessity' vs 'metaphysical necessity'? And if there is, can you explain it? Thank you. A short answer first.  Yes, there are these distinctions.  They amount to a distinction…