Category: Logica Docens

The Copula: Adorno Contra Heidegger

Adorno Time was when I was much interested in the philosophers of the Frankfurter Schule.  That was in the 'seventies and 'eighties. Less interested now,  I am still intrigued by Adorno's critique of Heidegger. Is it worth anything? For that matter, are Heidegger's ideas worth anything? Let's see.

I will explain one aspect of Heidegger's notorious Seinsfrage, an aspect centering on the role of the copula in predicative sentences/judgments. True-blue Heideggerians may not recognize much of their Master here, but I'm a thinker not an exegete. I will also consider what Adorno has to say in criticism of Heidegger in the section on the copula in Negative Dialektik.

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Paul Edward’s Heidegger’s Confusions: A Two-Fold Ripoff

(This was written 30 January 2006.  Paul Edwards, though he made some significant contributions to contemporary philosophy, was a notorious Heidegger-hater.  I slap him around good in this piece, ending with a nice polemical punch.  He asked for it, and he deserves it.  Not that I think that much of Heidegger.  Recently, controversy about the old Nazi has erupted anew.  More on that later today or tomorrow.)

I recently purchased, but then returned, Paul Edward’s Heidegger’s Confusions (Prometheus, 2004) when I found that it is nothing but an overpriced reprint of previously available materials. Twenty dollars for a thin (129 pp.) paperback is bad enough, especially given the mediocre production values of Prometheus Books; but the clincher was my discovery that there is nothing in this volume that has not appeared elsewhere. Edwards and his editors didn’t even bother to change the British quotation conventions in two of the reproduced articles to their Stateside counterparts.

There is also the question of the quality of Edward’s Heidegger-critique, a topic that needs to be treated more fully in a separate post. But for now a comment on Edwards’ refutation-strategy in his second chapter, "Heidegger’s Quest for Being." (What follows summarizes, but also extends, the discussion in my article, "Do Individuals Exist?" Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. XX (1995), pp. 195-220, and my book A Paradigm Theory of Existence (Kluwer 2002), Chapter 4.)

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Wonder at Existence

Existence elicited nausea from Sartre's Roquentin, but wonder from Bryan Magee:

. . . no matter what it was that existed, it seemed to me extraordinary beyond all wonderment that it should. It was astounding that anything existed at all. Why wasn't there nothing? By all the normal rules of expectation — the least unlikely state of affairs, the most economical solution to all possible problems, the simplest explanation — nothing is what you would have expected there to be. But such was not the case, self-evidently. (Confessions of a Philosopher, p. 13)

What elicited Magee's wonderment was the self-evident sheer existence of things in general: their being as opposed to their nonbeing. How strange that anything at all exists! Now what could a partisan of the thin conception of Being or existence make of Magee's intuition of existence?

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Tribute to Morris R. Cohen: Rational Thought as the Great Liberator

Morris r cohen Morris Raphael Cohen (1880-1947) was an American philosopher of naturalist bent who taught at the City College of New York from 1912 to 1938. He was reputed to have been an outstanding teacher. I admire him more for his rationalism than for his naturalism. In the early 1990s, I met an ancient lady at a party who had been a student of Cohen's at CCNY in the 1930s. She enthusiastically related how Cohen had converted her to logical positivism, and how she had announced to her mother, "I am a logical positivist!" much to her mother's incomprehension.

These are timely words. Dogmatism is the basis of all fanaticism.  Dogmatism can be combatted by the setting forth of one's beliefs as conclusions of (valid) arguments so that the premises needed to support the beliefs become evident.  One can also show by this method that arguments 'run forward' can just as logically be 'run in reverse,' or, as we say in the trade, 'One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.'

In Cohen's day, the threats to civilization were Fascism, National Socialism, and Communism. Today the threat is Islamo-totalitarianism. Then as now, logic has a small but important role to play in the defeat of these threats.  The fanaticism of the Islamic world is due in no small measure to the paucity  there of rational heads like Cohen. 

But I do have one quibble with Cohen. He tells us that "Every material proposition has an intelligible alternative…" (Ibid.) This is not quite right. A material proposition is one that is non-logical, i.e., one that is not logically true if true. But surely there are material propositions that have no intelligible alternative. No color is a sound is not a logical truth since its truth is not grounded in its logical form. No F is a G has both true and false substitution-instances. No color is a sound is therefore a material truth. But its negation Some color is a sound is not intelligible if 'intelligible' means possibly true. If, on the other hand, 'intelligible' characterizes any form of words that is understandable, i.e., is not gibberish, then logical truths such as Every cat is a cat have intelligible alternatives: Some cat is not a cat, though self-contradictory, is understandable. If it were not, it could not be understood to be self-contradictory. By contrast, Atla kozomil eshduk is not understandable at all, and so cannot be classified as true, false, logically true, etc.

So if 'intelligible' means (broadly logically or metaphysically) possibly true, then it is false that "Every material proposition has an intelligible alternative . . . ."

Arguments and Conditionals

The early Stoic logicians were aware of a distinction that most of us make nowadays but that certain medieval logicians, according to David H. Sanford (If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning, p. 31), either missed or did not make. I am referring to the difference between arguments and conditional statements. Note the difference between

1. Since murder is wrong, suicide is wrong

and

2. If murder is wrong, then suicide is wrong.

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Errol Harris on Material Implication

Errol E. Harris, Formal, Transcendental, and Dialectical Thinking: Logic and Reality (SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 38-39:

Sometimes an excuse is offered for the paradoxical (one might say, illogical) character of material implication on the ground that the Philonian interpretation of the conditional is the weakest which will satisfy the requirement that the rule of detachment gives a valid inference. But it is obvious from the foregoing that it does not satisfy this requirement; for unless there is some essential connection between p and q we cannot validly argue "If p then q, and p; therefore q." We ought not even to assert, "If p then q" except on the condition that there is a connection between what the propositions express. The Philonian interpretation licenses the schema "If p, then q" whether or not there is any connection, so we might argue:

If pigs cannot fly, Socrates is mortal;
but pigs cannot fly,
therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Although this argument is valid according to the current doctrine, the conclusion, as long as it includes the word "therefore," is false, because it alleges in effect that the reason for Socrates' mortality is the flightlessness of pigs. Accordingly, we have an implicitly false conclusion from true premisses, and that is precisely what the rule of detachment is supposed to preclude.

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The Meno Paradox and the Difference Between Paradoxes and Arguments

S. C. e-mails:

I stumbled onto a question in my studies today that I am not sure how to resolve and you seem like just the person to ask. The question is this: what, exactly, makes a paradox different from a regular old argument? Consider: we tend to call paradoxes those arguments which seem sound and yet whose conclusions we are not inclined to accept. Hence, what one of my professors calls Meno’s Paradox is not a paradox in Meno’s eyes. For him it’s simply an argument that shows we can’t come to know things.  I think the same can be said for Zeno’s paradoxes. Zeno was not trying to conclude with contradictions for us to be puzzled over—he was trying to give reductio ad absurdum arguments against motion and time. If Zeno was right about time and motion then none of his arguments are paradoxes any more than the problem of evil is a paradox for the atheist. It seems to me that the only thing that makes a paradox a paradox is that the consumer is unwilling to accept its conclusion (or has independent reason to think the conclusion must be wrong). Am I missing something here?

What is the difference between a paradox and an argument?  An excellent question the answer to which depends on how 'paradox' and 'argument' are defined.  Following Nicholas Rescher, I would define a paradox as a set of individually plausible but collectively inconsistent propositions.   Meno's paradox, also known as the paradox of inquiry, is an example.  It can be cast in the form of the following aporetic tetrad:

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Five Serious Uses of Argument

Even among calm and reasonable people, few are persuaded by argument, even when it satisfies the canons of logic. Changes of view under dialectical pressure are seldom seen. Most just dig in and fortify their defenses. This raises questions about the utility of argument, debate, and discussion. Call me sanguine, call me naive – but I believe in their utility. Herewith, a preliminary catalog of the uses of argument.

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Fred Sommers Abandons Whitehead and Metaphysics for Logic

Fred Sommers, The Logic of Natural Language (Oxford, 1982), p. xii:

My interest in Ryle's 'category mistakes' turned me away from the study of Whitehead's metaphysical writings (on which I had written a doctoral thesis at Columbia University) to the study of problems that could be arranged for possible solution.

The suggestion is that the problems of logic, but not those of metaphysics, can be "arranged for possible solution." Although I sympathize with Sommers' sentiment, he must surely have noticed that his attempt to rehabilitate pre-Fregean logical theory issues in results that are controversial, and perhaps just as controversial as the claims of metaphysicians. Or do all his colleagues in logic agree with him?

If by 'pulling in our horns' and confining ourselves to problems of language and logic we were able to attain sure and incontrovertible results, then there might well be justification for setting metaphysics aside and working on problems amenable to solution. But if it turns out that logical, linguistic, phenomenological, epistemological and all other such preliminary inquiries arrive at results that are also widely and vigorously contested, then the advantage of 'pulling in our horns' is lost and we may as well concentrate on the questions that really matter, which are most assuredly not questions of logic and language — fascinating as these may be.

Sommers' is a rich and fascinating book. But, at the end of the day, how important is it to prove that the inference embedded in 'Some girl is loved by every boy so every boy loves a girl' really is capturable, pace the dogmatic partisans of modern predicate logic, by a refurbished traditional term logic? (See pp. 144-145) As one draws one's last breath, which is more salutary: to be worried about a silly bagatelle such as the one just mentioned, or to be contemplating God and the soul?

 

Are There Any Rationally Compelling Arguments for Substantive Theses?

From the mailbag:

Greetings! First, you have a terrific blog, keep up the good work! I'm just an undergrad who is minoring in philosophy, so a lot of your posts are a little over my head, but I try to follow along when I can.

I was just having a quick glance at your post on Russell's Teapot, and one paragraph stuck out to me:
 
"Now it seems to me that both (S) and (W) are plainly false: we have all sorts of reasons for believing that God exists. Here Alvin Plantinga sketches about two dozen theistic arguments. Atheists will not find them compelling, of course, but that is irrelevant. The issue is whether a reasoned case can be made for theism, and the answer is in the affirmative. Belief in God and in Russell's teapot are therefore not on a par since there are no empirical or theoretical reasons for believing in his teapot."
 
I think I have an issue with your statement about atheists not finding theistic arguments compelling to be irrelevant, and all that is important is that, according to you, a reasoned case can be made for theism. So, it sounds to me like you are distinguishing between 2 statements:
 
"Atheists don't find theistic arguments compelling."
 
and
 
"A reasoned case can be made for theism."
 
You accept the former statement, but you say it's irrelevant, because you accept the latter statement. But to me, I find both statements to be essentially synonymous.
 

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Three Senses of ‘Or’

‘Or’ is a troublesome particle in dire need of regimentation. Besides its two disjunctive meanings, the inclusive and the exclusive, there is also what I call the ‘or’ of identity. The inclusive meaning, corresponding to the Latin vel, is illustrated by ‘He is either morally obtuse or intellectually obtuse.’ This allows that the person in question may be both.

The exclusive meaning, corresponding to the Latin aut, is exemplified by the standard menu inscription, ‘soup or salad,’ which means one or the other, but not both. Logicians view the inclusive ‘or’ as a basic propositional connective. Thus our first example would be symbolized by p v q, where p is the proposition expressed by ‘He is morally obtuse’; q the proposition expressed by ‘He is intellectually obtuse’; with ‘v’ — in honor of vel — standing for inclusive disjunction. Exclusive ‘or’ can now be defined as follows: p aut q =df p v q & ~(p & q), where the tilde and the ampersand, both propositional connectives, represent negation and conjunction respectively.

Further Modal Concepts: Consistency, Inconsistency, Contradictoriness, and Entailment

I argued earlier that the validity of argument forms is a modal concept.  But the same goes for consistency, inconsistency, contradictoriness, and entailment.  Here are some definitions. 'Poss' abbreviates 'It is broadly-logically possible that ___.' 'Nec' abbreviates 'It is broadly-logically necessary that ___.' '~' and '&' are the familiar truth-functional connectives. 'BL' abbreviates 'broadly logically.'

D1. A pair of propositions p, q is BL-consistent =df Poss(p & q).

Clearly, any two true propositions are consistent. (By 'consistent' I mean consistent with each other.  If I mean self-consistent, I'll say that.)   But there is more to consistency that this.  It is a modal notion.  Consistency cannot be defined in terms of what is actually the case.  One must also consider what could have been the case.  As long as p, q are contingent, they are consistent regardless of their truth-values. If both are true, they are consistent.  If both are false, they are consistent.  If one is true and the other false, or vice versa, they are consistent.

D2. A pair of propositions, p, q, are BL-inconsistent =df ~Poss(p & q).

D3. A pair of propositions p, q are BL-contradictory =df ~Poss(p & q) & ~Poss (~p & ~q).

Note the difference between inconsistency and the stronger notion of contradictoriness.  If two propositions are inconsistent, then they logically cannot both be true.  If two propositions are contradictory, then they are inconsistent but also such that their negations logically cannot be true.

Example. All men are rich and No men are rich are inconsistent in that they cannot both be true.  But they are not contradictory since their negations (Some men are not rich, Some men are rich) are both true.  All men are rich and Some men are not rich are contradictory.  Some men are rich, Some men are not rich are neither inconsistent nor contradictory.

D4. P entails q =df ~Poss(p & ~q).

Entailment, also called strict implication,  is the necessitation of material implication.  If '–>' stands for the material conditional, then the right hand side of (D4) can be put as follows: Nec (p –> q).

(Alethic) modal logic's task is to provide criteria for the evaluation of arguments whose validity or lack thereof depends crucially on such words as 'possibly' and 'necessarily.'  But if I am right, many indispensable concepts of nonmodal logic (e.g., standard first-order predicate logic with identity) are modal concepts. 

 

 

Retortion and Non-Contradiction in Aristotle, Metaphysics, Gamma 3, 4

Retortion is the philosophical procedure whereby one seeks to establish a thesis by uncovering a performative inconsistency in anyone who attempts to deny it. It is something like that benign form of ad hominem in which person A points out to person B that some proposition p that B maintains is inconsistent with some other proposition q that B maintains. "How can you maintain that p when your acceptance of p is logically ruled out by your acceptance of q? You are contradicting yourself!" This objection is to the man, or rather, to the man's doxastic system; it has no tendency to show that p is false. It shows merely that not all of B's beliefs can be true. But if the homo in question is Everyman, or every mind, then the objection gains in interest. Suppose there is a proposition that it is impossible for anyone (any rational agent) to deny; the question arises whether the undeniability or ineluctability of this proposition is a reason to consider it to be true. Does undeniability establish objective truth? Consider

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Modal Confusion in Rand/Peikoff

Comments are on.  If you have something intelligent and civil to contribute, please do.  But I have zero tolerance for cyberpunks.  If you fail to address what I actually say, or thoughtlessly spout the Rand party line, or show the least bit of disrespect to me or my commenters, then I will delete your comment.

Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology includes an essay by Leonard Peikoff entitled "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy."  The section "Necessity and Contingency" concludes with the following paragraph:

Truth is the identification of a fact with reality. Whether the fact in question is metaphysical or man-made, the fact determines the truth: if the fact exists, there is no alternative in regard to what is true. For instance, the fact that the U.S. has 50 states was not metaphysically necessary – but as long as this is men's choice, the proposition that "The U.S. has 50 states" is necessarily true.  A true proposition must describe the facts as they are.  In this sense, a "necessary truth" is a redundancy, and a "contingent truth" a self-contradiction. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., eds. Binswanger and Peikoff, NAL Books, 1990, p. 111, emphasis in original.) 

I have no objection to part of what is being said in this passage, in fact I heartily agree with it, namely, that facts determine truths.  The non-man-made fact of the moon's having craters makes-true the proposition expressed by 'The moon has craters.'  And similarly for the man-made fact regarding the 50 states cited by Peikoff.  So I cheerfully agree that "if the fact exists, there is no alternative in regard to what is true."  We can put the point as follows given that there is a fact F and a proposition p that records F:

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