Category: Language, Philosophy of
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Assertion and Grammatical Mood
Assertion has both a pragmatic and a semantic aspect. First and foremost, assertion is a speech act. As such, assertion or asserting is a different type of speech act from commanding, asking a question, or expressing a wish. But if we consider the language system in abstraction from the uses to which it is put…
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Pure Indexicals Versus Demonstratives
Suppose you like Italian cold cuts and cheeses, but you are not en rapport with the names: prosciutto, mortadella, capicola, salami, provolone, ricotta. So you are reduced to pointing when you belly up to the deli counter: 'I would like a pound of this, finely sliced.' Your use of 'this' must be accompanied by a…
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A Review of Jerrold J. Katz, Sense, Reference, and Philosophy
Here. By Kelley L. Ross, whose site contains a great deal of interesting material. But why anyone would use a black background escapes me.
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The Aporetics of Reference to Past Individuals
'Ocham' responds: You say "Although Caesar no longer exists, he did exist, and so it is reasonable to take 'Caesar' as having a referent. " It would be correct to say that the proper name 'Caesar' *had* a referent. But does it *have* a referent? If it has (present tense) a referent, then there is…
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Still More on Alienans Constructions
Our old friend 'Ocham' writes: I read your discussion of 'alienans' with interest. It is another of those interesting words (like 'inexistence') that look as though it comes from scholastic philosophy, but apparently doesn't. I use my Latin site searcher in cases of doubt – this analyses texts of specific writers and periods. None of…
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Seldom Seen Slim on ‘Tautologies’ That Ain’t
Seldom Seen Slim in a characteristic back-to-the-camera pose evaluates the shooting skills of the man we call 'Doc' (in allusion to Doc Holliday). Slim writes: Whilst I'm mulling over your thoughts on souls and salvation, here's a trifle you might agree with. You write "There are many examples of the use of tautological sentences to…
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More on Alienans Adjectives: Relative Truth and Derived Intentionality
I am sitting by a pond with a child. The child says, "Look, there are three ducks." I say, "No, there are two ducks, one female, the other male, and a decoy." The point is that a decoy duck is not a duck, but a piece of wood shaped and painted to appear (to a…
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A Quiz on Alienans Adjectives
First read study the post Alienans Adjectives. Then take the quiz. Answers below the fold. Classify the adjectives in the following examples as either specifying (S), alienans (A), or neither (N). Much of course depends on the context in which the phrase is used. So imagine a plausible and common context. 1. Deciduous tree. 2. Alleged…
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Alienans Adjectives
A reader inquires: I find your blog interesting and educational. A while ago you mentioned that there is a term for an adjective which is used not to specify a particular sort of the noun which it modifies, but rather a thing which does not meet the definition of that noun. (I've likely somewhat mangled…
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When Is a Tautology Not a Tautology?
My Aunt T. was married to a gruff and taciturn Irishman who rejoiced under the name of 'Morris.' Thinking to engage Uncle Mo in conversation during one of my infrequent visits to the Big Apple, and knowing that Morris drove a beer truck, I once made some comment about the superiority of German over American…
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A Modal Fallacy to Avoid: Confusing the Necessity of the Consequence with the Necessity of the Consequent
No one anywhere can utter 'I am talking now' without saying something true. Indeed, that is necessarily the case: it doesn't just happen to be the case. Letting T = 'I am talking now,' we can write 1. Necessarily, for any speaker S, if S utters T, then T is true. But it would be…
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A Sense/Reference Objection to the Irreducibility of Phenomenally Conscious States
I agree with Thomas Nagel, John Searle, and others that conscious experiences are irreducible to physical states. I have endorsed the idea that felt pain, phenomenal pain, pain as experienced or lived through (er-lebt), the pain that hurts, has a subjective mode of existence, a "first-person ontology" in Searle's phrase. If this is right, then…
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The Metaphysics 101 Argument for Propositions
In his SEP entry on propositions, Matthew McGrath presents what he calls the 'Metaphysics 101' argument for propositions. Rather than quote him, I will put the argument in my own more detailed way. 1. With respect to any occurrent (as opposed to dispositional) belief, there is a distinction between the mental act of believing and…
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Pavel Tichý on Whether ‘God’ is the Name of an Individual
This post is the third in a series on Pavel Tichý's "Existence and God" (J. Phil., August 1979, 403-420). So far I have sketched his theory of existence, made a couple of objections, and refuted his argument for it. I now turn to section II of his article (pp. 410-412) in which he discusses Descartes'…
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More on Tichý on Existence: One of His Arguments Examined
This post is a sequel to Pavel Tichý on Existence. There I explained Tichý's theory as a variation on the Fregean theory and made a start on a critique of it. Here I examine an argument of his for it. He writes, If existence were a property ascribable to individuals, then the force of such…