Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Language, Philosophy of

  • The ‘Is’ of Identity and the ‘Is’ of Predication

    Bill Clinton may have brought the matter to national attention, but philosophers have long appreciated that much can ride on what the meaning of 'is' is.  Edward of London has a very good post in which he raises the question whether the standard analytic distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication…

  • Time, Truth, and Truth-Making: An Antilogism Revisited and Transmogrified

    Earlier, I presented the following, which looks to be an antilogism.  An antilogism, by definition, is an inconsistent triad.  This post considers whether the triad really is logically inconsistent, and so really is an antilogism. 1. Temporally Unrestricted Excluded Middle: The principle that every declarative sentence is either true, or if not true, then false…

  • Could Qualia Terms and Neuroscience Terms Have the Same Reference?

    I made the point that the vocabularies of phenomenology and neuroscience are radically disparate, such that nonsense arises when one says things like, 'This burnt garlic smell is identical to a brain state of mine.'  To which a Viet Nam veteran, altering the example,  replied by e-mail: . . . when a neuro-scientist says your smelling this…

  • Sentences as Names of Facts: An Aporetic Triad

    There are good reasons to introduce facts as truth-makers for contingently true atomic sentences.  (Some supporting reasoning here.)  But if there are facts, and they make-true contingent atomic sentences, then what is the semantic relation between these declarative sentences and their truth-makers?  It seems we should say that such sentences name facts.  But some remarks…

  • Atomic Sentences, Negation, and Direct Reference

    Edward argues: Now I claim that in systems where there is no distinction between predicate and sentence negation, we have ‘direct reference’. This is easily shown. Direct reference in a singular sentence is when the sentence is meaningless when the singular subject fails to refer. Assume that ‘a is F’ is not meaningless. If it…

  • Negative Existentials and the Causal Theory of Reference: Notes on Donnellan

    Causal theories of reference strike me as hopeless.  Let's see how they fare with the problem of negative existentials. There are clear cases in which 'exist(s)' functions as a second-level predicate, a predicate of properties or concepts or propositional functions or cognate items, and not as a predicate of individuals. The   affirmative general existential 'Horses…

  • Singular Meaning

    Edward Ockham of Beyond Necessity is back from his Turkish holiday and reports that, besides lazing on the beach at Bodrum, he . . . spent some time thinking about singular concepts. Do you accept singular meaning? Either you hold that a proper name has a meaning, or not (Aquinas held that it does not,…

  • Are There Logically Simple Propositions?

    Leo Carton Mollica e-mails:   Your most recent post (for which many thanks) inspired the below-expressed argument, and I was curious as to your opinion of it . . . . I think it has something behind it, but right now I feel uncertain about my examples in (2).   0. There is something curious…

  • Atomic Sentences and Syncategorematic Elements

    According to Fred Sommers (The Logic of Natural Language, p. 166), ". . . one way of saying what an atomic sentence is is to say that it is the kind of sentence that contains only categorematic expressions." Earlier in the same book, Sommers says this: In Frege, the distinction between subjects and predicates is not…

  • The Aporetics of Singular Sentences

    I should issue a partial retraction.  I wrote earlier,"The TFL representation of singular sentences as quantified sentences does not capture their logical form, and this is an inadequacy of TFL, and a point in favor of MPL."  ('TFL' is short for 'traditional formal logic'; 'MPL' for 'modern predicate logic with identity.' ) The animadversions of Edward the…

  • Hypostatization and Plural Reference

    In Plural Reference, Franklin Mason writes that "Vallicella is often a delight, but upon occasion he annoys me to no end."  Apparently I remind him of a "philosophical pugilist," a former colleague perhaps, who is obnoxious in the manner of all-too-many analytic philosophers. (One such told me once that if one is not willing to become…

  • C. J. F. Williams’ Analysis of ‘I Might Not Have Existed’

    There are clear cases in which 'exist(s)' functions as a second-level predicate, a predicate of properties or concepts or propositional functions or cognate items, and not as a predicate of individuals. The   affirmative general existential 'Horses exist,' for example, is best understood as making an instantiation claim: 'The concept horse is instantiated.' Accordingly, the sentence does…

  • An Argument for Direct Reference

    Edward Ockham uses  ‘Direct Reference’ to refer to "the theory that part or all of the meaning of a proper name requires the existence of a named object."  This implies that a proper name cannot have a meaning unless there exists an object it names.  He then gives the following argument: A term signifies either a…

  • The Reference Relation: Internal or External?

    What is (linguistic) reference?  Is it a relation?  Edward the Ockhamist assumes that it is and issues the following request:  "To clarify, could I ask both you and Bill whether you think the reference relation is ‘internal’ or ‘external’?" Here is an inconsistent tetrad: 1. 'Frodo' refers to Frodo2. 'Frodo' exists while Frodo does not. 3. Reference…

  • Geach on Proper Names: Mental Acts Chapter 16

    Peter Geach, Mental  Acts, Chapter 16 (RKP, 1957) is eminently relevant to present concerns and quite sensible. Herewith, an interpretive summary. Per usual, I take the ball and run with it. Geach rejects the Russellian view that ordinary proper names are definite descriptions in disguise, but he also rejects the notion that proper names have…