Category: Language, Philosophy of
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A Quick Proof that ‘Exist(s)’ is not Univocal
Suppose we acquiesce for the space of this post in QuineSpeak. Then 'Horses exist' says no more and no less than that 'Something is a horse.' And 'Harry exists' says no more and no less than that 'Something is Harry.' But the 'is' does not have the same sense in both translations. The first is the…
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Van Inwagen on ‘Exists’ as a Polyadic Predicate
This post continues my examination of Peter van Inwagen's "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment." The first post in this series is here. There you will find the bibliographical details. We saw that van Inwagen gives something like the following argument for the univocity of 'exists': 1. Number-words are univocal 2*. 'Exist(s)' is a number-word Therefore…
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Van Inwagen on the Univocity of ‘Exists’
In "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment" (in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, eds. Chalmers et al., Oxford 2009, pp. 472-506), Peter van Inwagen argues that 'exists' is univocal: it does not have "different meanings when applied to objects in different categories." (482) This post will examine one of his arguments, an argument…
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Answering Questions With Questions
It is a commonplace that the grammatical form of a sentence is no sure guide to its logical form or to the ontological structure of the chunk of reality the sentence is about, if anything. For example, 'Kato Kaelin is home' and 'Nobody is home' are grammatically similar. They both seem to have the structure:…
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George F. Will and the Beach Boys Meet Alexius Meinong
"The Beach Boys Still Get Around." Excellent sociocultural analysis by George Will. Opening paragraph: Three hours before showtime, Brian Wilson says: “There is no Rhonda.” Sitting backstage at Merriweather Post Pavilion, gathering strength for the evening’s 48-song, 150-minute concert, Wilson was not asked about her, he just volunteered this fact. The other members of the…
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The Modified Leibniz Question: The Debate So Far
What follows is a guest post by Peter Lupu with some additions and corrections by BV. 'CCB' abbreviates 'concrete contingent being.' The last post in this series is here. Thanks again to Vlastimil Vohamka for pointing us to Maitzen's article, which has proven to be stimulating indeed. So far as I can see…
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The Problem of First-Person identity Sentences
0. Am I identical to my (living) body, or to the objectively specifiable person who rejoices under the name 'BV'? Earlier I resoundingly denied this identity, in (rare) agreement with London Ed, but admitted that argument is needed. This post begins the argument. We start with the problem of first-person identity sentences. 1. 'I am…
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Mereological Criteria for Sortals and a Retraction
I said something yesterday that isn't right, as I realized this morning. I said, ". . . a necessary condition of a term's being a sortal is that it be such that, if it applies to a thing, then it does not apply to the proper parts of the thing." What I said works for…
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The Argument From Circularity and Singular Existential Statements: A Response
This is a response to a post of the same name by London Ed. I am much in his debt for his copious and relentless commentary. My responses are in blue. After reading some of Maverick’s other posts on the subject, and reading some material he sent me, it is clear I have misrepresented his…
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Singular Concepts and Singular Negative Existentials
London Ed seems to be suggesting that we need irreducibly singular concepts (properties, propositional functions) if we are properly to analyze grammatically singular negative existence statements such as 1. Vulcan does not exist. But why do we need to take 'Vulcan' to express a singular concept or haecceity property? Why isn't the following an adequate…
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Saying and Showing
Again, show what? 'There are objects' is nonsense. One cannot say that there are objects. This is shown by the use of variables. But what is shown if not that there are objects? There, I've said it! Ray Monk reports on a discussion between Wittgenstein and Russell. L. W. balked at Russell's 'There are at least…
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On the Expressibility of ‘Something Exists’
Surely this is a valid and sound argument: 1. Stromboli exists.Ergo2. Something exists. Both sentences are true; both are meaningful; and the second follows from the first. How do we translate the argument into the notation of standard first-order predicate logic with identity? Taking a cue from Quine we may formulate (1) as 1*. For…
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The Stromboli Puzzle
Here is another puzzle London Ed may enjoy. Is the following argument valid or invalid: An island volcano exists.Stromboli is an island volcano.ErgoStromboli exists. The argument appears valid, does it not? But it can't be valid if it falls afoul of the dreaded quaternio terminorum, or 'four-term fallacy.' And it looks like it does. On the…
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Can Every General Existential be Expressed as an Instantiation Claim?
Here are some general existentials: An island volcano exists.There are uninhabited planets.Faithful husbands exist.Unicorns do not exist.There aren't many chess players in Bagdad, Arizona. Each of these is expressible salva significatione et veritate (without loss of meaning or truth) by a corresponding instantiation claim: The concept island volcano is instantiated. The concept uninhabited planet is…
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Morning Star and Evening Star
London Ed of Beyond Necessity does a good job patiently explaining the 'morning star' – 'evening star' example to one of his uncomprehending readers. But I don't think Ed gets it exactly right. I quibble with the following: Summarising:(1) The sentence “the morning star is the evening star” has informational content.(2) The sentence “the morning star…