Category: Kripke
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Saul Kripke (1940-2022)
We honor a philosopher best by re-enacting his thoughts, sympathetically, but critically. Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas. Here are a couple of entries from my Kripke category: Arguing with Kripke over Existence Kripke's Misunderstanding of Meinong
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Yet Another Exchange on the Necessity of Identity
The Opponent by e-mail: Still puzzling over this. I think Kripke believes we can get to N of I directly, via rigidity of designation. If names are rigid designators, then there can be no question about identities being necessary, because ‘a’ and ‘b’ will be rigid designators of a certain man or thing x. Then…
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Kripke, Belief, Irrationality, and Contradiction
London Ed comments: I also note a confusion that has been running through this discussion, about the meaning of ‘contradiction’. I do not mean to appeal to etymology or authority, but it’s important we agree on what we mean by it. On my understanding, a contradiction is not ‘the tallest girl in the class is…
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What Exactly is Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief?
I will try to explain it as clearly and succinctly as I can. I will explain the simplest version of the puzzle, the 'monoglot' version. We shall cleave to English as to our dear mother. The puzzle is generated by the collision of two principles, one concerning reference, the other concerning disquotation. Call them MILL…
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Ortcutt and Paderewski: Against the Millian Theory of Proper Names
Saul Kripke's Paderewski puzzle put me in mind of a rather similar puzzle — call it the Ortcutt puzzle — from W.V. Quine's seminal 1956 J. Phil. paper, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" (in The Ways of Paradox, Harvard UP, 1976, pp. 185-196). Back to Ortcutt! The ordinary language 'Ralph believes that someone is a spy' …
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Background for a Discussion of Kripke’s “A Puzzle About Belief”
London Ed wants to discuss the Paderewski example in Saul Kripke's "A Puzzle About Belief." But before doing so we should see if we agree on some preliminary points. Knowing Ed, he will probably find a way to disagree with a good chunk what I am about to say. So I expect we will get…
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Kripke’s Misrepresentation of Meinong
In "Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities" (in Philosophical Troubles, Oxford UP, 2011, pp. 52-74) Saul Kripke distances himself from the following view that he ascribes to Alexius Meinong: Many people have gotten confused about these matters because they have said, 'Surely there are fictional characters who fictionally do such-and-such things; but fictional characters don't exist;…
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Arguing with Kripke over Existence
I now have in my hands Saul Kripke's Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, Oxford UP, 2013. The lectures were given over forty years ago in the fall of 1973. Why did you starve us for 40 years, Saul? It is not as if you did much in those years to improve the lectures…