Category: Islamism

Again on “Muslims Attacked Us on 9/11”

This just over the transom in response to a post from yesterday.

Your terminology is technically correct, but what is incorrect with the statement "Muslim extremists attacked us on 911"?

One does not have to be ‘politically correct’ to have a desire not to invite misunderstanding of a statement (that it equals: " Muslims-as-a-group attacked us" ) or to desire to avoid a perceived implication that there is something about the ‘essence’ of ‘Islam’ that is responsible for 911.

Nothing is wrong with 'Muslim extremists attacked us on 9/11.'  But there is also nothing wrong with O'Reilly's statement, "Muslims attacked us on 9/11."  After all, the first entails the second.  No one maintains that every Muslim attacked us on 9/11 or that Muslims as a group attacked us on that day.

My correspondent is missing the point, which is that inappropriate offense was taken by Joy Behar and Whoopi Goldberg when they stomped off the set in protest.  That inappropriate offense taken  at an objectively inoffensive remark is what shows that political correctness is at work.

This is just one more example among hundreds.  Remember the man who was fired from his job for using the perfectly innocuous English word 'niggardly'?  And then there was the case of some fool taking umbrage at the use of 'black hole.'  See Of Black Holes and Political Correctness and Of Black Holes and Black Hos.

And then there was the recent case of Dr. Laura who pointed out the obvious truth that some blacks apply 'nigger' to other blacks.  This got her in trouble, but it ought not have.  After all, what she said is true!  And let's recall that she had a reason for bringing up this truth: her remark was not unmotivated or inspired by nastiness.

Please note that I am talking about the word 'nigger,' not using it.  This is the use-mention distinction familiar to (analytic) philosophers.  Is Boston disyllabic?  Obviously not: no city consists of syllables, let alone two syllables.  Is 'Boston' disyllabic?  Yes indeed.  Confusing words and their referents is the mark of a primitive mind. In the following sentence

'Nigger' has nothing semantically or etymologically to do with 'niggardly'

I am mentioning both words but using neither.  "But what if someone is offended by your mere mention of 'nigger'?"  Too bad.  That's his problem. He is in need of therapy not refutation.

Islam and the West

It is certainly time that the West considered systematically whether it has irreconcilable differences with Islam. The belligerence of many Islamic spokesmen and the unassimilable quality of many Muslim immigrants in the West, as well as the spectacular terrorist provocations of extreme Islamic groups, make this a very legitimate question.

Read the rest.

Self-Censorship Among the Politically Correct

There is no chicken like a liberal chicken.  Here.  Prager's comment: "Secular + Liberal = Wimp."

UPDATE 10/14.  Reason magazine weighs in.  Just Admit it, Newspapers: You're Scared of Muslims.

Of course.  The self-censorship is motivated by fear.  And it is a rational fear, which is why 'Islamophobia' and cognates are idiotic constructions that ought to be shunned by the intelligent.  Must I point out once again that a phobia is an irrational fear? So why do our leftist pals sling this word?

Some leftists sincerely believe that the concern over radical Islam is alarmist.  But most leftists know that it is not alarmist.  It is just that they hate conservatives more than they hate the threat to their own values.  They hate conservatives so much that they cannot or will not admit that they have more in common with contemporary American conservatives than they do with radical Muslims.  Astonishing, but true.  Apparently, they think they can use the Islamists, as a species of 'useful idiot,' to help destroy capitalism and usher in the socialist worker's paradise, dismissing or converting the Islamists when their services are no longer needed.  It's a bad bet.  It is more likely that they will lose their heads before any dismissal or conversion or mollification or other normalization of Islamists occurs.

No Provision in Islam for Mosque-State Separation

John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (Yale UP, 1989, pp. 48-49):

From the point of view of the understanding of this state of islam [submission to Allah] the Muslim sees no distinction between the religious and the secular.  The whole of life is to be lived in the presence of Allah and is the sphere of God's absolute claim and limitless compassion and mercy.  And so islam, God-centredness, is not only an inner submission to the sole Lord of the universe but also a pattern of corporate life in accordance with God's will.  It involves both salat, worship, and falah, the good embodied in behaviour.  Through the five appointed moments of prayer each day is linked to God. Indeed almost any activity may be begun with Bismillah ('in the name of Allah'); and plans and hopes for the future are qualified by Inshallah ('if Allah wills').  Thus life is constantly punctuated by the remembrance of God.  It is a symptom of this that almsgiving ranks with prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and confession of faith as one of the five 'pillars' of Islam.  Within this holistic conception the 'secular' spheres of politics, government, law, commerce, science and the arts all come within the scope of religious obedience.

What Hick calls a "holistic conception," I would call totalitarian.  Islam is totalitarian in a two-fold sense.  It aims to regulate every aspect and every moment of the individual believer's life. (And if you are not a believer, you must either convert or accept dhimmitude.)   But it is also totalitarian in a corporate sense in that it aims to control every aspect of society in all its spheres, just as Hick points out supra.

Islam, therefore, is profoundly at odds with the values of the West.  For we in the West, whether liberals or conservatives, accept church(mosque)-state separation.  We no doubt argue heatedly over what exactly it entails, but we are agreed on the main principle.  I regularly criticize the shysters of the ACLU for their extremist positions on this question; but I agree with them that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ."

This raises a very serious question.  Is Islam –  pure, unEnlightened, un-watered-down, fundamentalist, theocratic Islam — deserving of First Amendment protection?  We read in the First Amendment that Congress shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion.  Should that be understood to mean that the Federal government shall not prohibit the  establishment and  free exercise of a  totalitarian, fundamentalist  theocratic religion in a particular state, say Michigan? 

The USA is a Christian nation with a secular government.  Suppose there was a religion whose aim was to subvert our secular government.  Does commitment to freedom of religion enjoin toleration of such a religion?

 

Joseph Bottum on the Ground Zero Mosque

Here.  Excerpt:

Of course, the first thing that has to be said about the building of an enormous Muslim center so close to the destroyed towers is that it’s wildly offensive. And the second thing to be said is that it’s wildly constitutional.

The offensiveness looks like this: Regardless of how it is intended, it will be perceived by radical Muslims around the world as a giant monument, in the heart of the beast itself, to their success in attacking America. Indeed, it will be perceived by many Americans that way. The funereal and memorial emotion that embraces one on a visit to the Ground Zero site will be weakened—poisoned, just a little—by the presence of this new, grand construction. 
  

Schall on Belloc: Islam as a Christian Heresy

This is a thought-provoking essay. Excerpts with a bit of commentary:

Belloc’s thesis is that Islam began as a Christian heresy which retained the Jewish side of the faith, the Oneness and Omnipotence of God, but denied all the Christian aspects – the Incarnation, the divinity of Christ, who, as a result, became just a prophet. The denial of the church, the priesthood, and the sacraments followed. Islam succeeded because, in its own terms, it was a simple religion. It was easy to understand and follow its few doctrinal and devotional points.

Question: Given that Islam is much closer to Judaism than is Christianity, what explains the murderous ferocity of the Muslim hatred for Jews? One part of the explanation must be in terms of envy. Muslims feel profoundly diminished in their sense of worth by Jewish success and well-being. The Jews have made outstanding contributions to culture out of all proportion to their sparse numbers, whereas the hordes of Muslims have languished for the last four hundred years in backwardness and negativity. What else but envy could motivate the wild cries for the extermination of Jews and the destruction of Israel? Ahmadinejad, you will have noticed, is not a Palestinian, but an Iranian. When non-Palestinian Muslims call for the elimination of Israel, and prepare for decades of suicidal jihad, their 'beef' cannot be a relatively minor land dispute between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs.

Unlike Stanley Jaki, Belloc did not think that there was something in Islamic theology that militated against Islam’s ever becoming a major industrial or military-technological power by itself. (133). The fact that it never accomplished this transformation was for Belloc merely an accident, whereas for Jaki it was rooted in the relation of an absolute notion of divine will to its consequent denial of stable secondary causes. Jaki sees much of the rage in modern Islam to be due to its failure or inability to modernize itself by its own powers.6 Most of the weapons and equipment found in Muslim states are still foreign made, usually inferior, and paid for with oil money.

Islam apparently takes an occasionalist view of divine omnipotence. God is all-powerful not just in the sense that he has the power to do all, but in the sense that he exercises all the power that gets exercised. Thus secondary causes — so-called to distinguish them from the causa prima — are not causes at all, strictly speaking, but mere occasions for the exercise of divine causality, the only causality there is. If so, then everything is up to God, and nothing is up to secondary 'causes' including ourselves. When I lived in Turkey, I was struck by the prevalence of the belief in kismet, or fate. It is reflected in driving habits. Turks are arguably the worst drivers in the world. It is as if they don't believe that what happens on the road is largely up to them: kismet rules. When your number's up, it's up, and it doesn't matter what you do.

The very existence of Christianity is a blasphemy in Muslim terms if we insist on the truth of the Incarnation, that God became man.

In the eyes of Islam, Christianity is a form of idolatry: a mere man is identified with God. Schall quotes Belloc:

Mohammedanism was a heresy: that is the essential point to grasp before going any further. It began as a heresy, not as a new religion. It was not a pagan contrast with the Church: it was not an alien enemy. It was a perversion of Christian doctrine. Its vitality and endurance soon gave it the appearance of a new religion, but those who were contemporary with its rise saw it for what it was — not a denial, but an adaptation and misuse, of the Christian thing (76-77). Though it is not often attended to, saying Mass itself is forbidden in Saudi Arabia, even in private, and, even when permitted in other lands, it is restricted and constantly hemmed in by various formal and informal practices. Freedom of religion is not a concept that rises naturally in Muslim theory but it is a Western idea, even largely a modern Western idea. In Islam, the very practice of freedom of religion is thought to be a species of not giving submission to Allah, even where some non-Muslim churches are permitted.  Belloc thought that the Mohammedan temper was not tolerant. It was, on the contrary, fanatical and bloodthirsty. It felt no respect for, nor even curiosity about, those from whom it differed. It was absurdly vain of itself, regarding with contempt the high Christian culture about it. It still so regards it even today (90). The practical compromise in this situation was to allow the Christians to remain but within very confined areas and occupations. They had to pay a tribute. Many were gradually absorbed into Islam (91).

The Muslim Cab Driver and the Fundamentalist Christian Pharmacist

Mark Whitten inquires by e-mail re: Alcohol, Dogs, and Muslim Cab Drivers:

What is the difference between a Muslim cab driver who does not wish to transport a person with a dog or [an unopened container of]  alcohol, and a fundamentalist Christian pharmacist who does not want to dispense birth control?

Is there not a similar issue of social (dis)harmony / ‘‘assimilation’’ here?

I will assume arguendo that the arguments  against the moral permissibility of birth control (i.e., techniques that prevent conception as opposed to terminating a conceptus) are no better than the arguments against the moral permissibility of imbibing alcoholic beverages in moderation and keeping (well-behaved) dogs as pets  and transporting them in public.  On this assumption what the Christian pharmacist and the Muslim cab driver are doing is very similar.

If I were the owner of the pharmacy, I would fire the fundamentalist and give him this little speech:  "We live in a tolerant pluralistic society in which people disagree about many things including the morality of contraception.  I grant you that, objectively, the practice is either morally acceptable or it is not.  But we don't know which it is. While I respect your deep conviction, it is cuts no ice.  So we tolerate those who differ.  If in good conscience you cannot dispense birth control pills and devices, then you should resign.  But if you refuse to do your job, then you are fired."

If I were the owner of the cab company, I would fire the Muslim and give him this little speech:  "We live in a tolerant pluralistic society in which people disagree about many things including the morality of drinking.  I grant you that, objectively, the practice is either morally acceptable or it is not.  But we don't know which it is. While I respect your deep conviction, it  cuts no ice.  So we tolerate those who differ.  If in good conscience you cannot pick up uninebriated and otherwise well-behaved fares who are transporting unopened containers of hooch, then you should resign.  But if you refuse to do your job, you are fired.

And similarly for the Muslim supermarket checkout girl who refuses to touch a package of bacon.  She ought to be fired.  Ditto for the Muslim Disneyland hostess who insisted on wearing a hijab.  She should be fired and told to look for a job at ShariaLand.

Suppose a flat-chested lass tries to get a waitress  job at Hooters.  Hooters  is an establishment wherein adolescent males of all ages assemble to gawk at the front-end endowments — the 'hooters' — of nubile young ladies. (Some eating and drinking takes place as well.)  Suppose the applicant  is refused on the ground of cup size.  I would say that that is a legitimate form of discrimination  given the puerile purposes of that private enterprise.  It is similar to the Disneyland case.  The average American goes to Disneyland for a dose of pure Americana.  That's what  Disneyland sells.  The rubes from fly-over country don't want to see no Muslims.  Disneyland, as a private enterprise, has the right to demand that its employees project the right image. 

And political correctness be damned.

 

Alcohol, Dogs, and Muslim Cab Drivers

Apparently, significant numbers of Muslim taxi drivers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area are refusing to transport people carrying  dogs or unopened containers of alcoholic beverages. There is a lesson here, but I am quite sure that liberals won't learn it, until they learn it the hard way.  It is a simple lesson really: social harmony is difficult in any event and is made especially difficult when large numbers of people are let into a society who (i) have wildly different values than the rest of us, and (ii) have no intention of assimilating.

Cartoonist Molly Norris Driven into Hiding by Muslim Extremism

Story here. 

Among the great religions of the world, where 'great' is to be taken descriptively not normatively, Islam appears uniquely intolerant and violent.  Or are there contemporary examples of Confucians, Taoists, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, or Christians who, basing themselves on their doctrines, publically  issue and carry out credible death threats against those who mock the exemplars of their faiths?  For example, has any Christian, speaking as a Christian, publically  put out a credible murder contract on Andres Serrano for his "Piss-Christ"?  By 'credible,' I mean one that would force its target, if he were rational, to go into  hiding and erase his identity?

UPDATE 9/19.   Commentary by James Taranto here.  Why doesn't Obama speak up for First Amendment rights in this case?

Where Were You on 9/11/01?

I remember exactly where I was and what I was doing when I first of heard about the acts of 9/11 Islamoterrorism.  It was a cool and bright Arizona morning, dry and delightful as only the desert can be.  I had just returned from a long hard bike ride.  Preliminary to some after-ride calisthenics I switched on the TV only to see  one of the planes enter one of the Trade Towers.

I suspected correctly what was up and I remarked to my wife, "Well, two good things will come of this: Gary Condit will be out of the news forever, and finally something will be done about the porosity of the southern border."  I turned out to be right on one count.  Gary Condit, who had come to national prominence because of his adulterous affair with Chandra Levy, and who had dominated the news that summer of aught-one, dropped out of sight.  And good riddance.

But I was sadly mistaken on the second count.  So here we are, nine years later, with such abominations Obaminations as Department of Justice lawsuits against the State of Arizona for attempting to do what the Feds ought to do yet refuse to do while Mexican drug cartels control some portions of the state.

For detailed analysis, see my Arizona category.

Legality and Propriety: What One Has a Right to Do is Not Always Right to Do

What do the following have in common:  Flag burning, Koran burning, suspending a crucifix in urine and calling it art, building a mosque near Ground Zero, calling a black person 'nigger,' affixing a 'Fuck Your Honor Student' bumpersticker on your car?

They are all offensive, but they are all legal.

Flag burning.  If you steal my flag and burn it, then you violate my property rights and do something illegal.  If you burn a public flag, then that is illegal on grounds of vandalism.  If you burn a flag you own but in a way that causes a public disturbance or endangers members of the public, then  those acts fall under other existing statutes.  But if you buy an American flag and burn it on your property, then you are within your legal rights.  You are in the vast majority of cases a contemptible punk if you do so, and I have a right to my opinion on this score.  But you are within the law.  That is why calls for a flag-burning (or rather anti-flag-burning) amendment to the U. S. Constitution are pointless and just so much political grandstanding. Such appeals are just another way politicians evade the job of making tough decisions about matters of moment.

Ought flag burning come under the rubric of protected speech?  Logically prior question: Is it speech at all?  What if I make some such rude gesture in your face as 'giving you the finger.'  Is that speech?  If it is, I would like to know what proposition it expresses.  'Fuck you!' does not express a proposition.  Likewise for the corresponding gesture with the middle finger.  And if some punk burns a flag, I would like to know what proposition the punk is expressing.  The Founders were interested in protecting reasoned dissent, but the typical act of flag burning by the typical leftist punk does not rise to that level.  Without going any further into this issue, let me just express my skepticism at arguments that try to subsume gestures and physical actions under speech.  But the main point is that we don't need a flag-burning amendment and we ought not have a general legal prohibition on the burning or other desecration of privately owned national symbols if the burning or other desecration is done in a way that does not violate existing laws.

Koran burning.  If it is legal to burn the flag in certain circumstances, then it it legal to burn the Koran or any book in similar circumstances.  If you own a copy of the book, you can do anything you want with it.  You can use it for toilet paper.  So if the Gainesville yahoo wants to organize a Koran burning on private property with privately-owned copies of the Muslim holy book, that must be tolerated no matter how stupid and offensive it is.

But there must be no double standards.  If you condemn Koran burning, then you ought to condemn crucifix desecration and flag burning.  And if you tolerate the latter, then you ought to tolerate the former.

The media both Left and Right are piling on Terry Jones, the Gainesville pastor, while failing to see that his brand of red-necked push-back is exactly what one should expect in the face of Islamist provocation.

And there must be no kow-towing to Muslim hypersensitivity. 

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