Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Intentionality

  • Brentano on the Mark of the Mental

    1. What is the mark of the mental? Brentano took intentionality to be the mark of the mental, the criterion whereby physical and mental phenomena are distinguished. For Brentano, (i) all mental phenomena are intentional, (ii) all intentional phenomena are mental, and (iii) no mental phenomenon is physical. (Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874),…

  • F. H. Bradley on the Non-Intentionality of Pleasure and Pain

     I have argued at length for the non-intentionality of some conscious states.  None of the opposing comments made on the various posts inclined me to modify my view.  The agreement of Peter Lupu, however, fortified me in my adherence to it.  I was especially pleased recently to stumble upon a passage by the great F.…

  • Questions About Religion and Superstition. Superstitious Materialism

    1. Is there a difference between religion and superstition, or is religion by its very nature superstitious? There seem to be two main views. One is that of skeptics and naturalists. For them, religion, apart perhaps from its ethical teaching, is superstitious in nature so that there could not be a religion free of superstition.…

  • Four Uses of ‘Of’ and Non-Intentional Conscious States

    The thesis of intentionality can be stated roughly as follows: Every consciousness is a consciousness of something.  I claim that this Brentano thesis is false because of the existence of non-intentional states of consciousness. Peter Lupu understands and agrees but no one else hereabouts does.  So I need to take a few steps back and issue some…

  • Consciousness and Existence: Is Every Consciousness a Consciousness of What Exists?

    What follows in purple are two quotations (from separate works) from the Ayn Rand Lexicon.  If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness,…

  • Searle on Non-Intentional Mental States

    Herewith, a quotation from John Searle that supports my contention that there are non-intentional mental states: Now clearly, not all our mental states are in this way directed or Intentional. For example, if I have a pain, ache, tickle, or itch, such conscious states are not in that sense directed at anything; they are not…

  • Are There Non-Intentional Mental States?

    The thesis of this post is that there are non-intentional mental states. To establish this thesis all I need is one good example. So consider the felt pain that ensues when I plunge my hand into extremely hot water. This felt pain or phenomenal pain is a conscious mental state. But it does not exhibit…