Category: Intentionality
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Do Purely Fictional Items Exist? On Van Inwagen’s Theory of Ficta
A character in a novel is an example of a purely fictional item provided that the character is wholly 'made up' by the novelist. Paul Morphy, for example, is a character in Francis Parkinson Keyes' historical novel, The Chess Players but he is also a real-life 19th century New Orleans chess prodigy. So Paul Morphy,…
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Thinking About Frodo
Let me attack yesterday's puzzle from a different angle. The puzzle in one sentence: we think about things that do not exist; but how is this possible given that they do not exist? Here is the problem set forth as an aporetic hexad: 1. When I think about Frodo, as I am doing right now,…
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Lukas Novak on Reference to What is Not
Our Czech friend Lukas Novak sent me a paper in which, drawing upon John Duns Scotus, he rejects the following principle of reference: (PR) It is impossible to refer to that which is not. In this entry I will first pull some quotations from Novak's paper and then raise some questions about the view he…
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Must Singular Thoughts be Object-Dependent?
What follows are some ideas from London Ed about a book he is writing. He solicits comments. Mine are in blue. The logical form thing was entertaining but rather off-topic re the fictional names thing. On which, Peter requested some more. Let’s step right back. I want to kick off the book with an observation…
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On the Primacy of the Intentional Over the Linguistic
Following Chisholm, et al. and as against Sellars, et al. I subscribe to the broadly logical primacy of the intentional over the linguistic. But before we can discuss the primacy of the intentional, we must have some idea of (i) what intentionality is and (ii) what the problem of intentionality is. Very simply, (mental) intentionality is…
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Husserl’s Critique of the Image-Theory of Consciousness
Suppose I am conscious of an object in the mode of visual perception: I see a bobcat in the backyard. Does it make sense to try to analyze this perceptual situation by saying that 'in my mind' there is an image or picture that represents something 'outside my mind'? In the Fifth of his Logical…
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Conscience, Brain, and Scientistic Pseudo-Understanding
One of the tasks of philosophy is to expose and debunk bad philosophy. And there is a lot of it out there, especially in the writings of journalists who report on scientific research. Scornful of philosophy, many of them peddle scientistic pseudo-understanding without realizing that what they sell is itself philosophy, very bad philosophy. A…
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Seeing versus Imagining a Ghost: Another Round with Hennessey
It is plain that 'sees' has many senses in English. Of these many senses, some are philosophically salient. Of the philosophical salient senses, two are paramount. Call the one 'existence-entailing.' (EE) Call the other 'existence-neutral.' (EN) On the one, 'sees' is a so-called verb of success. On the other, it isn't, which not to say…
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Some Notes on Rescher’s “Nonexistents Then and Now”
A reader inquires: Have you read Nicholas Rescher's Nonexistents Then and Now? I read it recently and thought I'd bring it to your attention because it's relevant to your recent posts on fiction. If I understand the article, Rescher would agree with you that a fictional man is not a man, but he would say…
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On Seeing: Intentionality without Aspectuality?
Consider this argument: 1. Tom believes that the man at the podium is the Pope 2. The Pope is an Argentinian Therefore 3. Tom believes that the man at the podium is Argentinian. The argument is plainly invalid. For Tom may not believe that the Pope is an Argentinian. Now consider this argument: 4. Tom…
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On Multiplying Modes of Existence
Am I committed to an uneconomical multiplication of modes of existence? I said that the following set of propositions is logically consistent: a. Tom is thinking of a unicorn b. Unicorns do not exist in reality c. Tom's mental state is object-directed; it is an intentional state. d. The object of Tom's mental state does…
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Merely Intentional Objects and the ‘Existential Fallacy’
London Ed wants to pin the 'existential fallacy' on me. He writes and I respond in blue:
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Imagining X as Real versus Imagining X as Unreal and a Puzzle of Actualization
Peter and I discussed the following over Sunday breakfast. Suppose I want a table, but there is no existing table that I want: I want a table with special features that no existing table possesses. So I decide to build a table with these features. My planning involves imagining a table having certain properties. It…
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Do Merely Intentional Objects Have Being of Their Own? With a Little Help from Ingarden
WARNING! Scholastic hairsplitting up ahead! If you are allergic to this sort of thing, head elsewhere. My old post, On Hairsplitting, may be of interest. My Czech colleague Lukas Novak seems to hold that there is no mode of being that is the mode of being of purely or merely intentional objects: . . .…
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From the Laws of Logic to the Existence of God
James N. Anderson and Greg Welty have published a paper entitled The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from Logic. Having worked out similar arguments in unpublished manuscripts, I am very sympathetic to the project of arguing from the existence of necessary truths to the necessary existence of divine mind. Here is a quick sketch of…