Category: Intentionality
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AI and the Unity of Consciousness
Top AI researchers such as Geoffrey Hinton, the "Godfather of AI," hold that advanced AI systems are conscious. That is far from obvious, and may even be demonstrably false if we consider the phenomenon of the unity of consciousness. I will first explain the phenomenon in question, and then conclude that AI systems cannot accommodate…
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A Design Argument from the Cognitive Reliability of Our Senses: A Proof of Classical Theism?
Substack latest. I present an argument that many will take as supporting classical theism. But I point out that, so taken, the argument is not rationally inescapable or philosophically dispositive since it may also be construed along Nagelian lines to support an inherent immanent teleology in nature. Topics include rationality, intentionality, both intrinsic and…
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Jeffrey Long, M. D. on Near-Death Experiences (NDEs)
Here (under 5 minutes). 'Coded' as used by Dr. Long in this video clip is medical jargon. For a patient to 'code' is for the patient to suffer cardiac arrest. It is a mistake to think that if an episode of experiencing is real, then the intentional object of that episode of experiencing is also…
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Intentionality in Locks and Keys?
Daniel Dennett on the 'evolution' of intentionality. Substack latest.
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Consciousness is an Illusion . . .
. . . but truth is not? An inconsistency in Dennett. Over at the Stack.
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On Perceptual ‘Taking’
Ed writes, Something to think about. “I take an X to be a Y”. This can be true when there is no Y. For example, I take a tree root to be a snake. There is a tree root, but no snake. But what about the other way round? I take a mirror image to…
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The Problem of Consciousness and Galen Strawson’s Non-Solution
Hi Dr. Vallicella, I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts, if it interests you to write about it on your blog, on Strawson's intriguing 2021 paper "Oh you materialist!", in which he argues for a materialistic monism and a deflation of the hard problem. Here is a link to the paper: https://philarchive.org/archive/STROYM Best, Chandler…
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The Brentano Inference
London Ed writes, Early on I commented on the following ‘Brentano’ inference, with the question of whether it is valid or not. (1) Jake is thinking of something, therefore Jake’s thinking contains something as object. I think you said it was valid. It is not a question easy to answer properly, and my impression is…
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Intentionality, Singularity, and Individual Concepts
Herewith, some notes on R. M. Sainsbury, Intentionality without Exotica. (Exotica are those items that are "nonexistent, nonconcrete, or nonactual." (303) Examples include Superman and Arcadia.) 'Jack wants a sloop' could mean three different things. (a) There is a particular sloop Jack wants. In this case, Jack's desire is externally singular. Desire is an object-directed…
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Mark Sainsbury on Intentional Relations
Following A. N. Prior, Sainsbury sets up the problem of intentionality as follows: We are faced with a paradox: some intentional states are relational and some are not. But all intentional states are the same kind of thing, and things of the same kind are either all relational or all non-relational. (Intentional Relations, 327) Cast…
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Could Scollay Square be a Meinongian Nonexistent Object?
Bill, newly arrived in Boston, believes falsely that Scollay Square exists and he wants to visit it. Bill asks Kathleen where it is. Kathleen tells him truly that it no longer exists, and Bill believes her. Both use 'Scollay Square' to refer to the same thing, a physical place, one that does not exist. To…
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More on the Riddle of Intentionality with the Help of Molnar
According to George Molnar, The fundamental feature of an intentional state or property is that it is directed to something beyond itself . . . All mental states and processes have an internal reference to an object. The identity of the intentional state is defined in terms of this intentional object. . . . Since intentionality constitutes the…
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How Should We Use ‘Intentional Object’? Is the IO the Thing Itself?
Dr. Buckner comments, . . . we still need to agree on a clear definition of ‘Intentional Object’. Here are two other definitions I found. Tim Crane: what an intentional state is about.Merriam Webster: something whether actually existing or not that the mind thinks about. These are both very clear, and I suggest we adopt them. That…
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Guest Post: On the Fallacy of Intentionalism
ON THE FALLACY OF INTENTIONALISM D.E. Buckner, July 2021 Bill Vallicella critiques a short passage in my recent book (Reference and Identity in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Scriptures: The Same God? Rowman and Littlefield, 2020, p. 195) and he levels the following four charges. 1. Buckner has wrongly characterised intentionality as object-dependence. 2. Buckner has wrongly…
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Some Questions about Thinking, Relations, and Relational Expressions
Bill, you said by email earlier that the sentence “Jake is thinking of Zeus” would be true if Jake was indeed thinking of Zeus. BV: That's what I said, although I would put 'is' where you have 'was.' Is what I said a shocking thing to say? I have questions for you about the terms…