Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Identity and Individuation

  • An Identity Theory of Predication

    I will sketch a two-name, quasi-Scholastic, nominalistic/reistic  theory of predication that I believe is quite hopeless. But it may serve as a foil against which and in comparison to which a more plausible theory may be developed. Suppose it is true that Sam is poor. What are the truth-conditions of 'Sam is poor'?  Rewrite the…

  • The ‘Is’ of Identity and the ‘Is’ of Predication: Contra Sommers

    Dedication: To Bill Clinton who taught us that much can ride on what the meaning of 'is' is. ……………… The Opponent has a very good post in which he raises the question whether the standard analytic distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication is but fallout from an antecedent decision to…

  • Nominalism and an Identity Theory of Predication

    The Worthy Opponent comments, We nominalists hold that 'God is good' is true when what is signified by 'God' and what is signified by 'good' are numerically one and the same thing. I stumble over this.  Apparently, it is The Opponent's view that a sentence such 'Socrates is good' is true when what is signified…

  • Numerical and Qualitative Identity and Radical Flux

    Philosophers often use 'numerically' in contrast with 'qualitatively' when speaking of identity or sameness.  If I tell you that I drive the same car as Jane, that is ambiguous: it could mean that Jane and I drive one and the same car, or it could mean that Jane and I drive the same make and…

  • Belief, Designation, and Substitution

    Suppose it is true that Sam believes that Hesperus is a planet.  One cannot substitute 'Phosphorus' for 'Hesperus' in 'Sam believes that Hesperus is a planet' and be assured that the resulting sentence will also be true.  And this despite the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus. The reason is that Sam may be ignorant of…

  • Yet Another Exchange on the Necessity of Identity

    The Opponent by e-mail: Still puzzling over this. I think Kripke believes we can get to N of I directly, via rigidity of designation. If names are rigid designators, then there can be no question about identities being necessary, because ‘a’ and ‘b’ will be rigid designators of a certain man or thing x. Then…

  • Another Round With the Opponent on the Necessity of Identity

    The Opponent writes, The Maverick Philosopher has a comment on my earlier question about the necessity of identity. Can we get from ‘a=b’ to ‘necessarily a=b’ in a simple step? He thinks we can. Now if ‘H’ and ‘P’ designate one and the same entity, then what appears to be of the form a =…

  • The Necessity of Identity: A Puzzle and a Challenge

    The Opponent comments in black; my responses are in blue: Here is the puzzle: how can we establish the necessity of identity without appealing to principles which are either insufficient, or which are not universally valid? The principle of identity (necessarily, a = a) is not sufficient. We agree that necessarily, Hesperus is identical with…

  • Luke 2:21: Can the Not-Yet-Existent be Named?

    Luke 2:21 (NIV): On the eighth day, when it was time to circumcise the child, he was named Jesus, the name the angel had given him before he was conceived. (emphasis added) This New Testament passage implies that before a certain human individual came into existence, he was named, and therefore could be named.  The implication…

  • Identity and Quasi-Epistemic Contingency

    The Opponent sends the following puzzle to vex us: Story: there was someone called 'a', and there was someone called 'b'. This is all we have of the story. Let the predicate F be 'The story is consistent with anot being identical with ___'. Then clearly Fa is false, and Fb is true.  This is…

  • Our Knowledge of Sameness

    How ubiquitous, yet how strange, is sameness!  A structure of reality so pervasive and fundamental that a world that did not exhibit it would be inconceivable.  How do I know that the tree I now see in my backyard is numerically the same as the one I saw there yesterday? Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper…

  • Visual and Propositional Contents of That-Clauses: An Aporetic Hexad

    Edward of the Logic Museum bids us ruminate upon the following aporetic hexad: We agree that visual and propositional content can be the same. The content-clause ‘that a man was dead’ specifies a content that can be seen (‘the armour-bearer saw (or seemed to see) that a man was dead’) or told (‘the armour-bearer was…

  • Lecturer on Personal Identity Denied Honorarium

    The members of the philosophy department were so convinced by the lecturer's case against diachronic personal identity that they refused to pay him his honorarium on the ground that the potential recipient could not be the same person as the lecturer. This from a piece by Stanley Hauerwas: It is by no means clear to me…

  • Haecceitism and Future Individuals: Focusing the Question

    Suppose there had been a prophet among the ancient Athenians who prophesied the birth among them of a most remarkable man, a man having the properties we associate with Socrates.  Suppose this prophet, now exceedingly old, is asked after having witnessed the execution of Socrates: Was that the man you prophesied? Does this question make…

  • Divine Creation and Haecceity Properties

    Having somewhat churlishly accused Daniel M. of failing to understand my post Does Classical Theism Logically Require Haecceitism, he wrote back in detail demonstrating that he did understand me quite well.  I will now post his e-mail with some responses in blue. I'm sorry. I've re-read your post, and it strikes me as quite clear,…