Category: Idealism and Realism
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Butchvarov’s Paradox of Antirealism and Husserl’s Paradox of Human Subjectivity
Top o' the Stack. UPDATE (8/4/2025). Matteo writes, "As for your latest post on Substack about the dehumanization of the ego, there is this Italian philosopher who holds a very similar view (consciousness and the world are the very same thing, we literally ARE the world etc." https://archive.org/details/spreadmindwhycon0000manz
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Berkeley’s Unperceived Table
Ed writes, A question: if Berkeley is out of his study, and says ‘My table is in my study’, is he speaking truly or falsely? If truly, then ‘my table’ and ‘my study’ must have referents, and the referents must stand in the relation ‘in’. But neither referent is perceived, so neither exists, according to…
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Can one see that one is not a brain-in-a-vat?
This is a repost from 21 December 2009, slightly emended. I've added a clarifying addendum. ………………………….. John Greco, How to Reid Moore: So how does one know that one is not a brain in a vat, or that one is not deceived by an evil demon? Moore and Reid are for the most part silent on…
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Perception: An Inconsistent Triad
London Ed writes, I am making great progress on the perception book. I have borrowed your idea of an aporia, which I use to illustrate the central problem of perception: (1) Transparency: This is the surface of my desk. (2) Continuity: When I shut my eyes, the surface of my desk does not cease to exist (3) Discontinuity: When I…
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Philosophically Salient Senses of ‘See’
This entry is relevant to my ongoing discussion with Dr. Buckner. It is plain that 'sees' has many senses in English. Of these many senses, some are philosophically salient. Of the philosophical salient senses, two are paramount. Call the one 'existence-entailing.' (EE) Call the other 'existence-neutral.' (EN) On the one, 'sees' is a so-called verb…
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Notes on Idealism, Realism, Frege, and Prichard
Ed Buckner sent me a pdf the first couple pages of which I reproduce below. Bibliographical data here. Emphases added. My commentary is in blue. ……………………………………. Twentieth Century Oxford Realism Mark Eli Kalderon and Charles Travis 1 Introduction This is a story of roughly a century of Oxford philosophy told by two outsiders.Neither of us…
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Against H. A. Prichard and the ‘Standard Picture’ of Kant
In an earlier post, drawing on the work of Henry E. Allison, I wrote: The standard picture opens Kant to the devastating objection that by limiting knowledge to appearances construed as mental contents he makes knowledge impossible when his stated aim is to justify the objective knowledge of nature and oppose Humean skepticism. Allison reports…
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Berkeleyan and Kantian Idealism: How Do They Differ?
The good bishop, as Kant called him, held that reality is exhausted by "spirits" and their ideas. Thus on Berkeley's scheme everything is either a spiritual substance or mind, whether finite or infinite (God), or else an idea 'in' a mind. Ideas are thus modes or modifications of minds. As such they do not exist…
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Butchvarov’s Paradox of Antirealism and Husserl’s Paradox of Human Subjectivity
New and improved! Originally posted in October, 2015. For a longish review and critique of the Butchvarov volume mentioned below, see my "Butchvarov on the Dehumanization of Philosophy," Studia Neoaristotelica, vol. 13, no. 2 (2016), pp. 181-195. Butchvarov and Husserl are clearly related to my present and ongoing rehearsal of the problematic of Kantian transcendental…
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The Standard Picture of Kant’s Idealism
This entry draws on Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, Yale University Press, 1983. "According to the standard picture, Kant's transcendental idealism is a metaphysical theory that affirms the unknowability of the 'real' (things in themselves) and relegates knowledge to the purely subjective realm of representations (appearances)." (p. 3) P.F. Strawson…
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Idealism: Subjective, Objective, Transcendental
This from a recent comment thread: I think we should all agree on what counts as ‘subjective idealism’. I characterise it as the view that the objects we commonly take to be physical objects are in some way, or wholly, mind dependent. This a reasonable interpretation of Kant. Let's leave the interpretation of Kant for…
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Denial of God, Denial of Nature
These are opposite poles of the world of woke-leftist lunacy. The metaphysical naturalist denies God and elevates nature, and in some cases make an idol of nature. The theist, while not denying nature, subordinates it to God. He may succumb to idolatry too if his concept of God is unworthy. Both naturalist and theist are…
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Is Classical Theism a Type of Idealism?
I return an affirmative answer. If God creates ex nihilo, and everything concrete other than God is created by God, and God is a pure spirit, then one type of metaphysical realism can be excluded at the outset. This realism asserts that there are radically transcendent uncreated concrete things other than God. 'Radically transcendent' means…
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The Grand Central Polarity: Objective and Subjective
Objectively viewed, an individual human life is next-to-nothing: a fleeting occurrence in the natural world. But we know this, and we know it as subjects for whom there is a world of nature. If objectively we are next-to-nothing, subjectively we are everything. "When I die, the world ends." The thought expressed by this sentence is…
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Thomism and Husserlian Phenomenology: Combinable?
Over the phone the other night, Steven Nemes told me that his project is to synthesize Thomism and phenomenology. I expressed some skepticism. Here are my reasons. Part I: Methodological Incompatibility Essential to Thomism is the belief that the existence of God can be proven a posteriori by human reason unaided by divine revelation. Thus…