Family Life with the Cheever’s

I'm sure family life has its compensations. But it is not for everybody. I live with an angelic wife and two black cats.  All four of us will die without issue. My contact with relatives is minimal. Blood is thicker than water, but consanguinity is no guarantee of spiritual affinity, and in some cases the former seems to exclude the latter. * I can relate to Ralph Waldo Emerson's observation, somewhere in his Journal, I cannot go to the houses of my nearest relatives, because I do not wish to be alone.

The goods of family life I am missing, in a second sense I am not missing: one cannot miss what one never had.  But the bad things I am missing in the first sense I am happy to miss in that same sense.  The following from The Journals of John Cheever:

My daughter says that our dinner table is like a shark tank. I go into a spin. I am not a shark. I am a dolphin. Mary [Cheever's wife] is the shark. Etc. But what we stumble into is the banality of family situations. As for Susie [Cheever's daughter] she makes the error of daring not to have been invented by me, of laughing at the wrong times and of speaking lines I have not written. Does this prove I am incapable of love, or can love only myself? (282)

Well, John, it doesn't prove it, but it is pretty good evidence of it. You would prefer your daughter to be your own creation, a creature of fiction, who does not laugh at the wrong times and speaks only the right lines, a fictional object rather than the subject she is, an ipseity resistant to, and  in adolescent rebellion against, the will of pater familias.  You sired her; you did not create her.**

"Every craft makes crooked" as German folk-wisdom has it,*** and so it is with the novelist. He invents and gets carried away.   Here is an entry on family life illustrating the manipulation of memory by invention:

I think of my father, but nothing is accomplished. The image of him is an invention, not a memory, and an overly gentle invention. There was his full lower lip, wet with spit; his spit-wet cigarette, his hacking cough; the ash on his vest; and the shabby clothes he wore, left to him by dead friends. "Let's give Fred's suits to poor Mr. Cheever." I find in some old notes that my mother reported that he had, just before his death, written a long indictment of her — as a wife, a mother, a housekeeper, and a woman. I never saw the indictment. I suppose, uncharitably, that the effect on her would have been to fortify her self-righteousness. She had worked so hard to support a helpless old man, and her only reward was castigation.  Sigh — how deep were her sighs. I have no idea what their marriage was like, although I suspect that he worshipped her as my brother worshipped his choice and as perhaps I have worshipped mine. In my brother's case there was, I think, that rich blend of uxoriousness in which praise has a distinct aftertaste of bitterness, not to say loathing. I think that Mary was wounded years before I entered her life, and who is this ghost whose clothes I wear, whose voice I speak  with, what were the cruelties of which I am accused? (275)

From Blake Bailey's biography of Cheever, I take it that the ghost who wears Cheever's clothes and speaks through him, and haunts Mary, is the ghost of Mary's father, the formidable Dr. Milton Winternitz, "the legendary dean of the Yale School of Medicine" (as Bailey puts it in Cheever: A Life, Vintage, 2010, p. 102).  Winternitz was an oppressive and domineering presence who beat Mary as a child with a belt. One moral to extract from this is that one ought not marry a woman until one understands the relation she had with her father, lest you suffer through a marriage as bad as Cheever's. A girl's attitude toward men is formed in large part by her relationship with her father.  A recurrent theme of Cheever's journal is his rotten marriage to the woman he often refers to as Mary maldisposta. The Italian adjective is in the semantic vicinity of unwell, hostile, unfriendly, ill-disposed, and disinclined.

The topic of uxoriousness and the related one of putting women on pedestals beg to be ruminated upon. Romantics are prone to these related errors. Italians are well-represented among romantics, not that Cheever was of Italian extraction, but he had a thing for Italy and swotted up a lot of the lingo. According to G. M. Hopkins' biographer Robert Bernard Martin, Coventry Patmore was ". . . one of the most flagrantly uxorious men of the [19th] century, one who quite seriously worshipped women and all they stood for." (Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Very Private Life, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1991, p. 355.)

Finally, you can see that Cheever is a good writer. How do I know that? It takes one to know one. Like alone knows like. (I recall this principle's being referred as the homoion theorem. But Google turns up nothing. Paging Dave Lull!) 

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* This is evidence of a sort for our dual status. If we were animals merely, why would some of us find the spiritually affine only among the non-blood-related?  And why would be feel spiritually alienated from the blood-related?

** Can we understand divine creation in analogy to the creation of fictional characters by a novelist?  Hugh McCann makes a brave attempt in this direction in his 2012 Creation and the Sovereignty of God. I bring up some weighty objections in my review article Hugh McCann and the Implications of Divine Sovereignty, published in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2014, 88 (1):149-161.

*** Jeder Handwerk zieht krumm. I picked up this folk phrase from Nietzsche, The Gay Science [Die fröhliche Wissenschaft], 1882:

Almost always the books of scholars are somehow oppressive, oppressed: the “specialist” emerges somewhere—his zeal, his seriousness, his fury, his overestimation of the nook in which he sits and spins, his hunched back; every specialist has his hunched back. Every scholarly book also mirrors a soul that has become crooked; every craft makes crooked.…Nothing can be done about that. Let nobody suppose that one could possibly avoid such crippling by some artifice of education. On this earth one pays dearly for every kind of mastery.…For having a specialty one pays by also being the victim of this specialty. But you would have it otherwise—cheaper and fairer and above all more comfortable—isn’t that right, my dear contemporaries. Well then, but in that case you also immediately get something else: instead of the craftsman and master, [you get] the “man of letters,” the dexterous, “polydexterous” man of letters who, to be sure, lacks the hunched back—not counting the posture he assumes before you, being the salesman of the spirit and the “carrier” of culture—the man of letters who really is nothing but “represents” almost everything, playing and “substituting” for the expert, and taking it upon himself in all modesty to get himself paid, honored, and celebrated in place of the expert.

No, my scholarly friends, I bless you even for your hunched back. And for despising, as I do, the “men of letters” and culture parasites. And for not knowing how to make a business of the spirit. And for having opinions that cannot be translated into financial values. And for not representing anything that you are not. And because your sole aim is to become masters of your craft, with reverence for every kind of mastery and competence, and with uncompromising opposition to everything that is semblance, half-genuine, dressed up, virtuosolike, demagogical, or histrionic in litteris et artibus—to everything that cannot prove to you its unconditional probity in discipline and prior training.

Could old Fritz write or could he write? He puts us all to shame. He and his century-mate Kierkegaard, a prodigious engine of literary productivity if ever there was one. He lived for a scant 42 years (1813-1855); Nietzsche a mere 56 years (1844-1900).

Vehicles

I knew a man who knew all about his truck, its engine displacement, gear ratios, you name it. But when I asked him about his blood pressure, he replied that the doctor said it was OK. I thought to myself: Ken needs to get his vehicular priorities straight lest the via dolorosa through this vale of soul-making be more dolorous than it needs to be. 

Four Attitudes Toward Embodiment

Am I ineluctably trapped in a dying animal? Is embodiment an axiologically negative state of affairs or is it an axiologically positive one?  Here are four possible attitudes toward having a material body. They may be loosely associated, respectively, with the names Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Benatar.

a) To exist is good, but it would be better to exist without a gross material body subject to decay and dissolution. The body is an impediment, a vehicle for sublunary roads that it would be better not to have to travel.  I am neither identical to my body, nor dependent on it for my existence; I am a soul temporarily incarcerated in a body from which I will be released upon death. I have fallen from a topos ouranios into a spatiotemporal matrix and meat grinder extrication from which is both possible and desirable.

b) To exist is good, but a gross material body is necessary to exist as a conscious and self-conscious being, whence it follows that embodiment is at least instrumentally  good. I am not (identically) a soul; I am a soul-body composite, both components of which are necessary to exist at all.  

c) To exist is good, but only with a 'resurrected' and perfected body supplied by a divine being that needs no body to exist.

d) To exist is not good because possible only with a gross body.  (See my Benatar category.)

Moral Progress: Our Tantalusian Predicament

If I drive to Santa Fe, the town stays put while I get closer and closer. Moral progress is different. A good part of the moral journey involves the recession of the destination. This morning I discovered that C. S. Lewis had had a similar thought. 

"No man knows how bad he is until he tries very hard to be good." (Mere Christianity, 124)

Allowance made for  a bit of exaggeration, our moral predicament is describable as Tantalusian.  Remember your Greek mythology?

Tantalus (Ancient GreekΤάνταλος Tántalos), also called Atys, was a Greek mythological figure, most famous for his punishment in Tartarus: for trying to trick the gods into eating his son, he was made to stand in a pool of water beneath a fruit tree with low branches, with the fruit ever eluding his grasp, and the water always receding before he could take a drink. (Wikipedia)

Something of a stretch, but a tantalizing conceit that I couldn't resist. 

Social Distance and Good Relations

Social distance aids in the preservation of good relations with people. Familiarity breeds, if not contempt, disrespect. In the famiglia, especially. Conventional usages, phony and formulaic as they often are, have their uses. They allow for civil interaction while preserving distance. "Good morning." "After you, sir." We all want respect even while aware of how little we deserve it and how insincere are those who show it.

A figure from Schopenhauer comes to mind. We are like porcupines on a cold night. They come together to stay warm but then prick one another and move apart. Trial and error leads to the optimal spatial adjustment.

The art of life, with its trials and errors, is learned by living, and learned best by living long. 

The Axis of the Human Heart

Rod Dreher quotes Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn:

Gradually it was disclosed to me that the line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either—but right through every human heart—and through all human hearts. This line shifts. Inside us, it oscillates with the years. And even within hearts overwhelmed by evil, one small bridgehead of good is retained. And even in the best of all hearts, there remains … an un-uprooted small corner of evil.

This free Substack article by Dreher is one of his finest. Please do read it for your own good. And read it all: pay attention to the account of the unspeakable savagery of the American Indians, a savagery typically downplayed or unmentioned by leftists.

It Passes All the Same

No matter how many times you remind yourself to seize the day, to enjoy the moment, to do what you are doing, to be here now, to live thoughtfully and deliberately, to appreciate what you have; no matter how assiduous the attempts to freeze the flow, fix the flux, stay the surge to dissolution, and contain the dissipation wrought by time's diaspora and the mind's incontinence — it passes all the same.

The Childless as Anthropological Danglers

Top o' the Stack. 

The Austrian philosopher and Vienna Circle member Herbert Feigl wrote about nomological danglers.  Mental states as the epiphenomenalist conceives them have causes, but no effects. They are caused by physical states of the body and brain, but dangle nomologically in that there are no laws  that relate mental states  to physical states.

The childless are anthropological danglers.  They are life's epiphenomena. They have ancestors (causes) but no descendants (effects). Parents are essential: without  them we could not have come into fleshly existence.  But offspring are wholly inessential: the individual, though not the species, can exist quite well without them.

I mention pros and cons of dangling anthropologically.