Category: God
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What if God was One of Us?
What if God was one of usJust a slob like one of usJust a stranger on the busTrying to make his way home?
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The God of Philosophy and the God of Religion
Steven Nemes by e-mail: In posts of months past you claimed there was no distinction between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; they're the same thing, if God can be called a thing at all; you asked for an argument that they were [not the same], if…
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God, Probability, and Noncontingent Propositions
Matt Hart comments: . . . most of what we conceive is possible. So if we say that 1) In 80% of the cases, if 'Conceivably, p' then 'Possibly, p'2) Conceivably, God existsErgo,3) Pr(Possibly, God exists) = 80%4) If 'Possibly, God exists' then 'necessarily, God exists'Ergo,5) Pr(Necessarily, God exists) = 80%, we seem to get by.…
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The Ought-to-Be and the Ought-to-Do and the Aporetics of “Be Ye Perfect”
Is there any justification for talk of the ought-to-be in cases where they are not cases of the ought-to-do? Let's begin by noting that if I ought to do X (pay my debts, feed my kids, keep my hands off my neighbor's wife, etc.) then my doing X ought to be. For example, given that…
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Gratuitous Evil and Begging the Question: Does LAFE Beg the Question?
What is it for an argument to beg the question? I suggest that an argument begs the question if it is impossible to know one of the premises to be true without knowing that the conclusion is true. The simplest question-begging arguments are of the form p—p. Clearly, every argument of this form is valid,…
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Does God Exist Because He Ought to Exist?
Steven, Peter, et al.: This paper has been languishing on my hard drive for some time. Comments appreciated. Abstract. Modal ontological arguments for the existence of God require a possibility premise to the effect that a maximally perfect being is possible. Admitting the possibility of such a being may appear to be a minimal concession, but…
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More on Modes of Being with Two Applications
Clarity will be served if we distinguish the following four questions: Q1. What is meant by 'mode of being'? Q2. Is the corresponding idea intelligible? Q3. Are there (two or more) modes of being? Q4. What are the modes of being? So far in this series of posts I have been concerned only with the first two questions.…
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From the Mail: Bryan Magee on Kant and the Theistic Proofs
Dear Dr. Vallicella, I am of the understanding that one of your post-graduate degrees focussed on Kant. With your knowledge of said philosopher I wonder if I might trouble you to answer a few questions for me? These questions pertain to Kant's criticism's of the cosmological argument for God's existence. I know that this argument…
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God and the ‘No Angry Unicorn’ Argument
This from an astute reader commenting on the Hell post: 'No angry unicorn on the dark side of the moon' Does this not refer to doxastic uncertainty rather than a fatuous equation of God with something material? This is how I interpreted it when I read it. More in the vein of: why venerate something…
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The Problem of Evil and the Argument from Evil
(A reader found the following post, from the old PowerBlogs site, useful. So I repost it here with minor modifications and additions.) It is important to distinguish between the problem of evil and the argument from evil. The first is the problem of reconciling the existence of God, as traditionally understood, with the existence of…
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A Modal Ontological Argument and an Argument from Evil Compared
After leaving the polling place this morning, I headed out on a sunrise hike over the local hills whereupon the muse of philosophy bestowed upon me some good thoughts. Suppose we compare a modal ontological argument with an argument from evil in respect of the question of evidential support for the key premise in each. This post…
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God, Possibility, and Evidential Support for Non-Contingent Propositions
Mike Valle gave a presentation yesterday before the ASU philosophy club on the skeptical theist response to the evidential argument from evil. A good discussion ensued among Guleserian, Nemes, Lupu, Reppert, Valle, Vallicella, et al. Peter Lupu made a comment that stuck in my mind and that I thought about some more this morning. For…
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On Praying for Christopher Hitchens
There is something strange, and perhaps even incoherent, about praying for Christopher Hitchens if the prayers are not for his recovery or for his courageous acceptance of death, but for conversion or a change of heart. Let's think about it. I do not play the lottery; I have good reasons for not playing it; I…
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On Reconciling Creatio Ex Nihilo with Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit
This post examines Richard C. Potter's solution to the problem of reconciling creatio ex nihilo with ex nihilo nihil fit in his valuable article, "How To Create a Physical Universe Ex Nihilo," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 1, (January 1986), pp. 16-26. (Potter appears to have dropped out of sight, philosophically speaking, so if…
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Gutting, Dawkins, and Russell’s Celestial Teapot
In his recent NYT Opinionator piece, On Dawkins's Atheism, Notre Dame's Gary Gutting writes, describing the "no arguments argument" of some atheists: To say that the universe was created by a good and powerful being who cares about us is an extraordinary claim, so improbable to begin with that we surely should deny it unless…