Category: Free Will
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More on Jerry Coyne on Free Will
This is a sequel to an earlier discussion. You should read it first. Coyne writes, There's not much downside to abandoning the notion of free will. It's impossible, anyway, to act as though we don't have it: you'll pretend to choose your New Year's resolutions, and the laws of physics will determine whether you keep…
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Dennett on the Consequence Argument Against Compatibilism
Daniel Dennett is a compatibilist: he holds that determinism and free will are logically compatible. (Compare Dennett's position to Coyne's hard determinism and free will illusionism.) On p. 134 of Freedom Evolves (Penguin, 2003), Dennett considers the following incompatibilist argument. Itwill be interesting to see how he responds to it. 1. If determinism is true,…
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Jerry Coyne on Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will
It does not inspire much confidence when a writer begins his piece with a blatant confusion. But that is what Jerry A. Coyne does in Why You Don't Really Have Free Will: Perhaps you've chosen to read this essay after scanning other articles on this website. Or, if you're in a hotel, maybe you've decided what…
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What is Fatalism? How Does it Differ from Determinism?
Robert Kane (A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford 2005, p. 19) rightly bids us not confuse determinism with fatalism: This is one of the most common confusions in free will debates. Fatalism is the view that whatever is going to happen, is going to happen, no matter what we do. Determinism alone does…
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James Rachels’ Argument from Moral Autonomy Against the Existence of God*
A guest post by Peter Lupu. Minor edits and a comment (in blue) by BV. In an intriguing paper “God and Moral Autonomy”, James Rachels offers what he calls “The Moral Autonomy Argument” against the existence of God. The argument is based on a certain analysis of the concept of worship and its alleged incompatibility…
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Is Divine Simplicity Consistent With Contingent Divine Knowledge?
The day before yesterday, I sketched the problem mentioned in the title. Today I offer a more rigorous presentation of the problem and examine a solution. The problem can be set forth as an aporetic triad: 1. Every free agent is a libertarianly-free (L-free) agent. 2. God is ontologically simple (where simplicity is an entailment…
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Phil’s Trojan Horse Argument against PAP (Peter Lupu)
(I) In a post dated June 6, 2009 Philoponus presented the Trojan Horse Argument (THA) against thre Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) according to which a person is morally responsible for what he as done only if he could have done otherwise. He says: (A) “So, if we say a agent shall be responsible for…
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A Question about Leibniz on Free Choice
Leibniz's Theodicy consists of two parts, the first on faith and reason, the second on the freedom of man in the origin of evil. I am trying to understand paragraph #37 (p. 144 of the Huggard translation): . . it follows not that what is foreseen is necessary, for necessary truth is that whereof the…
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Consciousness, Free Will, and Illusion
This just over the transom: I'm an occasional reader of your wonderful blog, "Maverick Philosopher". I was wondering if I could probe you a bit regarding an argument you make in your post, "Could Freedom of the Will be an Illusion?" You make the statement, "An illusion is an illusion to consciousness, so that if…
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‘Could Have Done Otherwise’ Disambiguated
Here again is how Harry Frankfurt formulates the principle of alternate possibilities in his 1969 J. Phil. article: PAP. A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. It is now time to put 'could have done otherwise' under our logico-linguistic microscopes. The phrase is ambiguous. On…
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Incompatibilism and Frankfurt Counterexamples
I am an incompatibilist about moral responsibility. That is, I maintain that causal determinism and moral responsibility are logically incompatible. (Two propositions p, q are logically incompatible just in case they cannot both be true. Hence, logically incompatible propositions are logical contraries, not contradictories.) Here is an argument for incompatibilism: P1. Causal determinism rules out…
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The Indeterministic World Objection to Frankfurt Counterexamples
We got bogged down in an earlier thread, so let's try a different tack. The following discussion draws upon Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford 2005, pp. 87-88. In his seminal 1969 J. Phil. article, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Harry Frankfurt enunciates what he calls "the principle of alternate possibilities," (PAP)…
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An Objection Against Frankfurt-Style Examples (Peter Lupu)
(Comments in blue by BV.) 1) Frankfurt-style examples are intended to be counterexamples to PAP. PAP: A person S is morally responsible for intentionally doing X at t only if S can intentionally refrain from doing X at t. BV: The following formulation better captures what Frankfurt actually says in his 1969 J. Phil. article,…
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The Belief in Libertarian Free Will as a Life-Enhancing Illusion
William James famously characterized the true as the good in the way of belief. But is knowledge of the truth in every case life-enhancing? Does knowing the truth always contribute to human flourishing? Or is it rather the case that to live well with ourselves and others, to be happy, to flourish, requires the maintenance of certain…
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An Argument for Libertarian Freedom of the Will
First the argument in nuce, then a detailed explanation. P1. I am morally responsible for at least some of my actions and omissions.P2. I cannot be morally responsible for an action or omission unless I am libertarianly free with respect to that action or omission.ThereforeC. I am libertarianly free with respect to at least some…