Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Existence

  • Deism, Classical Theism, and Existential Inertia

    On deism, God starts the universe existing, but then he takes it easy, allowing it to exist on its own in virtue of its 'existential inertia.' The latter is an analog of inertia in physics. Newton's First Law states that a body at rest or in uniform rectilinear motion continues in its state of rest…

  • Knowledge of Existence: Is Existence Hidden?

    1) I see a tree, a palo verde.  Conditions are optimal for veridical perception.  I see that the tree is green, blooming, swaying slightly in the breeze. The tree is given to my perceptual acts as having these and other properties.  Now while I do not doubt for a second the existence of the tree,…

  • Existence, Unity, Possibility, and Actuality: Are There Merely Possible Individuals?

    Steven Nemes by e-mail: Here’s a question for you about existence, perhaps one you could discuss on the blog. In your book, you argue that existence is ontological unity. I think that’s right. But a merely possible this-such is a unity as much as an actual this-such. What then distinguishes merely possible existence from actual…

  • Can a Dead Animal be Buried?

    Arguably not. Here is an argument: 1) A dead animal can be buried if and only if it is identical to its corpse. 2) A dead animal is not identical to its corpse. Therefore 3) It is not the case that a dead animal can be buried. Argument for (2): 4) If a dead animal…

  • The Strange Thought of Absolute Nothingness

    I had the giddy thought of absolute nothingness as a boy; the old man I've become can't quite recapture in full its eldritch quality. But he can rigorously think what the boy could mainly only feel. The boy reasoned that if God hadn't created anything, then only God would exist. But suppose no God either!…

  • Some Responses to Tim Mosteller re: Existence

    The following is from a work in progress by Tim Mosteller, posted with his permission.  I thank him for his critical engagement with my work. Here are some responses.  My corrections in red; my comments in blue.

  • On J. P. Moreland’s Theory of Existence

    A re-post from February of 2016 with corrections and addenda.   What follows is largely a summary and restatement of points I make in "The Moreland-Willard-Lotze Thesis on Being," Philosophia Christi, vol. 6, no. 1, 2004, pp. 27-58.  It is a 'popular' or 'bloggity-blog' version of a part of that lengthy technical article.  First I summarize…

  • The Presentism of E. J. Lowe: Summary

    This entry is Part One of a multi-part attempt to understand and evaluate the late E. J. Lowe's 'untimely' version of presentism.  It is 'untimely' in that he resists what he takes to be the reification of time and times, and because his presentism is very different from its contemporary competitors. I am basing my…

  • Existence is Tenseless

    The Ostrich inquires, You hold that [instances of] both (1) and (2) below are true.                (1) X is no longer temporally present and (2) X exists tenselessly. Fair enough. But what does ‘exist tenselessly’ mean? To exist tenselessly is just to exist. To exist is to be something. More precisely, it is to be…

  • Continuing the Discussion of Time, Tense, and Existence

    This just in from London.  I've intercalated my responses. Here is another take. We agree on our disagreement about the following consequence (A)  X is no longer temporally present, therefore X has ceased to exist. You think it is not valid, i.e. you think the antecedent could be true with the consequent false. I think…

  • Time and the Existing Dead

    Another round with David Brightly.  My responses are in blue. Bill says, We don't want to say that a dead man becomes nothing after death since he remains a particular, completely determinate, dead man distinct from others. If the dead become nothing after death then all the dead would be the same. If your dead…

  • Rand and Peikoff on God and Existence

    The following is by Leonard Peikoff, acolyte of Ayn Rand: Every argument for God and every attribute ascribed to Him rests on a false metaphysical premise. None can survive for a moment on a correct metaphysics . . . . Existence exists, and only existence exists. Existence is a primary: it is uncreated, indestructible, eternal. So if you…

  • Defending Barry Miller against Herman Philipse: Existence as a First-Level Property, Part III

    This is the third in a series.  First installment, second, Philipse's review. Herman Philipse's strongest argument against Barry Miller's claim that existence is a a first-level property, a property of individuals, is the absurdity objection. According to this objection, if existence is an accidental real first-order property of individual entities, so must non-existence be, but…

  • Defending Barry Miller against Herman Philipse: Existence as a First-Level Property, Part II

    This is the second in a series. Here is the first installment. Read it for context and references. We are still examining only the first premise of Barry Miller's cosmological argument, as sketched by Philipse: 1) Existence is a real first-level accidental property of contingent individuals. Philipse gave two arguments contra. In my first entry…

  • Van Inwagen contra Meinong on Having Being and Lacking Being

    There is a passage in Peter van Inwagen's "Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities," (in Existence: Essays in Ontology, CUP, 2014, p. 98, emphasis added), in which he expresses his incomprehension of what the Meinongian means by 'has being' and 'lacks being':  . . . the Meinongian must mean something different by 'has being' and 'lacks…