Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Existence

  • On whether an individual is identical to its existence

    This just over the transom: Good day Dr. Vallicella,   I was reading your book on existence, and on page 71, there is this argument for the real distinction between an individual's essence and its existence:   "[I]f in a essence and existence are identical, then a's essence entails a's existence. But that is to say that a is a necessary…

  • Back to Time, Tense, and Existence

    What follows is a comment by David Brightly which just came in but is buried in the comments to an old entry.  I have added my responses in blue. ………………………… I have just spotted that you quote EJL as saying, This, of course, raises the question of how we can so much as talk about…

  • Among the Riddles of Existence

    Among the riddles of existence are the riddles that are artifacts of the attempts of thinkers to unravel the riddle of existence. This is one way into philosophy. It is the way of G. E. Moore. What riddled him was not the world so much as the strange things philosophers such as F. H. Bradley…

  • Singular Concepts and Singular Negative Existentials

    A re-post  from 15 May 2012. Reproduced verbatim. …………………………………. London Ed seems to be suggesting that we need irreducibly singular concepts (properties, propositional functions) if we are properly to analyze grammatically singular negative existence statements such as 1. Vulcan does not exist. But why do we need to take 'Vulcan' to express a singular concept or haecceity…

  • Could Scollay Square be a Meinongian Nonexistent Object?

    Bill, newly arrived in Boston,  believes falsely that Scollay Square exists and he wants to visit it. Bill asks Kathleen where it is. Kathleen tells him truly that it no longer exists, and Bill believes her. Both use 'Scollay Square' to refer to the same thing, a physical place, one that does not exist. To…

  • Relations and Nonexistents

     Consider the following two sentences:  a) Lions are smaller than dragons.b) Mice are smaller than elephants. From this datanic base a puzzle emerges.  1) The data sentences are both true.2) 'Smaller than' has the same sense in both (a) and (b).3) In both (a) and (b), 'smaller than' has the same reference: it refers to…

  • Is Existence Completeness?

    Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous, December 1990, p. 662: . . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words, for every F(x) either F[x/i] or ~F[x/i] holds.  The Tertium Non Datur is the hallmark of existence or…

  • Untangling Plato’s Beard

    I was asked by a commenter what motivates the thin theory of existence.  One motivation is  . . . the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato's beard; historically it has proved tough, frequently dulling the…

  • A Reader Asks about Existence and Instantiation

    My responses are in blue. Hello, Dr. Vallicella. I am a reader of your blog. I just read your article "Existence: Two Dogmas of Analysis" in Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics (eds. Novotny and Novak, Routledge, 2014, pp. 45-75 , and I thought it was fantastic. I will have to read it again at some point.…

  • Nominalism, Existence, and Subsistence

    Here are five versions of nominalism by my current count: Mad-Dog Nominalism: No word has an extra-linguistic referent, not even proper names such as 'Peter' and 'Paul.'  Extreme Nominalism: The only words that have existing referents are proper names like 'Peter' and Paul'; nothing in reality corresponds to such predicates as 'blond.' And a fortiori nothing…

  • Notes on Nicholas Rescher, “Nonexistents Then and Now”

    0. This entry is relevant to my ongoing dialog with Dr. Novak about reference to the nonexistent. I hope he has the time and the stamina to continue the discussion. I have no doubt that he has the 'chops.' I thank him for the stimulation. We philosophize best with friends, as Aristotle says somewhere. But…

  • Existence as Completeness? Gilson on Scotus, Thomas, and the Real Distinction

    I composed this entry with Lukáš Novák in mind. I hope to secure his comments. ……………………… Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous, December 1990, p. 662: . . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words,…

  • God and Existence: How Related?

    A reader asks: You seem to hold that, if God is identical to his existence, then God is Existence itself. Why think that? Why not think instead that, if God is identical to his existence, then he is identical to his 'parcel' of existence, as it were? This is an entirely reasonable question. I will…

  • A Contingent Self-Existent?

    Tom asks, Does it make sense to say that something could be contingently self-existent? I'm assuming that 'being self-existent' is not the same thing as 'existing necessarily', for then my question wouldn't make sense. Maybe I'm wrong to make this distinction. But if I'm not, can it be a contingent matter that x exists and…

  • The Aporetics of Existence: Do Existing Things Have Existence?

    A reader inquires, I have been wondering about whether existing things have existence. This seems obvious to me, but Bradley's regress makes me think twice. For if existing things have existence, then given that existence exists, existence also has existence. And since this latter existence also exists, it also has existence. And so on.  …