Category: Existence
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Univocity, Equivocity, and the MOB Doctrine
Here is another argument that may be banging around in the back of the heads of those who are hostile to the doctrine that there are modes of being, the MOB doctrine to give it a name: 1. If there are modes of existence, then 'exist(s)' is not univocal.2. If 'exist(s)' is not univocal, then…
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Review : Modes of Being
Herewith, a little summary of part of what I have been arguing. Most analytic philosophers would accept (A) but not (B): A. There are kinds of existent but no kinds of existence.B. There are kinds of existent and also kinds of existence. I have been defending the intelligibility of (B) but without committing myself to any particular MOB…
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More on Existence and Completeness
It is time to recommence 'hostilities' with Edward Ockham. (I do thank him for engaging my ideas.) I lately made two claims. One is that existence entails completeness. The other is that completeness does not entail existence. In support of the second claim, I wrote: Why can't there be complete nonexistent objects? Imagine the God…
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How Prevent a Proliferation of Modes of Being?
An astute reader comments: Allowing for multiple modes of being may lead to too many or infinitely many modes. Using your own example and oversimplifying on purpose: if the mode of being of the house made of bricks is different from that of the bricks, what prevents us from claiming that there are different modes…
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Why the Resistance to Modes of Being?
Why do so many distinguished philosophers fail to appreciate that a doctrine of modes of being (modes of existence) is a live option? Perhaps in the back of their minds is some such argument as the following: Existence is instantiationThere are no modes of instantiationErgoThere are no modes of existence. I grant that there are…
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Quentin Gibson (1913 – 2001)
I first became aware of the Australian philosopher Quentin Gibson when I discovered his book The Existence Principle. It was published in 1998, when Gibson was 85 years old, in the Kluwer Philosophical Studies Series, #75. My A Paradigm Theory of Existence appeared in the same series in 2002, #89. Our approaches are radically different:…
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Existence and Completeness
Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous, December 1990, p. 662: . . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words, for every F(x) either F[x/i] or ~F[x/i] holds. The Tertium Non Datur is the hallmark…
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Wholes, Parts, and Modes of Being
Do wholes and their parts exist in different ways? The analytic establishment is hostile to modes of being, but its case is weak. Indeed some establishmentarians make no case at all; they simply bluster and asseverate and beg the question. I wonder how a member of the establishment would counter the following argument. Consider a house…
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More on Modes of Being with Two Applications
Clarity will be served if we distinguish the following four questions: Q1. What is meant by 'mode of being'? Q2. Is the corresponding idea intelligible? Q3. Are there (two or more) modes of being? Q4. What are the modes of being? So far in this series of posts I have been concerned only with the first two questions.…
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Reinhardt Grossmann Against Modes of Being
Here is a plausible principle: if n items stand in an n-adic relation, then all of them exist. And necessarily so. If Miami is between Superior and Globe, then all three towns exist. Combine this principle about relations with the plausible idea that the intentional nexus is a dyadic relation that relates a thinker (or…
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In Defense of Modes of Being: Substance and Accident
The 'thin' conception of being or existence, lately explained, entails that there are no modes of being. Most analytic philosophers accept the thin conception and reject modes of being. Flying in the face of analytic orthodoxy, I maintain that the modes-of-being doctrine is defensible. Indeed, I should like to say something stronger, namely, that it…
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Thin (Analytic) and Thick (Continental) Conceptions of Being and the Question of Modes of Being
1. Peter van Inwagen maintains, quite rightly, that "One of the most important divisions between 'continental' and 'analytic' philosophy has to do with the nature of being." (Ontology, Identity, and Modality, Cambridge UP 1981, p. 4) Analysts favor a 'thin' conception while Continentals favor a 'thick' one. Although van Inwagen's claim is essentially correct, there are broadly…
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A Routley/Sylvan Argument for the Utter Nonexistence of Past Individuals
Many of us are inclined to say that purely past individuals (James Dean, Scollay Square, my cat Zeno, anything that existed but does not exist now), though past, yet exist. Of course, they don't presently exist. But why should only what presently exists, exist? Why should that which loses the temporal property of presentness fall…
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Presentism Between Scylla and Charybdis
What better topic of meditation for New Year's Eve than the 'passage' of time. May the Reaper grant us all another year! ………….. If presentism is to be a defensible thesis, a 'presentable' one if you will, then it must avoid both the Scylla of tautology and the Charybdis of absurdity. Having survived these hazards,…
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What Is Presentism?
What is time? Don't ask me, and I know. Ask me, and I don't know. (Augustine). The same goes, in my case at least, for presentism, as Peter Lupu made clear to me Christmas night. Don't ask me what it is, and I know. Ask me, and I don't know. The rough idea, of course, is that…