Category: Existence
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Nominalism and Being
Today I preach on an old text of long-time commenter and sparring partner, London Ed: Nominalism is the doctrine that we should not multiply entities according to the multiplicity of terms. I.e., we shouldn't automatically assume that there is a thing corresponding to every term. Das Seiende is a term, so we shouldnât automatically assume there…
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On Infinitely Regressive Explanations of the Universe’s Existence
We’ve never chatted. I’m Tom Belt, a friend of Alan Rhoda. I believe you know Alan. Yes, in fact I was thinking about him just the other day in connection with his espousal of presentism. I’ve always appreciated being challenged when I drop by your blog. I’m wondering if you’d be willing to help me understand…
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Rock, Reality, Ed Abbey, and the Attraction of the Incoherent
There is no denying the charm, the attractive power, of incoherent ideas. They appeal to adolescents of all ages. Edward "Cactus Ed" Abbey writes, "I sometimes think that man is a dream, thought an illusion, and that only rock is real." Well, Cactus Ed, is this thought of yours an illusion too? Cactus Ed's thought…
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Negative Existentials and the Causal Theory of Reference: Notes on Donnellan
Causal theories of reference strike me as hopeless. Let's see how they fare with the problem of negative existentials. There are clear cases in which 'exist(s)' functions as a second-level predicate, a predicate of properties or concepts or propositional functions or cognate items, and not as a predicate of individuals. The affirmative general existential 'Horses…
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Butchvarov: Objects, Entities, and Transcendental Idealism
This entry extends and clarifies my post, Blackman Versus Butchvarov: Objects, Entities, and Modes of Existence. Preliminaries For Butchvarov, all consciousness is intentional. (There are no non-intentional consciousnesses.) And all intentionality is conscious intentionality. (There is no "physical intentionality" to use George Molnar's term.) So, for Butchvarov, 'consciousness' and 'intentionality' are equivalent terms. Consciousness, by…
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Does Classical Theism Require Haecceitism?
Haecceitism is the doctrine that there are haecceities. But what is an haecceity? Suppose we take on board for the space of this post the assumptions that (i) properties are abstract objects, that (ii) they can exist unexemplified, and that (iii) they are necessary beings. We may then define the subclass of haecceity properties as…
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Being as the Apotheosis of the Copula: Frege’s Eliminativism in his Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence
Some time before 1884, Gottlob Frege had a discussion about existence with the Protestant theologian Bernard Pünjer (1850-1885). A record of the dialogue was found in Frege's Nachlass, and an English translation is available in Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings, eds. Hans Hermes et al., University of Chicago Press, 1979. Herewith, some critical commentary on part…
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C. J. F. Williams’ Analysis of ‘I Might Not Have Existed’
There are clear cases in which 'exist(s)' functions as a second-level predicate, a predicate of properties or concepts or propositional functions or cognate items, and not as a predicate of individuals. The affirmative general existential 'Horses exist,' for example, is best understood as making an instantiation claim: 'The concept horse is instantiated.' Accordingly, the sentence does…
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How Does One Know that There Are Contingent Beings?
When I was writing my book on existence I was troubled by the question as to how one knows that there are contingent beings. For I took it as given that there are, just as I took it as given that things exist. But one philosopher's datum is another's theory, and I was hoping to begin…
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The Rabbit of Real Existence and the Empty Hat of Mere Logic
Consider again this curious piece of reasoning: 1. For any x, x = x. Ergo:2. a = a. Ergo:3. (Ex)(x = a). Ergo:4. a exists. This reasoning is curious because it seems to show that one can deduce the real existence of an individual a from a purely formal principle of logic, the Law of…
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Deducing John McCain from the Principle of Identity
What, if anything, is wrong with the following argument: 1. (x)(x = x) (Principle of Identity) Therefore 2. John McCain = John McCain (From 1 by Universal Instantiation) Therefore 3. (Ex)(x = John McCain) (From 2 by Existential Generalization) Therefore 4. John McCain exists. (From 3 by translation into ordinary idiom) The initial premise…
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Ayn Rand on “Existence Exists”
Whether one calls it a renaissance or a recrudescence, Rand is on a roll. The Randian resurgence doesn't please David Bentley Hart whose First Things attack piece contains the following: And, really, what can one say about Objectivism? It isn’t so much a philosophy as what someone who has never actually encountered philosophy imagines a philosophy…
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“I Swear, If You Existed, I’d Divorce You.”
If the recipient of this insult had been a philosophy professor instead of a mere history professor, he might have responded as follows. "Darling, by the Existence Symmetry of Relations, if a relation R holds, then either all of its relata exist or none of them do. Now one cannot divorce a person to whom…
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Blackman Versus Butchvarov: Objects, Entities, and Modes of Existence
(UPDATE: 23 March. Butchvarov sent me some comments via e-mail the main ones of which I insert in the text in red.) This post assumes familiarity with Panayot Butchvarov's "protometaphysics," as he calls it. But I will begin by sketching the distinction between objects and entities. Then I will present an objection that occurred to…
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Is the Difference Between a Fact and Its Constituents a Brute Difference?
Note to Steven Nemes: Tell me if you find this totally clear, and if not, point out what is unclear. Tell me whether you accept my overall argument. The day before yesterday in conversation Steven Nemes presented a challenge I am not sure I can meet. I have maintained (in my book, in published articles,…