Category: Existence
-
Singular Concepts and Singular Negative Existentials
London Ed seems to be suggesting that we need irreducibly singular concepts (properties, propositional functions) if we are properly to analyze grammatically singular negative existence statements such as 1. Vulcan does not exist. But why do we need to take 'Vulcan' to express a singular concept or haecceity property? Why isn't the following an adequate…
-
More on Translating ‘Something Exists’ and a Response to Brightly
I issued the following challenge: translate 'Something exists' into standard first-order predicate logic with identity. This is the logic whose sources are Frege and Russell. So I call it Frege-Russell logic, or, to be cute, 'Fressellian' logic. My esteemed commenters don''t see much of a problem here. So let me first try to explain why…
-
On Translating ‘Some Individual Exists’ Fressellianly
An astute reader comments: You write: 2. But can this presupposition be expressed (said) in this logic? Here is a little challenge for you Fressellians: translate 'Something exists' into standard logical notion. You will discover that it cannot be done. Briefly, if existence is instantiation, which property is it whose instantiation is the existence of…
-
Wittgenstein and Rejectionism
I characterized Rejectionism with respect to the question why there is anything at all as follows: "The rejectionist rejects the question as ill-formed, as senseless." London Ed suggests that Wittgenstein may be lumped in with the rejectionists. He has a point, though I do insist on the distinction between taking 'Why is there anything at…
-
Siger of Brabant on Why Something Rather Than Nothing
London Ed offers this quick, over-breakfast but accurate as far as I can tell translation from the Latin (available at Ed's site): For not every being has a cause of its being, nor does every question about being have a cause. For if it is asked why there is something in the natural world rather…
-
A Catalog of Possible Types of Response to ‘Why Is There Anything At All?’
By my count there are seven possible types of response to the above question, which I will call the Leibniz question. I will give them the following names: Rejectionism, Mysterianism, Brutalism, Theologism, Necessitarianism, Nomologism/Axiologism, and Cosmologism. As far as I can see, my typology, or rather my emendation of Rescher's typology, is exhaustive. All possible…
-
The Ultimate Explanation-Seeking Why-Question and Contrastive Explanations
I argued yesterday that the following questions are distinct: Q1. Why does anything at all exist, rather than nothing? Q2. Why does anything at all exist? Today I explore a little further the difference between non-contrastive and contrastive explanations. Consider the difference between: 1. Why is Mary walking rather than swimming? 2.…
-
Two Forms of the Ultimate Explanation-Seeking Why-Question
Why does anything at all exist? Someone could utter this interrogative form of words merely to express astonishment that anything should exist at all. But it is more natural to take the question as a request for an explanation: Why, for what reason or cause, does anything at all exist? What explains the sheer existence…
-
Can Things Be Counted?
From the mail: I saw your blog post the other day titled Saying and Showing where you talked about Wittgenstein's exchange with Russell on 'things', along with his Kantian perspective. Toward the end you say this: "What goes for 'world' also goes for 'thing.' You can't count things. How many things on my desk? The…
-
Geach on the Real Distinction II: The Argument from Intentionality
See Geach on the Real Distinction I for some background on the distinctio realis. This post lays out the argument from intentionality to the real distinction. A theory of intentionality ought to explain how the objective reference or object-directedness of our thoughts and perceptions is possible. Suppose I am thinking about a cat, a particular…
-
Geach on the Real Distinction I
Oceans of ink have been spilled over the centuries on the celebrated distinctio realis between essence and existence (esse). You have no idea how much ink, and vitriol too, has flooded the scholastic backwaters and sometimes spilled over into mainstream precincts. Anyway, the distinction has long fascinated me and I hold to some version of it. I will first give a…
-
Existence and Property-Possession
Necessarily, whatever exists has properties, and necessarily, whatever has properties exists. So, necessarily, x exists iff x has properties. But it does not follow that existence is the property of having properties. Why not? Peter and Paul differ in their existence. But they don't differ in point of having properties. They have different properties, of…
-
On the Expressibility of ‘Something Exists’
Surely this is a valid and sound argument: 1. Stromboli exists.Ergo2. Something exists. Both sentences are true; both are meaningful; and the second follows from the first. How do we translate the argument into the notation of standard first-order predicate logic with identity? Taking a cue from Quine we may formulate (1) as 1*. For…
-
The Stromboli Puzzle
Here is another puzzle London Ed may enjoy. Is the following argument valid or invalid: An island volcano exists.Stromboli is an island volcano.ErgoStromboli exists. The argument appears valid, does it not? But it can't be valid if it falls afoul of the dreaded quaternio terminorum, or 'four-term fallacy.' And it looks like it does. On the…
-
Can Every General Existential be Expressed as an Instantiation Claim?
Here are some general existentials: An island volcano exists.There are uninhabited planets.Faithful husbands exist.Unicorns do not exist.There aren't many chess players in Bagdad, Arizona. Each of these is expressible salva significatione et veritate (without loss of meaning or truth) by a corresponding instantiation claim: The concept island volcano is instantiated. The concept uninhabited planet is…