Category: Existence
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The Modified Leibniz Question: The Debate So Far
What follows is a guest post by Peter Lupu with some additions and corrections by BV. 'CCB' abbreviates 'concrete contingent being.' The last post in this series is here. Thanks again to Vlastimil Vohamka for pointing us to Maitzen's article, which has proven to be stimulating indeed. So far as I can see…
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Stanislav Sousedik and the Circularity Objection to the Thin Theory
Daniel Novotny writes, I have discovered (something like) the circularity objection in Sousedik's translation of Frege's "Dialog with Punjer on Existence" into Czech. It's about two pages; here are some snippets (very rough translation): First we might find difficulties with the assertion that existence is a property of the second order, i.e. the property of "falling…
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Farewell to Krauss, A Universe From Nothing
The book is due back at the library today, and good riddance. A few parting shots to put this turkey to bed. The book is a mishmash of bad philosophy, badly written, and popularization of contemporary cosmology. I cannot comment on the accuracy of the popularization, but the philosophy is indeed bad and demonstrates why we…
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Causation, Existence, and the Modified Leibniz Question
Letting 'CCB' abbreviate 'concrete contingent beings,' we may formulate the modified Leibniz question as follows: Why are there any CCBs at all? We have been discussing whether this question is a pseudo-question. To be precise, we have been discussing whether it is a pseudo-question on the assumption that it does not collapse into one or more…
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The Modified Leibniz Question, Maitzen’s Critique of its Meaningfulness, and My Response
It is the thesis of Stephen Maitzen's Stop Asking Why There's Anything that the Leibniz question, 'Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all?' is ill-posed as it stands and unanswerable. Maitzen's point is intended to apply not only to the 'wide-open' formulation just mentioned but also to such other formulations as 'Why are there…
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Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist?
I recently considered and rejected the suggestion that a universe with a metrically infinite past has the resources to explain its own existence. But what if, as the cosmologists tell us, the universe is only finitely old? Could a variant of the first argument be nonetheless mounted? Surprisingly, yes. Unsurprisingly, it fails. The following also…
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The ‘How Many?’ and the ‘Why Any?’ Questions and Their Connection
This post continues the ruminations begun here which were inspired by Stephen Maitzen's intriguing paper Stop Asking Why There's Anything (Erkenntnis 77:1 (2012), 51-63). Let 'CCB' abbreviate 'concrete contingent being.' For present purposes, the 'How many?' question is this: How many CCBs are there? And for present purposes the 'Why any?' question is this: Why are there any…
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Must We Stop Asking Why There’s Anything?
1. A Pseudo-Question: How Many Things are There? A while back, in response to a reader's question, I argued that one cannot count things as things. I can count the cats in my house, the tiles on my roof, and 'in principle' the subterranean termites within two feet of my foundation. What I cannot do is count…
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The Thin Theory is Circular!
London Ed demands that I reduce my circularity objection to a sound bite. No can do. But at least I can combat this travesty he ascribes to me: The thin conception of 'exists' is that 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated'But if *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by…
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More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence
I have been arguing with London Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' about existence for years. Here is part of a post from the old blog dated 25 January 2006. Ed has never said anything to budge me from my position. So why continue? One reason is to clarify and deepen one's understanding of one's own position. I am…
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Existence and Quantification: Does London Ed Beg the Question?
In his latest installment, London Ed writes: Maverick argues: Ed thinks that the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals is a contingent assumption. But I didn't say that, and it is not. It is a necessary assumption if (1) [namely that ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some…
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Another Round on the Circularity of the Thin Conception of Existence
London Ed quotes me, then responds. I counterrespond in blue. 1. ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some volcano is an island.’ Agree, of course. 2. This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals. Disagree profoundly. The equivalence, being logical, cannot depend on any…
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The Argument From Circularity and Singular Existential Statements: A Response
This is a response to a post of the same name by London Ed. I am much in his debt for his copious and relentless commentary. My responses are in blue. After reading some of Maverick’s other posts on the subject, and reading some material he sent me, it is clear I have misrepresented his…
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The Circularity of the Fressellian Account of Existence: Objections and Replies
Being in receipt of the following detailed comments on a central argument in a forthcoming paper, "Existence: Two Dogmas of Analysis," I am now deeply in London Ed's debt. In each numbered item, Ed more or less quotes me and then comments. My responses are in blue. 1. On the thin theory existence is a property…