Category: Existence

The Modified Leibniz Question: The Debate So Far

What follows is a guest post by Peter Lupu with some additions and corrections by BV. 'CCB' abbreviates 'concrete contingent being.'  The last post in this series is here.  Thanks again to Vlastimil Vohamka for pointing us to Maitzen's article, which has proven to be stimulating indeed.
 
 
So far as I can see Steve Maitzen (in Stop Asking Why There's Anything)  holds three theses:
 
A. Semantic Thesis
 
1. As a general rule, dummy sortals such as ‘thing’, ‘object’, ‘CCB’, etc., are not referential terms, unless there is an explicit or implicit background presupposition as to which sortal term is intended as a replacement. This presupposition, if satisfied, fixes the referent of the dummy sortal. In the absence of the satisfaction of such a presupposition, sentences in which they are used (not mentioned) have no truth-conditions and questions in which they are used (not mentioned) have no answer-conditions.
 
2. Examples such as ‘Cats are CCBs’ are no exception. Either this sentence has no truth-conditions because the term ‘CCB’ is merely a place holder for an unspecified sortal or it should be understood along the lines of: ‘Cats are animals’, etc., where ‘animal’ is (one possible) substitution term for the dummy sortal ‘CCB.'
 
BV adds:  Right here I think a very simple objection can be brought against the semantic thesis.  We know that cats exist, we know that they are concrete, and we know that they are contingent.  So we know that 'Cats are concrete contingent beings' is true.  Now whatever is true is meaningful (though not vice versa). Therefore, 'Cats are concrete contingent beings' is meaningful.  Now if a sentence is meaningful, then its constituent terms are meaningful.  Hence 'CCB' is meaningful despite its being a dummy sortal.  I would also underscore a point I have made several times  before.  The immediate inference from the admittedly true (a) to (b) below is invalid:
 
a. The question 'How many CCBs are there?' is unanswerable, hence senseless
ergo
b. The question 'Why are there any CCBs?' is unanswerable, hence senseless.
 
3. The semantic thesis is the driving force behind Steve M’s view. It is the fallback position in all of his responses to challenges by Bill, Steven, and others. So far as I can tell, Steve M. did not defend the general form of the semantic thesis in his original paper. It is, therefore, surprising that it has been ignored by almost everyone in these discussions and that neither Bill nor Steven challenged the semantic thesis. I have written an extensive comment on this thesis and challenged it on several grounds.
 
 
B.  Explanatory Thesis
  
1. As a general rule, Why-Questions are answered by giving an explanation. ‘Why are there any CCBs?’
is a [explanation-seeking] Why-Question. [It is worth noting that the grammatically interrogative form of words 'Why is there anything at all?' could be used simply to express wonder that anything at all should exist, and not as a demand for an explanation.]  Therefore, it invites an explanation. What sort of explanation? Steve M. holds two theses about this last question:
 
 
(MI) The Adequacy Thesis: empirical explanations typical in science offer (at least in principle) adequate explanations for the Why-CCBs question, provided the Why-CCB questions are meaningful at all (and their meaningfulness is a function of satisfying the semantic thesis);
 
(MII) The Completeness Thesis: Once an empirical explanation is given to Why CCBs?, there is nothing left to explain. And in any case there are no suitable forms of explanation beyond empirical
explanations that could be even relevant to explain Why-CCBs?
 
2. Bill and Steven certainly deny (MII). They may also have some reservations about MI. What is the
basis on which Bill and Steven challenge MII? They maintain that even if we assume that an adequate empirical explanation is offered (i.e., MI is satisfied) to each and every CCB, there is something else left over to explain. What is that “something else” that is left over that needs explaining (Steve M. asks)?
 
3. It is at this juncture that the discussion either reverts back to the semantic thesis or it
needs to be advanced into a new metaphysical realm.
 
C. Metaphysical Thesis
 
Dummy sortals do not pick out any  properties or universals (monadic or relational) except via the mediation of genuine sortals. i.e., there are no properties over and beyond those picked out by genuine sortals.
 
1. Steven attempted to answer the challenge posed by the question at the end of B2 in one of his posts.
His answer is this: what is left over after all empirical explanations favored by Steve M. are assumed to have been given is a very general property, feature, or aspect that all CCBs, and only CCBs, have in common. So why shouldn't ‘Why-CCBs’ questions be understood as inquiring into an explanation of this general feature that all and only CCBs share? Call this alleged general feature ‘X’.
 
2. The dispute has turned to whether X has any content, i.e., Steve M. challenged the contention
that there is any phenomenon described by X that was not already accounted for by his favorite empirical explanations. Bill and Steven tried to articulate the content of X without (apparently) noticing that every such effort was rebutted by Steve M. either by appealing to the semantic thesis or to the explanatory thesis or both.
 
3. So what could X be? I suggest the following: X is the (second-order) property such that the
property of *is a contingent being* is instantiated (or something along these lines).  [I would put it this way:  X is the being-instantiated of the property of being a contingent being.]
 
4. Since the universal/property *is a contingent being* need not be instantiated, the fact that it is in fact instantiated in the actual world (i.e., that X holds) needs explaining (So claim Bill and Steven). And whatever is the explanation (including a “brute-fact” explanation) for this fact, it cannot take the form of an empirical explanation.
 
5. The Metaphysical Thesis I am attributing to Steve M. of course rules out that there is a property
such as X. Why? Two reasons: first, the property *is a contingent being* is not a sortal property; second, the predicate ‘is a contingent being’ (or any of its variants) contains a dummy sortal and therefore it does not pick out a property (nor does it have an extension) in the absence of a specific background presupposition of a specific sortal substituend.
 
D. Conclusion
  
Unless these three theses are clearly separated, the discussion will be going in circles. As one can see, the driving force behind the explanatory and metaphysical theses is ultimately the semantic thesis. No one challenged this thesis directly (except me in a comment that was ignored by everyone with the exception of Bill).

Stanislav Sousedik and the Circularity Objection to the Thin Theory

Daniel Novotny writes,

I have discovered (something like) the circularity objection in Sousedik's translation of Frege's "Dialog with Punjer on Existence" into Czech. It's about two pages; here are some snippets (very rough translation):

First we might find difficulties with the assertion that existence is a property of the second order, i.e. the property of "falling under a concept". This is not incorrect but we need to take notice of something that — as far as I know — has gone unnoticed, namely that this "property" is under closer scrutiny a relation. "To fall under" is evidently a two-place predicate expressing not the relation of the concept to the thing (as it seems from Frege's exposition) but rather of the thing to the concept.  …"

. . . If we accept that "falling under" (or more precisely: "to have under") is a name of the relation, a sentence [e.g., "Men exist"] speaks not only of the concept of "men" but also of something that falls under this concept. . . . .

In order to say truthfully that the concept  F has under itself the individual x, the condition of x's existence needs to be satisfied. This seems obvious but the question arises what does this word "exist" express in this case? … it cannot be the second-order property, since it is, as we have seen a relation; we ask here about existence which is presupposed by this second-order relational propery as its necessary condition.

Now I have never read anything by Professor Sousedik, and I would be very surprised if he has ever read anything by me.  So it is particularly gratifying to find that he is making points that are almost exactly the same as points I have made in published papers, my existence book, earlier posts and in a forthcoming manuscript, copies of which I sent to London Ed, Peter L., and a few others.  I will couch the points in my own preferred jargon.

1. The second-level property of being instantiated is a relational property, one logically  parasitic upon the  two-place relation  *___ instantiates —* or *___ falls under —*.  Being instantiated is like being married.  Necessarily, if a first-level concept is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual, just as, necessarily, if a person is married, then he is married to someone (distinct from himself), the Fargo, North Dakota woman who 'married' herself notwithstanding. (We won't speculate on the question how such a self-marriage is consummated.)

2. It follows from #1 that the grammatical form of a sentence like 'Men exist' is not the same as its logical form.  Grammatically, it has a subject-predicate form.  Logically, however, it is relational: the concept man is instantiated by one or more individuals.  So not only is the sentence not about men, but about a concept; it is also refers — with "studied ambiguity" to cop a phrase from Quine — to one or more individuals.

3.  Now if concept F is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists.  This is obvious, as Sousedik remarks.  What is less obvious, but still quite clear, is that the instantiating individuals cannot exist in the sense of being instantiated.  Obviously, no individual is instantiable; only concepts are instantiable.  If you insist that existence is the second-level relational property of being instantiated, then you obviously cannot say that the existence of Socrates is the second-level relational property of being instantiated.

4.  What this shows is that the 'Fressellian' attempt to reduce existence to instantiation fails miserably.  It ends up presupposing as irreducible what it tries to reduce, namely, genuine (pound the lectern, stamp the foot!) existence.  Another way of saying that the account presupposes what it tries to reduce is by saying that it is circular.  We want to know what existence is.  We are told that existence is a  property of concepts, the property of being instantiated.  Reflection on this property, however, reveals it to be relational and thus parasitic upon the dyadic relation of instantiation.  For this relation to hold, however, its terms must exist, and not in the sense of being instantiated.  So we are brought back to what we were trying to reduce to instantiation, namely, the existence that belongs to individuals.

Despite the clarity of the above, Peter L. balks, and London Ed baulks.  It is high time for both of them to cry 'uncle' and admit that I am right about this. Or must I sic the Czech contingent on them? [grin]

Farewell to Krauss, A Universe From Nothing

The book is due back at the library today, and good riddance.  A few parting shots to put this turkey to bed.  The book is a mishmash of bad philosophy, badly written, and popularization of contemporary cosmology.  I cannot comment on the accuracy of the popularization, but the philosophy is indeed bad and demonstrates why we need philosophy: to debunk bad philosophy, especially the scientistic nonsense our culture is now awash in.  I am tempted once more to quote some Kraussian passages and pick them apart.  But besides being a waste of time, that would be the literary equivalent of beating up a cripple or rolling a drunk.

In my post of 29 April I put my finger on the central problem with the book: the 'bait and switch.'  Krauss baits us with the old Leibniz question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' (See On the Ultimate Origin of Things, 1697.)  Having piqued our interest, he switches to a different question, actually to several different questions, one of which is: "Why is there ‘stuff’, instead of empty space?" (Click on above link for reference.)  Apparently our man forgot that empty space is not nothing.

Bait and switch.  I recall an old Tareyton cigarette commercial  from the '60s:  I'd rather fight than switch.  Apparently Krauss would rather switch than fight an intellectually honest fight.

Here are links to my more substantial, but no less polemical, Krauss posts.

Ed Feser picks up on the 'bait and switch' theme in his cleverly titled First Things review, Not Understanding Nothing.

Causation, Existence, and the Modified Leibniz Question

Letting 'CCB' abbreviate 'concrete contingent beings,' we may formulate the modified Leibniz question as follows: Why are there any CCBs at all?  We have been discussing whether this question is a pseudo-question.  To be precise, we have been discussing whether it is a pseudo-question on the assumption that it does not collapse into one or more naturalistically tractable questions: questions that can be answered by natural science.

My thesis is that the modified Leibniz question is a genuine question that does not collapse into one or more naturalistically tractable questions.

I

Consider a universe that consists of a beginningless actually infinite series of contingent beings. Let us assume that each CCB in this universe is (deterministically)  caused by a preceding CCB.  The beginninglessness of the series insures that every CCB has a cause.  Since every CCB has a cause, each has a causal explanation in terms of an earlier one. And since each has a causal explanation, the whole lot of them does. (Some may smell the fallacy of composition in this last sentence, but let's assume arguendo that no fallacy has been committed.)  Accordingly, the totality of CCBs, the universe, has an explanation in virtue of each CCB's having an explanation. 

Some will say that on this scenario the modified Leibniz question has received a naturalistic  answer.  Why are there CCBs as as opposed to no CCBs?  Because each CCB is causally explained by other CCBs, and because explaining each of them amounts to explaining the whole lot of them.  And since the question has this naturalistic or universe-immanent answer, the specifically philiosophical form of the question, the question as Leibniz intended it, is a pseudo-question.

Others, like me, will insist that on the scenario sketched the question has not been answered.  We will insist that a legitimate question remains:  why is there this whole infinite system of contingent beings?  After all, it is contingent, just as its parts are contingent whether taken distributively or collectively.  There might not have been any concrete contingent beings at all, in which case there would not have been any CCBs to cause other CCBs.  And nothing is changed by the fact that the series of CCBs is actually  infinite in the past direction.  The fact that the series always existed does not show that it could not have failed to exist.  The temporal 'always' does not get the length of the modal 'necessarily.'  If time is infinite in both directions, and the universe exists at every time, it does not follow that the universe necessarily exists.  But if it contingently exists, then we are entitled to ask why it exists.

It is no answer to be told that each member of the universe, each CCB, is caused by others.  I may cheerfully grant that but still sensibly ask: But what accounts for the whole causal system in the first place?

Please note that a possible answer here is: nothing does.  The existence of the universe is a brute fact.  Nothing I have said entails a theistic answer. My point is simply  that the modified Leibniz question is a genuine question that cannot be answered by invoking causal relations within the universe.

II

There another line of attack open to me, one that focuses on the connection between causation and existence.  It seems to me that the naturalist or 'immanentist' must assume that if x causes y, then x causes y to exist.  The assumption, in other words, is that causation is existentially productive, that the cause brings the effect into existence.  But on what theory of causation that the naturalist is likely to accept is  causation productive?

This is a huge topic and I can only begin to explore it in this post.  Suppose our naturalist, good empiricist that he is, subscribes to a Humean or regularity theory of causation along the following lines:

RT. x (directly) causes y =df (i) x and y are spatiotemporally contiguous; (ii) x occurs earlier than y; (iii) x and y are subsumed under event types X and Y that are related by the de facto empirical generalization that all events of type X are followed by events of type Y.

 If this is what causation is, it is is not existentially productive: the cause does not produce, bring about, bring into existence the effect.  On the contrary, the holding of the causal relation presupposes the existence of the cause-event and the effect-event.  It follows that causation as understood on (RT) merely orders already existent events and cannot account for the very existence of these events. 

Of course, the naturalist needn't be a Humean about causation.  But then he ought to tell us what theory of causation he accepts and how it can be pressed into service to explain the very existence of CCBs.

For details and a much more rigorous development, see my article "The Hume-Edwards Objection to the Cosmological Argument," Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. XXII, 1997, pp. 425-443.  

The Modified Leibniz Question, Maitzen’s Critique of its Meaningfulness, and My Response

It is the thesis of Stephen Maitzen's Stop Asking Why There's Anything that the Leibniz question, 'Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all?' is ill-posed as it stands and unanswerable.  Maitzen's point is intended to apply not only to the 'wide-open' formulation just mentioned but also to such other formulations as 'Why are there any concrete contingent beings at all?'  I will discuss only the latter formulation.  It is defensible in ways that the wide-open question is not.  Call it the modified Leibniz question.  For Maitzen it is a pseudo-question.  For me it is a genuine question.  On my classificatory scheme, Maitzen is a rejectionist concerning the modified Leibniz question.  The question is not to be answered but  rejected as senseless, because of an internal semantic defect that renders it necessarily unanswerable and therefore illegitimate as a question.

My defense of the meaningfulness of the modified Leibniz question does not commit me to any particular answer to the question such as the theistic answer.  For there are several possible types of answer, one of them being the 'brutal' answer:  it is simply a brute fact that concrete contingent beings (CCBs) exist.  When Russell, in his famous BBC debate with the Jesuit Copleston, said that the the universe is just there and that is all, he was answering the question, not rejecting it.  His answer presupposed the meaningfulness of the question.

1. Getting a Sense of What the Dispute is About

Maitzen's paper is in the context of a defense of naturalism and an attack on theism.  So I have to be careful not to assume theism or anything that entails or presupposes theism.  Defining 'naturalism' is a tricky business but it suffices for present purposes to say that naturalism entails the nonexistence of God as classically conceived, and the nonexistence of immortal souls, but does not entail the nonexistence of abstracta, many of which are necessary beings. 

To make things hard on theists let us assume (contrary to current cosmology)  that the universe has an actually infinite past. Hence it always existed. Let us also assume that the each total state of the universe at a time is (deterministically) caused to exist by an earlier such state of the universe. A third assumption is that the universe is nothing over and above the sum of its states. The third assumption implies that if each state has a causal explanation in terms of earlier states (in accordance with the laws of nature), then all of the states have an explanation, in which case the universe itself has a causal explanation. This in turn implies that there is no need to posit anything external to the universe, such as God, to explain why the universe exists. The idea, then, is that the universe exists because it causes itself to exist in that later states are caused to exist by earlier states, there being no earliest, uncaused, state. We thereby explain why the universe exists via an infinite regress of universe-immanent causes and in so doing obviate the need for a transcendent cause.

If this could be made to work, then we would have a nice neat self-contained universe whose existence was not a brute fact but also not dependent on anything external to the universe.  We would also have an answer to the modified Leibniz question.  Why are there any CCBs given the (broadly logical) possibility that there not be any?  Because each is caused to exist by other CCBs.

The five or so assumptions behind this reasoning can all be questioned. But even if they are all true, the argument is still no good for a fairly obvious (to me!) reason. The whole collection of states, despite its being beginningless and endless, is (modally) contingent: it might not have existed at all.  So, despite every state's having a cause, we can still ask why there are any states in the first place.

The fact that U always existed, if it is a fact, does not entail that U must exist. If I want to know why this universe of ours exists as opposed to there being some other universe or no universe at all, it does no good to tell me that it always existed. For what I want to know is why it exists at all, or 'in the first place.'   I am not asking about its temporal duration but about its very existence. Why it exists at all is a legitimate question since there is no necessity that there be a universe in the first place.  There might have been no universe, where 'universe' stands for the sum-total of concrete contingent beings all of which, on the assumption of naturalism, are physical or material beings.  And it seems obvious that the fact, if it is a fact, that every state has a cause in earlier states does not explain why there is the whole system of states.

The dispute between Maitzen and me can now be formulated.

BV:  The question 'Why are there any CCBs at all? is a legitimate question ( a meaningful question) that cannot be answered in a universe-immanent or naturalistic way as above where every CCB is causally explained by other CCBs. 

SM:  The question 'Why are there any CCBs at all?' is not a legitimate question (not a meaningful question) except insofar as it can be reformulated as a question whose answer can take a universe-immanent or naturalistic form.

2. Maitzen's Argument For the Meaninglessness of the Modified Leibniz Question

The argument begins with considerations about counting.  Maitzen arrives at a result that I do not question.  We can counts pens, plums and penguins, but we cannot count things, entities, or concrete contingent beings.  Or at least we cannot count them under those heads.  The reason is quite simple.  The first trio of terms is a trio of sortals, the second of dummy sortals. Sortals encapsulate individuative criteria that make possible the counting of the items to which the sortals apply.  Thus it makes sense to ask how many cats are on my desk.  The answer at the moment is two.  But it makes no sense to ask how many CCBs are on my desk at the moment. For to answer the question I would have to  be able to count the CCBs, and that is something I cannot do because of the semantic indeterminacy of 'CCB.'  When one counts cats one does not count the proper parts of cats for the simple reason that the proper parts of cats are not cats. (Pre-born babies inside a mother are not proper parts of the mother.)  In fact, it occurs to me now that a necessary condition of a term's being a sortal is that it be such that, if it applies to a thing, then it does not apply to the proper parts of the thing.  When I set out to count CCBs, however, I get no guidance from the term: I don't know whether to count the proper parts of the cat as CCBs or not.  It is not that I or we contingently lack the ability to count them, but that the semantic indeterminateness of 'CCB' makes it impossible to count them.  Things get even hairier — you will forgive the pun — when we ask about undetached arbitrary parts (e.g., Manny minus his tail) and mereological sums (e.g., Manny + the cigar in the ashtray).

All of this was discussed in greater detail in earlier posts. For now the point is simply that the question 'How many CCBs are there?' cannot be answered due to the semantic indeterminateness of 'CCB.'  And since it cannot be answered for this semantic reason, the question is senseless, a pseudo-question.

So far, so good.  But then on p. 56  of Maitzen's paper we find the following sudden but crucial move: "These considerations, I believe, also show that the question ‘Why is there anything?' (i.e., ‘Why is there any thing?’) confuses grammatical and logical function and hence necessarily lacks an answer . . . . "  The main weakness of Maitzen's paper, as I see it, is that he doesn't adequately explain the inferential connection between the counting question and the explanation question, between the 'How many?' question and the 'Why any?' question.  I cheerfully concede that it is senseless to ask how many CCBs there are if all we have to go on is 'CCB' as it is commonly understood.  (Of course there is a difference between 'thing,' say, and 'concrete contingent being.'  The first is a bit of ordinary English while the second is a term of art (terminus technicus).  But this difference does not make a difference for present purposes.)  But why should the fact that 'CCB' is a dummy sortal also make the 'Why any?' question senseless?  For that is precisely what Maitzen is claiming.  'Why is there anything?' is senseless because "the question's reliance on the dummy sortal 'thing' leaves it indeterminate what's being asked." (p. 56)

But wait a minute.  What is being asked about CCBs in the second question is not how many, but why they exist at all.  Why should the fact that we cannot assign a precise number to them render the second question senseless?  I know that there are at least two CCBs.  Here is one cat, here is another (he said Mooreanly).  Each is a concrete contingent being.  So there are at least two.  If there are at least two, then there are some. If there are some, then 'CCBs exist' is true.  Since it is true, it is meaningful. (Not every meaningful proposition is true, but every true proposition is meaningful.) 

To put it another way, 'CCBs exist' is a (closed) sentence.  It expresses a complete thought, a proposition.  It is not an open sentence like 'Xs exist.'  The latter is no more a sentence than a dummy sortal is a sortal.  Unlike 'CCBs exist,' it cannot be evaluated as either true or false.  So, while 'CCB' lacks the semantic determinacy of a sortal, it is not wholly semantically indeterminate like the variable 'X.'  It makes a semantic contribution to the sentence 'CCBs exist.'

Now if it is meaningful to assert that CCBs exist, despite their number being indeterminate, then it is also meaningful to ask why CCBs exist, despite their number being indeterminate.  Now it is meaningful to assert that CCBs exist.  Therefore, it is meaningful to ask why they exist, despite their number being indeterminate.

Although the uncountability of CCBs is a good reason to think that 'How many CCBs are there?' is senseless, it is not a good reason to think that 'Why are there any CCBs?' is also senseless.

My point is that it is a non sequitur for Maitzen to move from

a. 'How many CCBs are there?' is  a senseless question

to

b. 'Why are there any CCBs?' is a senseless question.

(a) is true.  But one can hold (a) consistently with holding the negation of (b).

How might Maitzen respond?

3. 'Concrete Contingent Being' as a Mere Covering Term

For Maitzen, 'CCB' is "only a covering term for pens, plums, penguins . . . ." (p. 57)  and other instances of sorts.  It doesn't refer to anything distinct from pens, plums, penguins, cats, human births, explosions, and so on. In other words, 'CCB' does not pick out a special sort — an uber-sort, if you will — the instances of which are distinct from the instances of genuine sorts.  And so 'CCB' does not pick out a sort whose instances elude natural-scientific explanation and therefore EITHER require some special explanation by God or some other entity transcendent of the physical universe OR are such that their existence is a brute fact.  As Maitzen puts it, "there aren't any contingent things whose explanations outstrip the explanations available for the individuals covered by the covering term 'contingent things.'" (p. 58)  The 'Why any?' question "has no content until we replace referentially indeterminate words with genuine sortals." (p. 59) 

If Maitzen is telling us that CCBs are not a sort of thing distinct  from ordinary sorts, then he is right, and I agree.      Suppose we we have a complete list of all the sorts of thing in the universe: pens, plums, pussycats, penguins, and so on.  It would be absurd if someone were to object: "But you forgot to list the concrete contingent beings!"  That would be absurd since each pen, plum etc. is a CCB, and there is no CCB that is not either a pen or a plum or, etc. But it doesn't follow that a sentence in which 'CCB' occurs is without content. 

It is simply false to say that the 'Why any?' question "has no content until we replace referentially indeterminate words with genuine sortals." (p. 59)   Right here is where Maitzen makes the mistake that invalidates the move from (a) to (b).  He conflates the partial semantic indeterminacy of dummy sortals with the total semantic indeterminacy of variables. Compare:

  • Why are there any penguins?
  • Why are there any concrete contingent beings?
  • Why are there any Xs?

 The first two questions are genuine, despte the fact we can count only penguins.  The third question is pseudo since it has no definite sense.

Note finally that we cannot replace the second question with a long disjunctive question like 'Why are there either penguins or plums or pussycats or pens, or . . . ?'  For suppose you had a complete naturalistic answer to the latter question.  You could still meaningfully ask why there are any CCBs at all as opposed to none at all, and why these rather than some other possible set.

There is more to say, but tomorrow's another day, and brevity is the soul of blog.

Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist?

I recently considered and rejected the suggestion that a universe with a metrically infinite past has the resources to explain its own existence.  But what if, as the cosmologists tell us, the universe is only finitely old? Could a variant of the first argument be nonetheless mounted?  Surprisingly, yes.  Unsurprisingly, it fails.

The following also fleshes out a version of what I called Cosmologism and listed recently as one possible type of response to the Leibniz question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Written in the summer of 1999. Submitted to The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 25 January 2000. The acceptance letter is dated 14 February 2000. Published in Philosophy 75 (2000), pp. 604-612. Copyright held by The Royal Society of Philosophy,  London.  Philosophy pagination is provided  in brackets, e.g., [P 604]. Endnote numbers are also given in brackets, e.g., [1].

ABSTRACT: This article responds to Quentin Smith's, "The Reason the Universe Exists is that it Caused Itself to Exist," Philosophy 74 (1999), 579-586. My rejoinder makes three main points. The first is that Smith's argument for a finitely old, but causally self-explanatory, universe fails from probative overkill: if sound, it also shows that all manner of paltry event-sequences are causally self-explanatory. The second point is that the refutation of Smith's  argument extends to Hume's argument for an infinitely old causally self-explanatory universe, as well as to Smith's two 'causal loop'  arguments. The problem with all four arguments is their reliance on Hume's principle that to explain the members of a collection is ipso facto to explain the collection. This principle succumbs to counterexamples. The third point is that, even if Hume's principle were true, Smith's argument could not succeed without the aid of a theory of causation according to which causation is production (causation of existence).

Continue reading “Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist?”

The ‘How Many?’ and the ‘Why Any?’ Questions and Their Connection

This post continues the ruminations begun here which were inspired by Stephen Maitzen's intriguing paper Stop Asking Why There's Anything (Erkenntnis 77:1 (2012), 51-63).

Let 'CCB' abbreviate 'concrete contingent being.'  For present purposes, the 'How many?' question is this: How many CCBs are there?  And for present purposes the 'Why any?' question is this: Why are there any CCBs?  There might have been none, but there are some, so why are there some?  (I take that to be equivalent to asking why there are any.)

What I want to get clear about is the connection between these two questions.  In particular,  I want to see if the senselessness of the first, if it is senseless, entails the senselessness of the second.

I think it is clear that 'CCB,' like 'thing,' 'entity,' 'existent,' object,' etc. is not a sortal expression.  There are different ways of explaining what a sortal is, but for present purposes a sortal

  • supplies a criterion for counting the items to which the term applies
  • provides a criterion of identity and non-identity among the items to which the term applies
  • gives a criterion for the continued existence of the items to which the term applies.

'Pen' and 'penguin' are examples of sortals.  I can count the pens and penguins on my desk.  There are five pens and zero penguins. (It's a tad warm for penguins here in the Sonoran desert.)  The penguins in Antartica are countable as well, in principle if not in practice.  (This use of 'countable' is not to be confused with its use in set theory.  A countable (uncountable) set is an infinite set the members of which can be (cannot be) placed in one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers.)

'CCB' is not a sortal because it does not provide a criterion for counting the items to which it applies, say, the things on my desk.  Is a pen together with its cap one CCB  or two?  And what about the particular blackness of the cap?  Presumably it too is a CCB. Are we now up to three CCBs?  And so on.

Maitzen concludes that the 'How many?' question is a pseudo-question because ill-formed, and its is ill-formed because   it features a dummy sortal, a term that functions grammatically like a sortal, but is not a sortal.  As senseless, the question is to be rejected, not answered.

From this result Maitzen straightaway (without any intermediate steps) infers that the 'Why any?'' question is also senseless and for the same reason, namely, that it harbors a dummy sortal.  It is not clear, however, why the fact that the second question features the dummy sortal 'CCB' should render the second question senseless.  We need an argument to forge a link between the two questions.  Perhaps the following will do the trick.

1. If it makes sense to claim that penguins exist, then it makes sense to claim that there is in reality some definite number of penguins.  (It cannot  be true both that there are penguins and that there is no definite number of penguins.) Therefore:
2. If it makes sense to claim that CCBs exist, then it makes sense to claim that there is in reality some definite number of CCBs.  But:
3. It makes no sense to claim that there is in reality some definite number of CCBs. Therefore:
4. It makes no sense to claim that CCBs exist. (2, 3, Modus Tollens)
5. If it makes no sense to claim that CCBs exist, then it makes no sense to ask why CCBs exist.  Therefore:
6. It makes no sense to ask why CCBs exist. (4, 5 Modus Ponens)

I suspect that some such argument as the foregoing is running behind the scenes of Maitzen's text.  The crucial premise is (3).  But has Maitzen established (3)?  I agree that WE cannot count CCBs.  We cannot count them because 'CCB' is not a sortal.  And so FOR US the number of CCBs must remain indeterminate.  But from a God's Eye point of view — which does not presuppose the actual existence of God –  there could easily be a definite number (finite or transfinite) that is the number of CCBs.

On can conceive of an ideally rational spectator (IRS) who knows the true ontology and so knows what all the categories of entity are and knows the members of each category.  What is to stop the IRS from computing the number of CCBs?  We can't do the computation because we are at sea when it comes to the true ontology.  All we have are a bunch of competing theories, and the English language is no help: 'CCB' does not supply us with a criterion for counting.

In short, we must distinguish the question whether the number of CCBs is indeterminate in reality or only indeterminate for us.  If the latter, then we cannot move from the senselessness of the 'How many?' question to the senselessness of the 'Why any?' question.  If the former, the move is valid, but as far as I can see, Maitzen has not given any reason to think that the former is the case.

 

Must We Stop Asking Why There’s Anything?

1. A Pseudo-Question:  How Many Things are There?

A while back, in response to a reader's question, I argued that one cannot count things as things.  I can count the cats in my house, the tiles on my roof, and 'in principle' the subterranean termites within two feet of my foundation.  What I cannot do is count things (entities, beings, existents, items, objects, etc.) as things. The reason, briefly, is that 'thing,' unlike 'cat,' is not a sortal.  It is a dummy sortal.  It is a term that functions grammatically like a sortal, and can serve as a placeholder for a sortal, but is logically unlike a sortal in that it supplies no criteria of identification and re-identification for the things to which it applies.  I can count the cats in my house because I know what it is to be a cat; I know what 'counts' as a cat and what does not 'count' as a cat: the lifespan of a cat is not a cat; the location of a cat is not a cat; the posture of a cat is not a cat; the parts of a cat are not cats; the properties and relations of a cat are not cats, etc.

But I can't count the things in my house because I don't know what all counts as a thing, and what all doesn't.  Are only middle-sized specimens of dry goods things?  Or are persons also things?  Are my cats things?  Is their blackness a thing? Everything black is colored.  So do I count the cat as one thing, its blackness as a second thing, the being colored of the cat as a third thing?  If I have a cat on my lap, do I have at least three things on my lap, or only one, or perhaps a countable or (heaven forbid) an uncountable infinity of things on my lap?  And what about the parts of the cat, and the parts of the parts, and how far do we go with that?  To the molecular level. the atomic level. the quark level?

I trust the point is clear: one cannot count things (entities, etc.) as things.  It seems to follow that the question 'How many things are there?' is a pseudo-question.  It is a pseudo-question because it is unanswerable in principle.  'Many' and 'more than one' are not answers.  A Parmenidean monist might insist that there is exactly one thing, and a nihilist that there are none.

2. Why is There Anything at All?  A Pseudo-Question?

But now a vexing question arises:  does the fact that 'thing' is a dummy sortal, hence not a sortal, constitute a reason for holding that the question 'Why is there anything (any thing) at all?' is also a pseudo-question?  Stephen Maitzen answers in the affirmative in his paper, Stop Asking Why There's Anything. (Thanks to Vlastimil Vohanka for alerting me to the article.)

Maitzen seems to be reasoning along the following lines.  We can sensibly ask why there are apples, trees, plants, living things, and sensibly expect a natural-scientific answer.  But we cannot sensibly ask why there are things (existents, beings, etc.).  The same goes for the restricted question why there are any contingent beings.  This is because 'contingent being' is just as much a dummy sortal as 'being.'   Dummy sortals are referentially indeterminate unless replaced by a genuine sortal such as 'penguin.' 

Maitzen's point could be put as follows.  There are various sorts of thing, and of each sort we can sensibly ask: why are there things of this sort?  But we cannot sensibly ask: why are there things at all, or contingent things at all?  Things that are are not a sort of thing. And the same goes for things that are contingently.

So perhaps the point is simply this.  'Why is there anything at all?' is a pseudo-question because (a)  things that are are not a sort of thing, and (b) we can sensibly ask the 'why' question only about sorts of things.

3. Tentative Evaluation

Well, I think it is perfectly clear that things that are are not a sort of thing.  Aristotle said essentially that long ago when he said that being is not a genus (Metaph. 998b22, Anal Prior. 92b10).  We could put the point in formal mode by saying that 'being,' ens, das Seiende, are not sortal expressions.  (I am thinking of Heidegger's question, Warum ist das Seiende und nicht vielmehr nichts? )  But who ever said they were?

Maitzen's explanation of why people fall for the pseudo-question 'Why is there anything at all?' is because they confuse dummy sortals with genuine sortals.  But it seems to me that we can avoid the confusion and still sensibly ask the question.

Consider the question, 'Does anything exist?'  The question makes sense and has an obvious answer: 'Yes, things exist.'  Both the question and the answer make sense despite the presence in them of the dummy sortal 'thing.'  So why shouldn't it also make sense to ask why things exist?

Maitzen mistakenly assimilates the question 'Why does anything exist?' to the obviously senseless question 'How many things exist?'  This is the central weakness of his paper.  He never adequately explains the connection between the 'how many?' question and the 'why?' question.  The former is senseless and precisely for the reason that 'thing' is not a sortal.  But from the fact that 'thing' is not a sortal, how is it supposed to follow that the 'Why?' question is also senseless? 

The Thin Theory is Circular!

London Ed demands that I reduce my circularity objection to a sound bite.  No can do.  But at least I can combat this travesty he ascribes to me:

The thin conception of 'exists' is that 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated'
But if *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists
Therefore the thin conception of 'exists' is circular.

So let me try once more.  I will try to be succinct.  But there is no way I can get my point across in just a few sentences.  Philosophy cannot be reduced to sound bites!

1. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated.'
2. If a first-level concept such as *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual.
3. Let the arbitrary constant 'a' denote an individual that instantiates *F.*

We now ask whether a exists, does not exist, both, or neither.  These are the only options.

4. By LNC, a cannot both exist and not exist.
5. By LEM, a must either exist or not exist.
6. If a does not exist, i.e., if a is a Meinongian nonexistent object, then the link expressed in (1) between existence and instantiation is broken.
Therefore
7. If  *F* is instantiated, then *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.
Therefore
8. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.'
9. A definition (analysis, account, theory, explanation ) is circular iff the term to be defined occurs in the defining term.
10. 'Exists' occurs both in (8)'s definiendum and its definiens.
Therefore
11. The thin theory is circular.

Summary:  Our question is: What is existence?  The thin theory maintains that existence reduces to instantiation.  The whole point of the theory is that existence is in no sense a property of individuals; what it is is a property of concepts, the property of having an instance.  But if a first-level concept is instantiated, it is instantiated by an individual that exists. Therefore, the attempt to reduce existence to instantiation ends up presupposing what was to be reduced, namely existence, and is a failed theory for this reason.

Objection.  (5) is false. Individual a neither exists nor does not exist.  To exist = to be instantiatiated, and no individual is either instantiated or not instantiated. 

Reply.  This objection begs the question.  The question is whether existence can be reduced to instantiation.  One cannot just assume that it can be so reduced.  Furthermore,it is a plain fact that individuals exist.  I exist. This cat exists.  And of course the existence of this cat is not its being instantiated.  Since I exist, and my existence is not my being instantiated, existence cannot be reduced to instantiation.

The point could be put as follows.  The thin theory tries to reduce singular existence to general existence.  But general existence presupposes singular existence: there cannot exist cats in general unless this or that individual is a cat and exists.  Therefore, singular existence cannot be reduced to general existence.

It may  that what London Ed is doing is simply stipulating that 'exist(s)' shall mean 'is instantiated.'  But an arbitrary stipulation gratuitously made can be gratuitously rejected.  That individuals exist is a plain fact, innocent until proven guilty.  The question about existence cannot be answered by any mere stipulative definition.

More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence

I have been arguing with London Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' about existence for years.  Here is part of  a post from the old blog dated 25 January 2006.  Ed has never said anything to budge me from my position.  So why continue?  One reason is to clarify and deepen one's understanding of one's own position.  I am also fascinated by the problem of disagreement in general.  Why do intelligent and sincere people disagree?  What can be done about it?  What does protracted disagreement say about us and our condition?

…………..
     
I reject nonexistent objects in Meinong's sense. (But note well: to reject Meinongian possibilia and
impossibilia is not to reject non-epistemic possibilities and impossibilities. One can be a modal realist without being a possibilist; one can be an actualist. I am an actualist.) Given my rejection of Meinongian nonexistent objects, I cannot take negative existentials at face value.

'Frictionless planes do not exist,' for example, cannot be interpreted to be about nonexistent frictionless planes; it must be interpreted in some other way. In the language of Bertrand Russell circa 1918, one might say this: The propositional function 'x is a frictionless plane' is never true. Or one could say that the concept frictionless plane has no instances. Or: the property of being a frictionless plane is not instantiated. The point here is that the property does exist, and so is there to have a property predicated of it, the second-level property of being uninstantiated.

So I agree with Williams and 'Ockham' that there are no nonexistent objects and that apparent reference to them must be paraphrased away. There is no individual of which  we can say: it does not  exist, is not actual, is not real. But why should it follow that there  is no individual of which we can say: it exists, is actual, is real?

In my book, this is a non sequitur.

Williams assumes a sort of symmetry thesis: if there are no individuals that do not exist, then there are no individuals that exist. But my A Paradigm Theory of Existence rejects this symmetry thesis (pp. 114-116). Here is the way I put it in my book:

     If an individual exists, then no doubt it instantiates properties,
     satisfies descriptions and saturates concepts. But its existence
     cannot consist in, be identical with, its doing any of those
     things. However, if a putative individual does not exist, then its
     nonexistence can easily consist in a property's being
     uninstantiated. For a nonexistent individual is not a genuine
     individual, contra Meinong, but the mere absence of something of a
     more or less complete description. Thus there is no individual
     Pegasus to lack existence or to have nonexistence. [ . . .]

     Nonexistence is therefore always general nonexistence as opposed to
     singular nonexistence. But existence is primarily singular
     existence, the existence of individuals. Thus the asymmetry of
     existence and nonexistence. There is singular existence (the
     existence of individuals) and general existence (the
     being-instantiated of concepts) which latter presupposes singular
     existence: a first-level concept cannot be instantiated unless
     there exists an individual that instantiates it. But there is no
     such thing as singular nonexistence, e.g., the nonexistence of
     Cerberus. Thereis only general nonexistence, which is a
     second-level property.

So to Williams and 'Ockham' I say: You are right that there are no nonexistent objects. But you are wrong to infer that existence cannot  belong to individuals. It is well-nigh self-evident that existence belongs to individuals and can be predicated of them, as I do when, enacting the Cartesian cogito, I conclude, sum, 'I exist.'It is therefore a mistake to think that 'exist(s)' can only be used as a second-level predicate.

'Exist(s)' has both legitimate second-level and legitimate first-level uses.  Suppose I spy a mountain lion in my back yard.  I exclaim, 'There are mountain lions around here.'  That is a general existential sentence.  I could just as well have said, 'Mountain lions exist around here.'  The latter sentence sports a second-level use of 'exist.'  The sentence is not about any particular mountain lion even though based on the observation of a particular such critter.  Suppose I dub the distinctive cat, 'Monty.'  I can then say 'Monty exists,' and if he dies, 'Monty no longer exists.'  These latter two sentences feature first-level uses of 'exists.'

The attempt to reduce all first-level uses to second-level uses is throughly wrongheaded and impossible to carry out.  For details, see C. J. F. Williams' Analysis of 'I Might Not Have Existed.'

Existence and Quantification: Does London Ed Beg the Question?

In his latest installment, London Ed writes:

Maverick argues:

Ed thinks that the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals is a contingent assumption. But I didn't say that, and it is not. It is a necessary assumption if (1) [namely that ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some volcano is an island.’] and sentences of the same form are to hold. [My emphasis]

But he then says that there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals, which I don't follow at all. We start with the initial logical or definition[al] assumption about the meaning of the verb 'exists'.

 (1) 'A golden mountain exists' = 'Some mountain is golden.'

[. . . ]

I suppose I need to explain why there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals.  There would be something to stop us if the notion of a nonexistent object were logically self-contradictory.  But I see no contradiction in it.  So let me put the question to Ed:  Do you think that the very idea of a nonexistent object is logically self-contradictory?  If you do think this, then I refer you to my November 2009 post, Is Meinong's Theory of Objects 'Obviously Self-Contradictory'? Van Inwagen Says 'Yes.'

There is also the issue of question-begging.  Ed needs to justify the slide from

a. 'A golden mountain exists' is logically equivalent to 'Some mountain is golden'

to

1. 'A golden mountain exists' = 'Some mountain is golden.'

Equivalence is not identity!  Not even logical equivalence is identity. Propositions p, q are logically equivalent iff there is no logically possible world in which p is true and q false, or vice versa.  Now Ed and I agree about (a).  But the inference from (a) to (1) is invalid.  Consider triangularity and trilaterality.  There is no logically possible world in which it is true that something is triangular but not true that something is trilateral.  So 'Something is triangular' and 'Something is trilateral' are logically equivalent.  But it doesn't follow that they express the same proposition or that the triangularity = trilaterality.

Likewise, it does not follow from (a) that existence = someness.  Every world in which cats exist is a world in which something is a cat.  No doubt.  But how is it supposed to follow that the 'property' of existence is identical to the syntactical 'property' expressed by *Some ___ is a —*?

Ed begs the question against me by simply stipulating that the meaning of the verb 'exists' shall be identical to the meaning of 'Some ___ is a –.'   That is what I deny.

Another Round on the Circularity of the Thin Conception of Existence

London Ed quotes me, then responds.  I counterrespond in blue.

1. ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some volcano is an island.’

Agree, of course.

2. This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals.

Disagree profoundly. The equivalence, being logical, cannot depend on any contingent assumption. From the logical equivalence of (1), it follows that ‘the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals’ is equivalent to ‘some individuals are in the domain’. But the equivalence is true whether or not any individuals are in the domain. E.g. suppose that no islands are volcanoes. Then ‘Some volcano is an island’ is false. And so is ‘island volcanos exist’, by reason of the equivalence. But the equivalence stands, because it is a definition. Thus the move from (1) to (2) is a blatant non sequitur.

Ed says that the move from (1) to (2) is a non sequitur.  But the move cannot be a non sequitur since (2) is not a conclusion from (1); it is  a separate premise.  In any case, Ed thinks that (2) is false while I think it is true.  (2) is the bone of contention.  To mix metaphors in a manner most atrocious, (2) is the nervus probandi of my circularity objection.

Ed thinks that the  assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals is a contingent assumption.  But I didn't say that, and it is not.  It is a necessary assumption if (1) and sentences of the same form are to hold.  Let me explain.

On the thin theory, 'exist(s)' has no extra-logical content.  It disappears into the machinery of quantification.  It is just a bit of logical syntax: it means exactly what *Some ___ is a —* means.  But quantifiers range over a domain.  In first-order logic the domain is a domain of individuals.  That is not to say that the domain cannot be empty.  It is to say that the domain, whether empty or non-empty is a domain having or lacking individuals as opposed to properties or items of some other category.

Now there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals.  So suppose we have a domain populated by nonexistent individuals only.  Supppose a golden mountain is one of these individuals.  We can then say, relative to this domain, that some mountain is golden.  But surely 'Some mountain is golden' does not entail 'A golden mountain exists.'  The second sentence entails the first, but the first does not entail the second.  Therefore, they are not logically equivalent.

To enforce equivalence you must stipulate that the domain is a domain of existing individuals only.  If 'some' ranges over existing individuals, then 'Some mountain is golden' does entail 'A golden mountain exists.'   In other words, you must stipulate that the domain be such that, if there are any individuals in it, then they be existent individuals, as opposed to (Meinongian) nonexistent individuals.  The stipulation allows for empty domains; what it rules out, however, are domains the occupants of which are nonexistent individuals in Meinong's sense.

I hope it is now clear that a necessary presupposition of the truth of equivalences like (1) is that the domain of quantification be a domain of existing individuals only.  Again, such a domain may be empty.  But if it is, it is empty of existent individuals – which is not the same as its harboring nonexistent individuals.

In other words, we can eliminate 'exist(s)' in favor of the particular quantifier 'some,' but only at a price, the price being the stipulation that quantification is over a domain of existing individuals.  But then it should be clear that the thin theory is circular.  We replace 'exist(s)' with 'some,' but then realize that the particular quantifier must range over a domain of existing individuals.  The attempt to eliminate first-level existence backfires.  For we end up presupposing the very thing that we set out to eliminate, namely, first-level existence.  The circularity is blatant.

Ed's argument against all this is incorrect.  We agree that (1), expressing as it does a logical equivalence, is necessarily true.  As such, its truth cannot be contingent upon the actual existence of any individuals.  If existence reduces to someness, then this is the case whether or not any individuals actually exist.  My point, however, was not that (1) presupposes the existence of individuals, but that it presupposes that any individuals in the the domain of quantification be existent individuals as opposed to (Meinongian) nonexistent individuals.

(1) presupposes, not that there are individuals, but that any individuals that there are be existent individuals.  If you appreciate this distinction, then you appreciate why Ed's argument fails.

The Argument From Circularity and Singular Existential Statements: A Response

This is a response to a post of the same name by London Ed.  I am much in his debt for his copious and relentless commentary.  My responses are in blue.

After reading some of Maverick’s other posts on the subject, and reading some material he sent me, it  is clear I have misrepresented his argument. Although I am still some way from understanding it, I think it is this.

Suppose there is only one American philosopher, and suppose that it is Vallicella. Then the sentence ‘an American philosopher exists’ is true because Vallicella (qua American philosopher) exists. Now we can translate ‘an American philosopher exists’ into ‘some philosopher is American’, which reduces the verb ‘exists’ to the copula ‘is’. But we can’t translate ‘Vallicella exists’ in the same way. Thus general existential statements presuppose the truth of singular existential statements (or a disjunction or conjunction of singular existential statements). But we cannot analyse away ‘exists’ from singular existential statements. Therefore there is circularity: the same word appears on the right and left hand side of the definition. An American philosopher exists if and only if Vallicella exists.

That is not quite what I say, but it is a fair approximation.

But there is an obvious route out of this problem. What actually makes ‘some philosopher is American’ true is ‘Vallicella is an American philosopher’, which does not use the word ‘exist’. Vallicella may object that ‘Vallicella exists’ has to be true for that to work. Certainly, but we can reply in two ways. We could suppose that empty proper names are meaningless, and that ‘Vallicella’ is only meaningful because it names something. I.e. if it names something, it must name an existing something. ‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’. Or we could allow that empty proper names are meaningful, and that they have a sense but not a reference. Then we can appeal to the idea of instantiation, as with general concepts. ‘Vallicella exists’ means that the sense of ‘Vallicella’ has a referent or instance. ‘An American philosopher exists’ means that the sense of ‘American philosopher’ has an instance.

That is, either common names and proper names fall into different logical categories, in which case we don’t need to use the word ‘exists’ in singular sentences at all. Or they fall into the same category, in which case we can analyse singular existential statements exactly as we analyse general existential statements. In neither case is the definition of ‘exists’ circular.

The second alternative is available only if there are haecceity properties to serve as the Fregean senses of proper names.  Now I have argued many times in these pages and in print against such properties.  It follows that we cannot analyze 'Vallicella exists' in the same as as 'American philosophers exist.'  This leaves the first alternative, according to which the meaning of 'Vallicella' is its referent, an existing individual.  Ed claims that on this alternative "‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’."

I would say that Ed has it precisely backwards.  What he should say is that 'Vallicella' has meaning in virtue of the truth of 'Vallicella exists.'  What Ed says illustrates the linguistic idealism that I have more than once criticized him for.  V.'s existence does not depend on his name or on its meaning.  The point is clearer in terms of a non-human example.  So consider Stromboli, the island volcano.  Presumably Stromboli existed long before the emergence of language.  So what we should say is that 'Strromboli' has meaning in virtue of the fact that Stromboli extralinguistically and extramentally exists, and not vice versa.

Ed and I agree that 'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to 'Some volcano is an island.'  This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals.  (If the domain were populated by Meinongian nonexistent objects, then the equivalence would fail.)   The attempted reduction of existence to someness is therefore circular.  For when we think it through we come to realize that the general existence expressed by sentences like 'Some volcano is an island' presupposes the  singular existence of the individuals in the domain of quantification.  This singular existence, obviously enough, precisely because it is singular, cannot be understood in terms of the logical quantity, someness.  So we move in a circle: from existence to someness and then back to existence.

The same argument can be couched in terms of instantiation.  'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to the second-level predication  'The concept island volcano is instantiated.'  But if a first-level concept is instantiated, it is instaniated by at least one individual.  Obviously, this individual must exist.  (If it were a nonexistent individual, the link between existence and instantiation would be broken.)  So again we move in an explanatory circle,from existence to instantiation and back to existence again.  It follows that existence cannot be reduced to instantiation.

Pace Quine, existence is NOT what 'existential' (i.e., particular) quantification expresses.  What the particular quantifier expresses is instantiation, and instantiation is not existence. 

The Circularity of the Fressellian Account of Existence: Objections and Replies

Being in receipt of the following detailed comments on a central argument in a forthcoming paper, "Existence: Two Dogmas of Analysis," I am now deeply in London Ed's debt. In each numbered item, Ed more or less quotes me and then comments.  My responses are in blue.

 1. On the thin theory existence is a property of concepts only and cannot be sensibly predicated of individuals. The theory says that existence is the property of being instantiated, the property of having one or more instances.

This leaves out other versions of the thin theory, which do not mention concepts.

I thought I had made it  clear that 'concepts' is short for 'concepts, properties, propositional functions, and cognate items,' a phrase I used earlier in the paper.  To save words, I did not use the longer phrase.

2. An affirmative general existential such as '‘Horses exist'’ does not predicate existence of individual horses; it predicates instantiation of the concept horse.

Other versions would translate 'horses exist' as 'some things are horses'.

It does not make any difference for my purpose, which is to present a 'master argument' against every version of the Fressellian theory.  If the concept horse is instantiated, then of course something is a horse. And if something is a horse, then either the concept horse is instantiated, or the property of being a horse is exemplified, or the propositional function 'x is a horse is "sometimes true" (in Russell's phrase), or the word 'horse' applies to something, and so on for every cognate item you can think of.


Continue reading “The Circularity of the Fressellian Account of Existence: Objections and Replies”

A Review of Barry Miller’s From Existence to God

I have reviewed two of Barry Miller's books. My review of A Most Unlikely God appeared in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (vol. XXXVIII, no. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 614-617). My review of From Existence to God appeared in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (Summer 1993), pp. 390-394, I post a version of the latter here.

Barry Miller, From Existence to God: A Contemporary Philosophical Argument (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. x + 206. $42.50.

I

Arguments for the existence of God a contingentia mundi usually proceed by way of some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), where this embraces principles of intelligibility and causality. Professor Miller's book is a bold but rigorous defense of a contingency argument that makes no use of any of these controversial principles. He thus evades the standard objections to PSR-based arguments. The engine driving Miller's argument is Non- Contradiction, a principle he deploys at various stages of his treatment. (cf. pp. 172-174) Accordingly, his central thesis is that there is "a hidden contradiction in claiming both that, say, Fido exists and that God does not." (p. ix)

If so, the existence of God should follow by dint of sheer analysis of what it is for a concrete individual to exist, in the presence of the uncontroversial premise that concrete individuals do in fact exist. By 'God' Miller understands the god of classical theism, a being that is the uncaused sustaining cause of the universe, where "The Universe is everything existing which either is a concrete individual or is individuated by individuals." (p. 131) This uncaused cause is unique, identical with its existence (and thus subsistent existence), metaphysically (not logically) necessary, and an individual only in an analogical sense of this term. (p. 137) Thus the above definition of 'universe' does not imply that God is in the universe. God cannot be an individual in the strict sense since He is not distinct from his existence; but He is nevertheless a concrete entity since capable of causal activity. (p. 126) The 'omni-properties' (omniscience, etc.) are not discussed. Thus Miller starts here below with existing concrete individuals, works his way up to the uncaused cause of their existence, and only then embarks on a discussion of those of the divine attributes relevant to the analysis of existence. This in marked contrast to the usual procedure of beginning with a definition of 'God' and then considering whether anything satisfies the definition.

A central challenge Miller faces is to show that the existence of concrete individuals is not a brute fact, where "a brute fact is by definition one for which any explanation is simply unnecessary." (p. 79) He meets this challenge by arguing that the existence of concrete individuals would harbor a contradiction if taken to be a brute fact. Given this putative contradiction, an inquiry into how it is possible that any such individual exist becomes logically inescapable. It turns out that the contradiction can only be removed if the existence of concrete individuals is not a brute fact but is dependent on something
external to them. (p. 84)

Wherein lies the contradiction? Consider Fido's existing. On Miller's preferred analysis, Fido's existing has two constituents, Fido and Fido's existence. Whereas Fido is a complete entity, one capable of independent existence, Fido's existence is a property-instance and therefore incomplete: incapable of independent existence, it requires a complete entity for its "individuation." (p. 38, n. 22) As constituents, Fido and his existence are ontologically, not chronologically, prior to Fido's existing in the sense that "…Fido's existing must be constructible conceptually from Fido and his existence." (p. 10) But such a construction would make no sense if Fido could not be conceived prior to Fido's existing. Yet chapter 3 ("The Inconceivability of Future Individuals") issues in precisely this conclusion: "Fido could neither be referred to nor conceived of before he existed." (p. 11)

Thus a contradiction emerges at the heart of concrete individuals: Fido's existing is a complex whose ontological constituents are such that one of them (Fido) must be and cannot be conceived prior to Fido's existing. Fido must be independently conceivable if he is to be available for the conceptual construction; but he cannot be so conceivable since "prior to its existing no concrete individual could be conceived of by anyone or in any way." (p. 42)

To establish that there is this contradiction, Miller must first of all develop a constituent ontology of individuals. This he does in chapter 2, "Sense Structure and Ontology." The analysis is pushed further in chapter 4, "Existence is a Real Property." Here he argues (convincingly to my mind) against the dominant Frege-Russell line that 'exists' and cognates are never legitimately predicable of individuals. The upshot is that existence is a first-level property.

Further argument is to the effect that it is a real (as opposed to a 'Cambridge') first-level property. Miller is now in a position to think of Fido's existing as built up from two constituents, Fido and Fido's existence. But what is Fido in distinction from his existence? One way to think of this is in terms of the question, What was Fido before he came to exist? Was he conceivable or referrable-to before he existed?

Chapter 3 defends the thesis that concrete individuals can neither be conceived of nor referred to prior to their existence, not even by God. This implies that, prior to Socrates' coming to exist, there was no de re possibility of his coming to exist. Thus there are no singular propositions about future individuals; all such propositions are general. (p. 42) Further implications are that the coming into existence of an individual is not the actualization of a merely possible individual, or the exemplification of any such exotic property as a Plantingian haecceity.

Now if Fido is inconceivable before he existed, then, "he cannot be conceived of except as existing or as having existed…" (p. 62) If so, how can Fido be a constituent of his existing? The result of chapters 2 and 4 thus contradicts that of chapter 3.

Given the obvious fact that Fido does exist, the contradiction in Fido's existing must be merely apparent. But if the analyses in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are correct, Fido's existing can neither be a brute fact needing no explanation, nor a fact explainable in terms of its constituents. So Fido's existing must be "dependent upon something other than either it or its constituents." (p. 84) This is the thesis of chapter 5, "Why existence? The penultimate answer."

The ultimate answer is provided in chapter 6, where it is argued that nothing is amiss in the idea of a causal regress that terminates necessarily in an uncaused cause. A causal series terminates necessarily if its members are intrinsically such that the series must terminate. (pp. 98-99) I take it that the series of causes that reaches back some 13-15 billion years ago to the Big Bang (assuming the truth of current cosmology) is a contingently terminating series: there is nothing in the nature of an ordinary physical event-cause that necessitates that a series of such causes should terminate, or should not terminate. So if there are no necessarily terminating causal series, there is no hope for a contingency argument that does not apply some version of PSR to an initial event like the Big Bang.

The main challenge Miller faces in showing the possibility of necessarily terminating causal series derives from Hume's contention that in an infinite series of causes each member is wholly explained
by the preceding member without any member being uncaused. If so, there is no a priori reason why a causal regress must terminate. To the objection that this would leave the series itself unexplained, the Humean rejoinder is that the explanation of each member by the preceding member suffices to explain the series as a whole. Miller responds to Hume's challenge by distinguishing five types of causal series. The justice of Hume's remarks is admitted with respect to types I-III. But types IV and V are argued to escape Humean censure.

It is impossible in the short space allotted to summarize Miller's intricate and carefully argued discussion of causal series. But perhaps the gist of it can be rendered as follows.

Miller needs a causal series that is both explanatory and necessarily terminating. But if a series is such that each of its members is caused by that which precedes it and causes that which succeeds it, then that series cannot be necessarily terminating. "Series IV and V, however, are cases of causal series in which each part neither is caused by that which precedes it, nor causes that which succeeds it . . ." (p. 111) How? Let a be the cause of Fido's existing, and suppose (to put it roughly) a is caused to exist by b, b by c, c by d, and d by m. Miller's idea is that when properly formulated, what causes a to exist is not b, but b inasmuch as it is caused to exist by c inasmuch as it is caused to exist by d inasmuch as it is caused to exist by m. (p. 112) Now m must be an uncaused cause, says Miller, on pain of the series' no longer being able to cause anything. (p. 112)

Having thus arrived at the uncaused cause, the remaining chapters consolidate and elaborate this result. Chapter 7, "The Uncaused Cause," argues that the ground of the uncaused cause's status as uncaused is in the lack of "any distinction between itself and its existence" (p. 117) and defends this consequence of the doctrine of divine simplicity against charges of incoherence. Miller also addresses the question whether the universe might be the uncaused cause, and concludes that it cannot since it is distinct from its existence, and what is so distinct can exist only if caused to exist. (p. 135)

Chapter 8 ("Necessary Existence") explains the sense in which God's existence is necessary "in terms of the more basic notion of something's lacking any distinction from its existence." (p. 148)

Chapters 9 and 10 treat, respectively, "Objections to the Contingency Argument" and "The Contingency Argument Misconceived." The book concludes with three appendices in support of chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively, and a useful index.

The production job is reasonably good, although the quality of the paper inspires little confidence in its ability to resist the onset of yellowing. I note only four typographical errors: p. 1 has 'prologomena' instead of 'prolegomena.' P. 35, line 16 sports 'Fido's existing' in place of 'Fido's blackness.' P. 38, n. 22, line 6 shows 'predicate' where it should have 'property.' And a spot check of the index revealed on p. 202, col. I, line 7 a reference to p. 74 when it should be to p. 76.

II

Miller's book is a significant contribution not only to philosophical theology, but also to metaphysics and the philosophy of language. He engages a fundamental question ("How ever can it be that the Universe does exist?" (p. 1)) and he does so in a clear and rigorous manner. Equally important, he develops a line of reasoning which has been largely ignored in the theistic renaissance of recent decades. Along the way, a number of dogmas come under fire, among them the dogma held by atheists and theists alike that the doctrine of divine simplicity is incoherent. Miller leaves no doubt that he is historically informed, but does not allow himself to be led down exegetical sidetracks. All in all, an exciting and important work.

I conclude with a couple of critical comments, offered in the spirit of a request for clarification.

Miller's contingency argument is motivated by "the recognition that to accept Fido's existing as a brute fact would be to accept that Fido and hi
s existence were simultaneously both constituents and non-constituents of Fido's existing."(p. 116) Suppose we take a closer look at this putative contradiction. Given that they are constituents, Fido and his existence are ontologically, not chronologically, prior to Fido's existing. (p. 10) But if Fido is ontologically prior to Fido's existing, how is this priority contradicted by the fact, if it is one, that Fido is inconceivable until he exists? Fido's being nothing, not even a possible entity, chronologically prior to his existing seems logically compatible with his being ontologically prior to his existing, and therefore a constituent of his existing. The fact that "…Fido's existing should be conceptually constructible from Fido and his existence" (p. 83) seems consistent with Fido's being "disqualified [from being the starting point of the construction] by being inconceivable until he has completed his existence." (p. 83) A conceptual construction is presumably not a temporal process, despite Miller's talk of "beginning" the construction, moving through its "steps" and "stages," (p. 81) and "finishing" it. (p. 82) This talk is surely to be taken nontemporally. If so, it is not clear why Fido cannot be both ontologically prior and chronologically simultaneous with his existing. Surely Miller is not equivocating on 'prior'?

A second point concern's Miller's oft-made admission that Fido's existing admits of more than one legitimate analysis. (p. 37, n. 18, p. 81) Miller's analysis generates a contradiction; but if there is a legitimate analysis that does not generate a contradiction, would this not undercut Miller's argument? He would not think so, since "The nub of the argument is that a legitimate analysis cannot generate an insoluble paradox." (p. 81) But isn't the fact, assuming it is a fact, that Miller's analysis issues in a contradiction, together with the fact that alternative legitimate analyses are available, prima facie evidence that his analysis is illegitimate? It seems that for Miller's argument to work he must show, or at least render credible, the view that his analysis is the only legitimate analysis.

W. F. Vallicella