Category: Existence
-
‘Something is Self-Identical’ Cannot Translate ‘There are Objects’: Another Argument Against the Thin Theory
At Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 4.1271 we read: "So one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects', as one might say, 'There are books'." In endnote 9, p. 194, of "The Number of Things," Peter van Inwagen (Phil. Issues 12, 2002) writes: Wittgenstein says that one cannot say " 'There are objects', as one might say, 'There are…
-
A Quick Proof that ‘Exist(s)’ is not Univocal
Suppose we acquiesce for the space of this post in QuineSpeak. Then 'Horses exist' says no more and no less than that 'Something is a horse.' And 'Harry exists' says no more and no less than that 'Something is Harry.' But the 'is' does not have the same sense in both translations. The first is the…
-
Existence and Plural Predication: Could ‘Exist(s)’ be a First-Level Non-Distributive Predicate?
'Horses exist' is an example of an affirmative general existential sentence. What is the status of the predicate '___ exist' in such a sentence? One might maintain that 'exist(s)' is a second-level predicate; one might maintain that it is a first-level distributive predicate; one might maintain that it is a first-level non-distributive (collective) predicate. 1. Frege famously maintained…
-
God, Socrates, and the Thin Theory
I maintain that there are modes of being. To be precise, I maintain that it is intelligible that there be modes of being. This puts me at odds with those, like van Inwagen, who consider the idea unintelligible and rooted in an elementary mistake: . . . the thick conception of being is founded on…
-
Holes and Their Mode of Being
Consider a particular hole H in a piece of swiss cheese. H is not nothing. It has properties. It has, for example, a shape: it is circular. The circular hole has a definite radius, diameter, and circumference. It has a definite area equal to pi times the radius squared. If the piece of cheese is 1/16th…
-
Whether Being is an Activity on the Thick Theory: Van Inwagen’s Straw Man Argument
(Note to Alfredo and Peter L: I need your help in understanding this particularly opaque portion of PvI's paper.) Here are some notes on section 2 of Peter van Inwagen's "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment" (pp. 476-479 of the Metametaphysics volume). The first of the Quinean theses that van Inwagen maintains is that "Being is…
-
Is Meinong’s Theory of Objects “Obviously Self-Contradictory?” Van Inwagen Says ‘Yes’
A good post from November aught-nine. Highly relevant to current discussions.
-
Existence and an ‘Open Question’ Consideration
G. E. Moore famously responded to the hedonist's claim that the only goods are pleasures by asking, in effect: But is pleasure good? The point, I take it, is that the sense of 'good' allows us reasonably to resist the identification of goodness and pleasure. For it remains an open question whether pleasure really is good. To…
-
Nausea at Existence: A Continental Thick Theory
A reader wants me to comment on the analytic-Continental split. Perhaps I will do so in general terms later, but in this post I will consider one particular aspect of the divide that shows up in different approaches to existence. Roughly, Continental philosophers espouse the thick theory, while analytic philosophers advocate the thin theory. Of course there…
-
Some Man is White Because a White Man Exists
(Theme music: Ballad of a Thin Man) Phoenicians and Londoners agree that 'Some F is a G' and 'An FG exists' are logically equivalent. Thus, 'Some man is white' is logically equivalent to 'A white man exists.' But I take a further step: some man is white because a white man exists, where 'because' expresses…
-
Can a Thin Theorist Experience Wonder at Existence?
Existence elicited nausea from Sartre's Roquentin, but wonder from Bryan Magee: . . . no matter what it was that existed, it seemed to me extraordinary beyond all wonderment that it should. It was astounding that anything existed at all. Why wasn't there nothing? By all the normal rules of expectation — the least unlikely…
-
Existence, Circularity, and Metaphysical Grounding
London Ed must have known by some paranormal means that I was talking about him over Sunday breakfast with Peter Lupu. For his post upon return from sunny Greece is about the alleged circularity of the thin conception of existence. Peter and I were discussing Peter van Inwagen's "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment" (in Metametaphysics: New…
-
Van Inwagen on ‘Exists’ as a Polyadic Predicate
This post continues my examination of Peter van Inwagen's "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment." The first post in this series is here. There you will find the bibliographical details. We saw that van Inwagen gives something like the following argument for the univocity of 'exists': 1. Number-words are univocal 2*. 'Exist(s)' is a number-word Therefore…
-
Van Inwagen on the Univocity of ‘Exists’
In "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment" (in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, eds. Chalmers et al., Oxford 2009, pp. 472-506), Peter van Inwagen argues that 'exists' is univocal: it does not have "different meanings when applied to objects in different categories." (482) This post will examine one of his arguments, an argument…
-
Existence: A Contrast Argument Defeated
This is a post from the old blog. It originally appeared on 27 May 2008 and appears now slightly redacted. *********** In this blogging game you throw out your line and damned if you don't snag a good catch now and again. I dredged up Peter Lupu from the Internet's vasty deeps long about January…