Joseph A. e-mails:
Just a quick question. You recently posted that you think atheism can be intellectually respectable. Fair enough. But wouldn't you agree that intellectual respectability in general seems to be assumed more often than it should be?
To put a point on the question: Do you think materialism is intellectually respectable? I seem to recall you saying that (at the least) eliminative materialism is a view you wouldn't bother teaching in a philosophy course. Yet it also seems that some people, even those who would argue that theism isn't intellectually respectable, would bend over backwards to deny that EM isn't as well.
We should begin with a working definition of 'intellectually respectable.' I suggest the following:
A view V is intellectually respectable =df V is logically consistent with (not ruled out by) anything we can legitimately claim to know.
People claim to know all sorts of things they do not know, which explains the qualifier 'legitimately.' Note also that truth and intellectual respectability are different properties. What is true might not be intellectually respectable, and what is intellectually respectable might not be true. Truth is absolute while intellectual respectability is relative to the class of people to whom 'we' in the definition refers. And which class is this? Well, it would include me and Peter Lupu and other astute contemporaries who are well apprised of the facts of logic and mathematics and science and history and common sense. It would not include a lady I once encountered who thought that the Moon is the source of its light. That opinion is not intellectually respectable.
There are indefinitely many views that are clearly not intellectually respectable, and indefinitely many that clearly are. The interesting cases are the ones that lie in between. Let's consider two.
1. Eliminative materialism. This is defended by some otherwise sane people, but I would say it is not intellectually respectable. For it is ruled out by plain facts that we can legitimately claim to know, such facts as that we have beliefs and desires. It is a position in the philosophy of mind that denies the very data of the philosophy of mind. Here is an argument that some might think supports it:
(1) If beliefs are anything, then they are brain states; (2) beliefs exhibit original intentionality; (3) no physical state, and thus no brain state, exhibits original intentionality; therefore (4) there are no beliefs.
But anyone with his head screwed on properly should be able to see that this argument does not establish (4) but is instead a reductio ad absurdum of premise (1) according to which beliefs are nothing if not brain states. For if anything is obvious, it is that there are beliefs. This is a pre-theoretical datum, a given. What they are is up for grabs, but that they are is a starting-point that cannot be denied except by those in the grip of an ideology. Since the argument is valid in point of logical form, and the conclusion is manifestly, breath-takingly, false, what the argument shows is that beliefs cannot be brain states.
2. Theism. Not every version of theism is intellectually respectable, obviously, but some are. If you think otherwise, tell me which known fact rules out a sophisticated version, say, the version elaborated over several books by Richard Swinburne. ('Known fact' is not pleonastic in the way 'true fact' is; a fact can be unknown.)
a. Will it be the 'fact' that nothing immaterial exists? But that's not a fact, let alone a known fact. Abstracta such as the proposition expressed by 'Nothing immaterial exists' are immaterial but indispensable. Arguments to the effect that they are dispensable merely show at the very most that it is debatable whether abstracta are dispensable, with the upshot that it will not be a known fact that nothing immaterial exists. No one can legitimately claim to know that nothing immaterial exists.
b. Will it be the fact that nothing both concrete and immaterial exists? Even if this is a fact, it is not a known fact. I am arguably a res cogitans. We do not know that this is not the case the way we know that the Moon is not fifty miles from Earth.
c. Will it be the fact of evil? But how do you know that evil is a fact at all? Can you legitimately claim to know that the people and events you call evil are objectively evil and not merely such that you dislike or disapprove of them? But even if evil is an objective fact, what makes you think that it is logically inconsistent with the existence of God? The Hume-Mackie logical argument from evil is almost universally rejected by contemporary philosophers.
My claim is that there is no fact which we can claim to know — in the way we can claim to know that the Moon is more than 50 miles from Earth — that rules out the existence of God. But I also claim that there is no such fact that rules it in. Both theism and atheism are intellectually respectable. I take no position at the moment on the question whether one is more respectable than the other, or more likely to be true; my claim is merely that both are intellectually respectable — in the way that eliminative materialism and the belief that the Moon is its own source of light are not intellectually respectable.