Category: Ethics of Belief
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Atheism, Materialism, and Intellectual Respectability
Joseph A. e-mails: Just a quick question. You recently posted that you think atheism can be intellectually respectable. Fair enough. But wouldn't you agree that intellectual respectability in general seems to be assumed more often than it should be? To put a point on the question: Do you think materialism is intellectually respectable? I seem…
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From the Mail: John Bishop, Believing by Faith
Dr. Vallicella, Another excellent post with which I whole-heartedly agree! You asked if there were any other options besides: A. Rationalism: Put your trust in reason to deliver truths about ultimates and ignore the considerations of Sextus Empiricus, Nagarjuna, Bayle, Kant, and a host of others that point to the infirmity of reason. B. Fideism: Put…
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Lycan, Rationality, and Apportioning Belief to Evidence
Is William G. Lycan rational? I would say so. And yet, by his own admission, he does not apportion his (materialist) belief to the evidence. This is an interesting illustration of what I have suggested (with no particular originality) on various occasions, namely, that it is rational in some cases for agents like us to believe…
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On Belief
I have been thinking about belief and whether it is under the control of the will. This question is important since it lies at the foundation of the very possibility of an 'ethics of belief.' People believe all sorts of things, and it is quite natural to suppose that some of the things they believe they…
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Locke, James, Doxastic Voluntarism and Two Bases of Toleration
The topic of doxastic voluntarism is proving to be fascinating indeed. It is interestingly related to the topic of toleration about which I have something to say in On Toleration: With a Little Help from Kolakowski, in The Danger of Appeasing the Intolerant, and in Toleration and its Limits. Let us begin today's meditation with…
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Are Any Beliefs Acquired At Will? Any Room for an ‘Ethics of Belief’?
William P. Alston boldly maintains that "no one ever acquires a belief at will." (Beyond Justification, Cornell 2005, 67) This blanket rejection of doxastic voluntarism — the view that some belief-formation is under the control of the will — sounds extreme. What about beliefs that one acquires as a result of reasoning? Are not some of…