Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Eliminative Materialism

  • The ‘Gordian’ Solution to the World-Knot

    If the mind-body problem is the world-knot, as Schopenhauer is supposed to have said, then eliminative materialism is the 'Gordian' solution.  

  • A Reader Poses a Question about the Extent of My Solubility Skepticism

    M.M. writes, I understand that your method is aporetic – you argue that the great problems of philosophy are genuine problems but also insoluble, at least by us here below.    [. . .]   My question is: do you think that  — even if all positions in some metaphysical disputes have their problems —…

  • The Eliminative Materialist

    The eliminative materialist is a bit like a man who blows his brains out to be rid of a headache.  No head, no headache, no problem! Related articles Pascal on Materialism Thinking Meat?

  • Paul Churchland on Eliminative Materialism

    Via Ed Feser, I see that that Paul Churchland's Matter and Consciousness has appeared in a third edition.  Just what the world needs.  I concur with Ed's judgment: The only thing more outrageous than Churchland’s persistence in superficiality and caricature would be the continued widespread use of his book as a main text for introductory courses…

  • Thomas Nagel, Heretic

    Andrew Ferguson writes on the the explosion of hostility toward Thomas Nagel after the publication of his 2012 book, Mind and Cosmos.  Here is my overview of the book.  More detailed posts on the same book are collected under the Nagel rubric. For a non-philosopher, Ferguson's treatment is accurate.  Here are a couple of  interesting excerpts in…

  • How Could I Be Wrong?

    I say that there are beliefs.  An eliminativist contradicts me, insisting that there are no beliefs.  He cannot, consistently with what he maintains, hold that I have a false belief.  For if there are no beliefs, then there are no false beliefs.  But he must hold that I am wrong.  For if there are no…

  • When Is an Identification an Elimination, and When Not? Idealism and Eliminativism not in the Same Logical Boat

    A reader, recently deployed to Afghanistan, finds time to raise an objection that I will put in my own words to make it as forceful as possible: You endorsed William Lycan's Moorean refutation of eliminative materialism, but then you criticized him for thinking that Moorean appeals to common sense are also effective against  standard idealist claims such as…

  • Of Berkeley’s Stones and the Eliminativist’s Beliefs

    I lately endorsed William Lycan's Moorean refutation of eliminative materialism (EM). But I disagreed with Lycan on one point.  Lycan thinks that Moorean arguments refute Bradley and McTaggart and that there is no essential difference between the characteristic claims of the British Idealists and the characteristic claims of eliminativists in the philosophy of mind: both…

  • Eliminative Materialism and Belief: Another Wrinkle

    I've made it clear that I think eliminative materialism (EM) is a "lunatic philosophy of mind" to borrow a phrase from A. W. Collins.  Peter Lupu basically agrees though he may not care to put the point in such an intemperate way.  What follows is an excerpt from a recent e-mail of his.  Since I…

  • Lycan’s Moorean Argument Against Eliminative Materialism

    The following is from  William G. Lycan, A PARTICULARLY COMPELLING  REFUTATION OF ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM: [. . .] I contend that the Eliminativist is refuted by Moore's technique, in just the same way as was the temporal idealist. The argument will now be quite straightforward:  Numerous common-sense mental ascriptions, such as that Granny wants a beer…

  • No Beliefs? Then No Truths Either!

    Peter Lupu e-mails:  A comment to mull over regarding your premise (A) in your recent post about Eliminative Materialism. A. If a proposition is true, then it is possibly such that it is believed by someone. Premise (A) says that in order for a proposition to be true, it is a necessary condition that it…

  • Is Folk Psychology a Theory? The Case of Desire

    When one is in the grip of a desire one typically knows it. He who wants a cold beer on a hot day knows what he wants and is likely to deem unhinged anyone with the temerity to deny that there are desires. Anywhere on the scale from velleity to craving, but especially at the…

  • Eliminative Materialism: Can You Believe It?

    In an earlier post, I provided a rough characterization of eliminative materialism (EM). Here is a more technical exposition for the stout of heart. If EM is true, then there are no beliefs. But what about the belief that EM is true, a belief that one would expect eliminative materialists to hold? If we exfoliate…

  • Lupu on Rosenberg on Scientism: The Mother of All Self-Defeating Notions

    Another guest post by Peter Lupu who apparently is as exercised as I am about the pseudo-philosophy that Rosenberg's been peddling.  Minor editing and comments in blue by BV. Prompted by your recent post on Rosenberg, I checked again what he says about scientism. Here is the actual statement (emphasis added):  Scientism is my label…

  • A Conundrum for Eliminativist Naturalists

    A guest post by Peter Lupu.  Minor edits by BV.  His comments in blue at the end.  Suppose I am a naturalist. Then I take science seriously just as Alex Rosenberg counsels.I also provisionally trust Rosenberg's argument, thereby, I find myself inclined  to believe the conclusions of Rosenberg’s argument. One of these conclusions is 1) There…