Political Violence: Issues and Questions, Part II

In Part I, I argued that in the current state of affairs in the USA, our  political opponents are not mere opponents, but enemies. Given that this enmity is a contingent state of affairs, one that could have been otherwise, I am not defining political opposition or the political in terms of enmity.  This distinguishes my position (in progress, and thus tentatively held) from that of Carl Schmitt’s. For Schmitt, the essence of the political (das Politische) consists in the Freund-Feind (friend-enemy) distinction. (See his The Concept of the Political.) By contrast with Schmitt, I am not trying to isolate the essence or nature of the political; I am merely saying that at the moment, as a matter of contingent fact, our opponents, the Democrats, are our enemies. They are our enemies in that they pose a clear and present threat to us and our way of life. And increasingly this threat is being executed, and in the worst way, by assassination, attempted assassination, calls for assassination, celebrations of assassination, and refusals to condemn assassination.  What is the source of this enmity? In Part I a case was made that our political opponents are enemies. In this Part II, I will proffer an explanation of why we are enemies. In a future Part III, I will consider what we can do to ameliorate our nasty and highly dangerous predicament. 

With our (mere) opponents we share common ground; with our enemies we do not. The source, then, is the lack of common ground. We do not share ground sufficient to keep enmity at bay if we don’t agree on many things. For now, I will mention just  three things we need to agree on, but on which we no longer agree, borders, reality, equality.

BORDERS.  Nations need enforceable, and enforced, borders to maintain their cultural identity and their security as sovereign states. There is no right to immigrate. Correlatively, there is no obligation on the part of any state to allow immigration.  The granting of asylum is not obligatory but supererogatory. Illegal immigration cannot be tolerated. What’s more, legal immigration must be to the benefit of the host country. For each nation has the right to look to its own interests first. More that that, a properly functioning government has the duty to look first to the interests of the nation of which it is the government. 

America first is merely a special case of nation first; it does not imply that America ought to dominate other nations. So only those persons can be allowed into the USA  who are likely to assimilate and accept our republican system of government and our culture. This implies that certain groups  ought to  be favored over others, English speakers, for example, over those who do not know our language, other things being equal.  Ought we “welcome the stranger?”  Yes, but not unconditionally: only if they satisfy the conditions I have specified and some others I do not have the time to specify.  There must not be any blanket “Welcome  the stranger.” Squishy Catholic bishops take note.

Immigration without assimilation is a recipe for disaster, leading as it does to Balkanization, ‘no go’ zones, and endless civil contention. Europe and the U. K. are committing cultural suicide by failure to grasp the importance of this principle. Sharia-supporting Muslims must not be allowed to immigrate into the West, and in particular into America, the last hope of the West. If we fall, the West falls. The rest of the Anglosphere has pretty much abdicated. Sharia law is antithetical to our founding values and principles. Only those people from Muslim lands who renounce Sharia are admissible. The Constitution is not a suicide pact.

But isn’t diversity good? Diversity of various types is of course good, but diversity as such  is precisely not our strength, as foolish and/or deliberately destructive leftists mindlessly repeat. Full-spectrum diversity would be our undoing, and was in process of undoing us until Donald Trump came along.  If any one thing is ‘our strength,’ it is unity, not diversity. “One nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all.”  To call a sane immigration policy that benefits the host country ‘xenophobic’ is a  typically vicious and typically mendacious leftist smear. And the same goes for ‘Islamophobic’ used to dismiss what I wrote one paragraph up. A phobia is an irrational fear, by definition, but there is nothing irrational about fear of full-strength, Sharia-based Islam, which is not merely a religion, but is also an expansionist political ideology, one that poses an existential threat to us.

REALITY. A second thing we need to agree on, but no longer agree on, is that there is a real world out there independent of our thoughts and dreams, wishes and desires. No doubt there are social constructs, but nature herself in her abiotic and biotic strata are not social constructs.  Money, a social construct, does not grow on trees, but leaves do.  Foliage, tectonic plates, and animals, including human animals, are quite obviously not social constructs. The world cannot be social construction all the way down. And so you cannot change your sex. Once a biological male, always a biological male.  It follows that it is morally outrageous to allow biological males to compete against women in sporting events.  Metaphysical nonsense leads to moral nonsense. Nor can you change your race, as I argue rigorously, at Substack.  You can change your political affiliation, and you should if you are a Democrat; but membership in a race is not a political form of belonging. 

EQUALITY and EQUITY.  The transmogrification of the former into the latter is a third bone of contention between us and our political enemies. An old lie of leftists is compressed into one of their more recent abuses of language: ‘equity.’ So-called ‘equity’ is woke-speak for equality of outcome or result. ‘Equity’  in this obfuscatory sense cannot occur and ought not be pursued. It cannot occur because people are not equal either as individuals or as groups. Leftists won’t face this fact, however, because they confuse the world as they would like it to be with the world as it is. The default setting of the leftist  or ‘progressive’ is utopian. Utopia, however, is Nowheresville and he who pursues it is a Nowhere Man. 

‘Equity’ ought not be pursued because its implementation is possible only by the violation of the liberty of the individual by a totalitarian state apparatus precisely unequal in power to those it would equalize. Paradoxically, the pursuit of equality of outcome presupposes an inequality of power as between the equalizers and the equalized, which is to say: equality of outcome cannot be achieved.  The latter is a form of equality only if it is equal for all. But it cannot be equal for all for the reason given.

Again, people are not equal, by any empirical measure, either as individuals or as groups.  That “all men are created equal,” as per the Declaration of Independence, is not to the point.  Jefferson & Co. were obviously not making the manifestly false assertion that human beings  are equal in point of empirically measurable attributes.  As the word ‘created’ indicates, the Founders were maintaining that all human beings are equal in the eyes of God, the Creator. From a God’s eye point of view, all empirical difference vanish and we are equal as persons, as rights-possessors. And so each of us, regardless of race, sex, level of intellectual or physical prowess, etc., has an equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  

CONCLUSION. Our political opponents are not mere opponents but enemies: they pose an existential threat to us. The source of that enmity and this threat is lack of common ground. We lack common ground as regards the three issues mentioned above, and for others as well. We are in dire straits and headed for full-on hot civil war.  That is an outcome no sane person could want. How avoid it?

Charlie’s Murderers

This catalog should allay any doubts you may still have about the depth of human stupidity, depravity, and sheer viciousness. A friend, alluding to the world-wide celebration of Kirk’s life, tells me he has never been more hopeful. I believe he is fooling himself. We are spiraling downward. Hot civil war is now a clear and present danger.
You are living in a dream world if you think mutually respectful free speech and unrestrained dialog can save us. Wonderful things, no doubt, but they come too late, presupposing as they do common ground — which is precisely what we no longer have.  The problem of common ground has several sides. I will mention just one now. 
Suppose you agree with me that there is objective truth and that it is possible for us to know some of it. (That is something few will concede in these days of Claudine Gay and ‘my truth,’ but just suppose.) That concession’s a start, but if you and I are ‘siloed into our positions’ and we each believe we possess the truth about a particular question, then truth-seeking dialog is a sham. For if you already know the truth, or rather think you do, you will not be working with me to find the truth: one does not seek what one possesses. And vice versa: if I am convinced that I have the truth, then my conversation with you cannot be truth-seeking dialog. What we will each be engaged in is an attempt to change the other person’s mind.  For genuine truth-seeking dialog to occur, there must be a Socratic confession of ignorance on both sides, or at least an admission that one might be mistaken in one’s beliefs.   Kirk was no latter-day Socrates: he was not out to show people that they didn’t know what they thought they knew about things that he knew he knew little or nothing about so that they might reason together in search of the truth.  Kirk lacked the doxastic modesty of Socrates. His doxastic stance was more like the firm conviction of Christ. Doxastic modesty is what is lacking today on so many issues that divide us. Neither side admits that it might be wrong.  And this, I think, is a major source of all the rage, hatred, and violence, both verbal and physical.
So, while Charlie Kirk was morally superior to his enemies — and in particular greatly superior to those who rejoice in his assassination — he too was convinced that he was right as are his followers who are convinced  that he is now with Jesus in heaven. Kirk was also intellectually superior to most of his enemies: he could give reasons for his positions and they were better than the ones they could give for theirs.  He had unshakeable convictions and he could defend them rationally. Pressed on why he accepted the Resurrection of Christ, he replied that so many martyrs would not have gone to their deaths in that belief were it not true. The argument has some merit but it is hardly conclusive.  That would not be a problem if his interlocutors were not adamantly opposed to Christianity and all of its presuppositions.  But they are. Hence their hatred of him and his ideas and their fear that his powerful influence would lead to their suppression.  This fear is one, though not the only, factor that fueled their desire to see him assassinated. 
When there was still a large chunk of common ground, mutual respect came easy and conversation among political opponents was fruitful for the ironing out of details against the backdrop of commonly held values and presuppositions.  Ronald Reagan and Tip O’Neill differed politically but not as enemies; after hours they were on friendly terms. Those days are over. There is no longer any common ground to stand on.  Political opponents are now political enemies, enemies who see each other as existential threats.  When we see each other as existential threats is when the guns and knives come out, and when assassination becomes politically if not morally ‘justifiable.’
Addendum (9/15)
Is political assassination ever morally justifiable? I think most of us will agree that the 20 July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, Operation Valkyrie,  was morally justified, despite its being illegal by the laws of the Third Reich.  Morality trumps legality. So if Trump really were another Hitler, as our political enemies madly assert, then his assassination would be morally justifiable, and by extension so would the assassination of others such as Kirk who strongly supported Trump and his MAGA agenda.  Now surely seasoned politicians such as Hillary Clinton and Kamala Harris who assert with a straight face that Trump is Hitler or a fascist do not believe what they assert, in fact, they know that what they assert is false: they are smearing him in an attempt to gain power for themselves and their party. Unfortunately, many naive, ignorant young people believe what their elders say, and some of these are willing to act on their beliefs. So I say that such contemptible liars as Clinton and Harris have Kirk’s blood on their hands, figuratively speaking, due to their egregiously irresponsible rhetoric.

Zelenskyy’s Performance in the Oval: Two Views

We live in times of extreme social and political polarization. (We are so polarized that we are polarized over the nature, extent, and causes of polarization! But I will resist the temptation to meta-level digress.)

Cathy Young, A Shameful, Appalling Spectacle

Philip Wegmann, How Zelensky Miscalculated Trump

 

Disagreement in Philosophy: Notes on Jiří Fuchs

J FuchsThat philosophers disagree is a fact about which there is little disagreement, even among philosophers. But what this widespread and deep disagreement signifies is a topic of major disagreement. One issue is whether or not the fact of disagreement supplies a good reason to doubt the possibility of philosophical knowledge.  

The contemporary Czech philosopher Jiří Fuchs begins his book Illusions of Sceptics (2016) by considering this question.  He grants that the "cognitive potential of philosophy" is called into question by the "embarrassing fact that there is not a single thing that philosophers would agree on." (13) Nevertheless, Fuchs insists that we have no good reason to be skeptical about the possibility of philosophical knowledge. His view is that "Discord among philosophers can . . . be sufficiently explained by the frequent prejudices of philosophers . . . Consequently, the existence of discord among philosophers does not imply that their work is of fundamentally unscientific character." (16)

Besides the prejudices of philosophers, the lack of consensus among philosophers may also be attributed to philosophy's difficulty: "the discord may just be a consequence of the specific challenging character of philosophy."(19)

Fuchs maintains that "consensus has no relation to the core of scientific quality. . . ." (24). The core of scientific quality is constituted by "proof or demonstration." (24)  His claim is that interminable and widespread disagreement or lack of consensus has no tendency to show that philosophy is incapable of achieving genuine knowledge, where such knowledge involves apodictic insight into the truth of some philosophical propositions. 

There are two main issues we need to discuss. One concerns the relation of consensus and truth; the other the relation of consensus and knowledge. My impression is that Fuchs conflates the two issues. I will argue, contra Fuchs, that while it is obvious that consensus and truth are logically independent, it is not obvious that consensus and knowledge are logically independent.  My view, tentatively held, is that the lack of consensus in philosophy does tend to undermine philosophy's claim to be knowledge.

Consensus and Truth

I maintain, and Fuchs will agree, that the following propositions are true if not platitudinous.

1) Truth does not entail consensus. If a proposition is true, it is true whether or not there is consensus with respect to its truth.

2) Consensus does not entail truth. If most or all experts agree that p, it does not follow that p is true.

3) Consensus and truth are logically independent. This follows from (1) in conjunction with (2). One can have truth without consensus and consensus without truth. 

Lack of consensus, therefore, does not demonstrate lack of truth. Even if no philosophical proposition wins the agreement of a majority of competent practitioners, it is possible that some such propositions are true. But it doesn't follow that some philosophical propositions have 'scientific quality.'  To have this quality they have to be true, but they also have to be knowable by us.  But what is knowability and how does it relate to consensus? To answer this question we must first clarify some other notions.

Truth, Knowledge, Knowability, Cognitivity, Justification, and Certainty

I add to our growing list the following  propositions, perhaps not all platitudinous and perhaps not all agreeable to Fuchs:

4) Knowledge entails truth. If S knows that p, it follows that p is true. There is no false knowledge. There are false beliefs, and indeed  justified false beliefs; but there is no false knowledge. You could think of this as an conceptual truth, or as a truth about the essence of knowledge. These are different because a concept is not the same as an essence.

5) Truth does not entail knowledge. If p is true, it does not follow that someone (some finite mind or ectypal intellect) knows that p.  If an omniscient being, an archetypal intellect, exists, then of course every true proposition p is known by the omniscient being.

6) Truth does not entail knowability by us. If, for any proposition p,  p is true, it does not follow that there is any finite subject S such that S has the power to know p. There may be truths which, though knowable 'in principle,' or knowable by the archetypal intellect, are not knowable by us.

7) Cognitivity does not entail knowability. Let us say that a proposition is cognitive just in case it has a truth value. Assuming bivalence, a proposition is cognitive if and only if it is either true, or if not true, then false. Clearly, cognitivity is insufficient for knowability. For if a proposition is false, then it is cognitive but cannot be known because it is false. And if a proposition is true, then it is cognitive but may not be knowable because beyond our ken.

8) Knowledge entails justification. If S believes that p, and p is true, it does not follow that S knows that p. For knowledge, justification is also required. This is a bit of epistemological boilerplate that dates back to Plato's Theaetetus.

9) Knowledge entails objective certainty.  Knowledge implies the sure possession, by the subject of knowledge, the knower, of the object of knowledge; if the subject is uncertain, then the subject does not have knowledge strictly speaking.  Objective certainty is not to be confused with subjective certitude.

Consensus and Knowledge

Fuchs and I will agree that consensus is not necessary for truth: a true proposition need not be one that enjoys the consensus of experts. But consensus may well be necessary for knowledge.  Fuchs, however, seems to conflate truth and certainty, and thus truth with knowledge.  A truth can be true without being known by us; indeed, without even being knowable by us. But, necessarily, whatever is known is true.  On p. 30 we read:

By denying that the thought processes of philosophers can exhibit a scientific quality simply because of the existence of discord among philosophers, we make consensus a necessary condition for the general validity and potential certainty of scientific knowledge, which is the attribute of science. (Emphasis added.)

On the following page we find the same thought but with a replacement of 'potential certainty' by 'certainty':

. . . the necessary question of whether the consensus of experts is really such an essential and indispensable condition for the certainty and general validity of scientific knowledge. (31, emphasis added.)

When one speaks of the validity of a proposition, one means its truth. ('Valid' as a terminus technicus in formal logic is not in play here.) So it seems clear that Fuchs is maintaining that consensus is necessary neither for the truth of propositions nor for their certainty.  He seems to be maintaining that one can have certain knowledge of a proposition even if the consensus of experts goes against one. This is not obvious. Why not?

Knowledge requires justification. Now suppose I accept the proposition that God exists and that my justification takes the form of various arguments for the existence of God.   Those arguments will be faulted by an army of competent practitioners, not all of them atheists, on a variety of grounds. What's more, the members of the atheist divisions will marshal their own positive arguments, the strongest of them being arguments from evil. Now if just one of my theistic arguments is sound, then God exists.

But I do not, by giving a sound argument for God, know that God exists unless I know that the argument I have given is sound.  (A sound argument is a valid deductive argument all of the premises of which are true.) But how do I know that even one of my theistic arguments is sound? How can I legitimately claim to know that when a chorus of my epistemic peers rises up against me?  

If what I maintain is true, then it is true no matter how many epistemic peers oppose me: they are just wrong! Truth is absolute: it is not sensitive to the vagaries of agreement and disagreement. Justification, however, is sensitive to agreement and disagreement. My justification for considering a certain argument sound is undermined by your disagreement assuming that we are both competent in the subject matter of the argument and we are epistemic peers.  

In a situation in which my justification for believing that p is undermined by the disagreement of competent peers, there is no objective certainty that p. If knowledge logically requires objective certainty, and objective certainty is destroyed by the disagreement of competent epistemic peers, then I can no longer legitimately claim to know that p. So, while truth has nothing to fear from lack of agreement, knowledge does. For knowledge requires justification, and justification can be augmented or diminished by agreement or disagreement, respectively.

Interim Conclusion

Fuchs makes things too easy for himself by conflating truth and knowledge. We can agree that consensus is logically irrelevant to truth.  Protracted disagreement by the (morally) best and the (intellectually) brightest over the truth value of some proposition  p has no tendency to show either deductively or inductively that p is not either true or false. Truth is absolute by its very nature and thus insulated from the vagaries of opinion. But truths (true propositions) do not do us any good unless we can know them.  It is not enough to know that some truths are known; what we need is to know of a given truth that it is true. But disagreement inserts a skeptical blade between the truth and our knowledge of it.

Disagreement in philosophy undermines her claims to knowledge.  As I see it, Fuchs has done nothing to undermine this undermining.

Athens and Jerusalem, Disagreement and Dogmatism: The Case of Gilson

Elliot in a comment from an earlier thread  writes,

 . . . I mentioned negligence about the truth. Something similar seems to be the case regarding reasons and arguments. Folks might be interested in them (and even in weak ones) if they support a belief already held. But the same folks might turn away from good arguments in disgust if those arguments undermine their beliefs.

What’s happening here? Confirmation bias? Something like Sartrean bad faith or Heideggerian inauthenticity? Pauline suppression of the truth? (Romans 1:18) Intellectual laziness? Doxastic rigidity? Indifference to intellectual virtue?

Something else?

Elliot is here touching upon a problem that not only fascinates me intellectually, but vexes me existentially. It is the old problem of Athens and Jerusalem: given their tension, does one have final authority over the other, and if so, which?   Must philosophy be assigned a merely ancillary status? Is philosophy the handmaiden of theology (philosophia ancilla theologiae)? Must philosophy listen and submit when (revelation-based) theology speaks? Or must the putative revelations of a religion satisfy the exigencies of autonomous reason in order to be credible (worthy of belief) in the first place? Many moderns would argue that Trinity and Incarnation, for example, flout  norms of rationality, or even worse, norms of morality, and for one or the other or both of these reasons, ought not be accepted.  

Etienne Gilson comes down on the Hierosolymitan side:

When the mind of a Christian begins to take an interest in metaphysics, the faith of his childhood has already provided him with the true answers to most of these questions. He still may well wonder how they are true, but he knows that they are true. As to the how, Christian philosophers investigate it when they they look for a rational justification of all the revealed truths accessible to the natural light of understanding. Only, when they set to work, the game is already over. [. . .] In any case, speaking for myself, I have never conceived the possibility of a split conscience divided between faith and philosophy. The Creed of the catechism of Paris has held all the key positions that have dominated, since early childhood, my interpretation of the world. What I believed then, I still believe. And without in any way confusing it with my faith, whose essence must be kept pure, I know that the philosophy I have today is wholly encompassed within the sphere of my religious belief. (The Philosopher and Theology, Cluny Media, 2020, p. 5, bolding added, italics in original)

I have bolded the main points. Gilson holds that the faith he uncritically imbibed as a child is true. But he does not merely believe it is true, he knows that it is true. Knowledge, however, entails objective certainty, not mere subjective certitude. So we may justly attribute to Gilson the claim that he is objectively certain that the main traditional Catholic tenets are true, and that therefore  it is impossible that he be mistaken about them.

And so the game is over before it begins. Which game? The very serious 'game' of rational examination, of critical evaluation, the Socratic 'game.' ("The unexamined life is not worth living.")  And so for Gilson there is simply no genuine problem of faith versus reason, no serious question whether reason has any legitimate role to play in the evaluation of the putative truths of revelation.  From the point of view of an arch-dogmatist such as Gilson, there is nothing 'putative' about them.  They are objectively, absolutely, certain such that:

Whatever philosophy may have to say will come later, and since it will not be permitted to add anything to the articles of faith, any more than to curtail them, [i. e., subtract anything from them] it can well be said that in the order of saving truth philosophy will come, not only late, but too late. (p. 4, italics added)

I hope we can agree that what a true philosopher, a serious philosopher, is after is the "saving truth," although what salvation is, and what it involves, are matters of controversy, whether one is operating within the ambit of philosophy or of theology.  Don't make the mistake of supposing that salvation is solely the concern of religionists. After all, Plato, Plotinus, and Spinoza, to mention just these three, were all concerned with  a truth that saves.

Gilson is asserting that he and others like him who were brought up at a certain time, in a certain place, in a particular version of Christianity, the traditional Roman Catholic version, possess for all eternity the saving truth, a truth that stands fast and is known (with objective certainty) to stand fast, regardless of what any other religion (including a competing version of  Christianity) or wisdom tradition has to say.  He is also asserting that philosophy can neither add anything to nor subtract anything from the substance of the salvific truth that Gilson and others like him firmly possess. And so philosophy's role can only be ancillary, preambulatory (as in, e.g., the preambulum fidei of Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica), expository, and clarifying, but never critical or evaluative.  That is to say, on Gilson's conception (which of course is not just his) philosophy will not be permitted (see quotation immediately above) to have veto power, i.e., power to reject any tenet of the depositum fidei as codified and transmitted by the one, true, holy, catholic (universal), and apostolic  church.

To cap it all off, Gilson reports that he himself is psychologically incapable of admitting even the possibility of a "split conscience," or perhaps 'split consciousness,' that is, a conscience/consciousness that is "divided between faith and philosophy" and is thus pulled in opposite directions, the one Athenian, the other Hierosolymitan. 

This confession of incapacity shows that Gilson has no personal, existential grasp of the problem of faith versus reason. To understand the problem, one must live the tension between the autonomy of reason and the heteronomy of obedient faith. One cannot appreciate the problem without feeling that tension; Gilson fails to feel the tension; he therefore has no existential appreciation of the problem.

To take the tension seriously and existentially, one must appreciate the legitimacy of the claims made by the two 'cities.' One cannot simply dismiss one or the other of them.  The 'Four Horsemen'  of the now passé New Atheism, Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens and Harris, two of whom are now dead,* dismissed the claims of Jerusalem; Gilson dismisses the claims of Athens, unless Athens is willing to accept a subaltern status at once ancillary, preambulatory, expository, and clarifying.  I trust the reader understands that Gilson is not taking a Tertullian tack: he is not saying that the two cities have nothing to do with one another. They have something to do with one another, all right, in the way that a handmaiden and her mistress have something to do with one another. For a Thomist such as Gilson, revelation supplements reason without contradicting it; equally, however, revelation is under no obligation to satisfy the exigencies of reason: it needn't be rationally acceptable to be true.

For example, Trinity and Incarnation are truths whether or not reason can make sense of them or explain how they could be true. These items of revelation are true despite their apparently contradictory status. If reason can explain how they could be true, fine and dandy; if reason cannot explain how they could be true, no matter: they remain true nonetheless as truths beyond our ken as mysteries. What is paradoxical for us need not be contradictory in itself. Reason in us has no veto power over revelational disclosures.

Insofar as Gilson dismisses Athens and its claims, he privileges his own position, and finds nothing either rationally  or morally unacceptable in his doing so. Thus the diametrical disagreement of others equally intelligent, equally well-informed, and in equal possession of the moral and intellectual virtues, does not give him pause: it does not appear to him to be a good reason to question the supposed truth he was brought up to believe.  

I find this privileging of one's position to be a dubious affair.  Surely my position cannot be privileged just because it is mine. After all, my opponent who we are assuming is my epistemic peer, can do the same: he can privilege his position and announce that disagreement with him gives him no good reason to question his position.  Suppose our positions are diametrically opposed: each logically excludes the other. If he is justified in privileging his position just because it is his, and I am justified in privileging my position just because it is mine, then we are both justified in privileging our respective positions, and I have no more reason to accept mine than he has to accept his. I would have just as good a reason to accept his as he would have to accept mine. Logically, we would be in the same boat.

I conclude that a person cannot justify his privileging of his position simply because it is his.  What then justifies such privileging? Gilson might just announce that his position is justified because it is true and it is true regardless of who holds it.  But then how does he know that? He says: philosophy has no veto power over the deliverances of any divine revelation. His opponent says: Philosophy does have veto power over the deliverances of divine revelations that either are or entail logical contradictions. These proposition are contradictory: only one of them can be true.  Which?  Gilson cannot reasonably maintain that he knows that what he was brought up to believe is true because he was brought up to believe it.

Contra Gilson, my view is that, if you and I are epistemic peers, then your disagreement with me gives me good reason to question and doubt the position I take.  So, by my lights, Gilson has no rational right to make the claims he makes in the passages quoted. He ought not dogmatically claim that his view is absolutely true; he ought to admit that he has freely decided to accept as true the doctrine that he was brought up to believe and live in accordance with it. That is what intellectual honesty demands.

Getting back to Elliot, and in agreement with him, I agree that a good (bad) argument cannot be defined as one that leads to a conclusion that one is antecedently inclined to accept (reject).  That is no way to evaluate arguments! So why do so may people proceed that way?  I agree with all of Elliot's explanations for different cases.

_________________

*Philosophy department graffiti: "God is dead." — Nietzsche. "Nietzsche is dead." — God 

As for the tension between faith and reason (philosophy), I am reminded of a famous passage from Goethe's Faust:

Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,
die eine will sich von der andern trennen:
Die eine hält in derber Liebeslust
sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen;
die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.

https://www.gutzitiert.de/zitat_autor_johann_wolfgang_von_goethe_thema_seele_zitat_18635.html

 

In the Teeth of Increasing Polarization . . .

. . . Should We Discuss Our Differences?

Pessimism versus optimism about disagreement.  

Our national life is becoming like philosophy: a scene of endless disagreement about almost everything. The difference, of course, is that philosophical controversy is typically conducted in a gentlemanly fashion without bloodshed or property damage. Some say that philosophy is a blood sport, but no blood is ever shed, and although philosophers are ever shooting down one another's arguments, gunfire at philosophical meetings is so far nonexistent.  A bit of poker brandishing is about as far as it gets.

Some say we need more 'conversations' with  our political opponents about the hot-button issues that divide us.  The older I get the more pessimistic I become about the prospects of such 'conversations.'  I believe we need fewer conversations, less interaction, and the political equivalent of divorce. Here (from a site no longer online) is an extremely pessimistic view:

Dueling Articles

We need to revisit in thought if not in fact the practice of dueling. Later. In lieu of that, here are a couple of dueling articles. You know where I stand. How about you?

David Frum, The Ruin that a Trump Presidency Would Mean

Steve Cortes, Only Trump Can Save America

For the foolish Frum Ukraine is the only issue worth mentioning.. He neglects to observe, however, that the devastation of that country would not have occurred had Trump been president. 

Nothing else seems to interest him. And so he fails to understand Trump's broad appeal. Cortes gets it:

We confront a perilous moment in U.S. history. Our country suffers from sky-high violent crime, the ravages of an effectively open border, a subversive educational system, and the anxiety of an economy that punishes workers – all brought about, deliberately, by Joe Biden and his allies. [emphasis added.]

There you have the explanation of Trump's comeback in a nutshell. There is more to be said, but  the Cortes quotation cannot be beat for pith and punch.  

But let me tweak it a bit. For the average citizen, the order of concern is  (i) the economy, (ii) crime, (iii) the subversion and 'wokification' of curricula with the concomitant labelling of protestors at school board meetings as 'domestic terrorists,' and (iv) the wide-open border. Now I don't expect Joe Sixpack to understand the full ramifications of a wide-open border, but my surmise is that what really rankles him is the fact is that he is being played for a chump: he works long and hard, plays by the rules, obeys the law and has to watch global elitist lawbreakers allow illegal alien lawbreakers to invade his country, and then add insult to injury by smearing him as a 'racist' and a 'white supremacist.'

Without touching upon the deeper issues that exercise right-thinking historians, political scientists, and philosophers, we have in the four points mentioned an adequate explanation of Trump's ascendency.

Addendum

Anent the folly of Frum, vide Francis P. Sempa, "David Frum and the Axis of Errors."

Political Polarization: the Radical Cure

Political polarization is deep and wide. We are 'siloed' into our positions and things threaten to go 'thermonuclear.'  The usual cures cannot be dismissed out of hand, but are mostly blather served up by squishy, bien-pensant 'liberals' for their own insipid and clueless ilk. No doubt we should listen to others respectfully, but how many of our political opponents are worth listening to or are worthy of respect? No doubt we should seek common ground. But is they any left to be found?

Go ahead, take a civility pledge, but civility is only for the civil, and how many of our political enemies are civil? Civility is like toleration: it is a good thing but it has limits.

And so it falls to me to point out a cure for polarization that is never mentioned: eliminate one of the poles. The Hamas-Jew polarization, for example, is solved by eliminating Hamas. For here there is and can be no common ground, no mutual respect, no 'conversation' or 'negotiations.' Palliation is out of the question; amputation is the answer. Examples are easily multiplied. The side that is in the right should destroy the side that isn't.  

You say that war is never the answer? It depends on the question. Sometimes you have to give war a chance. 

Sam Harris and the Problem of Disagreement

Is conversation our only hope?

Substack stack-leader

Excerpt:

What about ethical instruction?  Only a liberal fool would advocate conversations with young children about theft and murder and lying and bestiality as if the rightness or wrongness of these acts is subject to reasonable debate or is a matter of mere opinion.  They must be taught that these things are wrong for their own good and for the good of others. Discussion of ethical niceties and theories comes later, if at all, and presupposes ethical indoctrination: a child who has not internalized and appropriated ethical prescriptions and proscriptions cannot profit from ethical conversations or courses in ethics.  ‘Indoctrination,’ contrary to ‘woke’ dogma, is not a dirty word. To have had sound doctrines inculcated in one at an early age is obviously a good thing. You cannot make a twenty-year-old ethical by requiring him to take a course in ethics.  He must already be ethical by early upbringing, and thus by indoctrination and example without conversation.

Debate, Disagreement, and the Limits of Rational Discourse

I wrote a few months back,

. . . the wisest policy is not to debate leftists. Generally speaking and admitting exceptions, leftists need to be defeated, not debated. Debate is worthwhile only with open-minded truth seekers. Truth, however, is not a leftist value. At the apex of the leftist's value hierarchy stands POWER. That is not to say that a leftist will never speak the truth; he will sometimes, but only if it serves his agenda. 

Tony Flood replied that the above quotation reminded him "of [Eric] Voegelin's stance on this very issue, about which I blogged a few years ago."  In that post Tony reproduces the first paragraph of Voegelin's Debate and Existence as follows. [note to AGF: your hyperlink is busted: 404 error]  Tony breaks Voegelin's one paragraph into four.

 

Continue reading “Debate, Disagreement, and the Limits of Rational Discourse”

Clarity and Agreement

Agreement on matters of moment, religious, political, and philosophical, seems out of reach. But we may be able to reach clarity about our respective positions on the issues that divide us.  That's what I used to think.  I used to think that clarity is attainable even if agreement is not.  But now I think that things are worse than I thought.

For the attaining of clarity requires agreement on what the issues are: we have to agree on the identity of the issues  and how they are to be formulated. Do we agree on the issues and questions? Do we agree about what we are asking when we ask whether God exists? Or whether there are rights? Or whether the USA is systemically racist? Or whether there is climate change? The depth of disagreement may be such that we cannot attain clarity.  It may be that neither agreement nor clarity  are attainable goals. Philosophers often disagree about what they are disagreeing about. I need to adduce  further examples.

Agreed then both wrong

Thomas Sowell on the Root of What Divides Us

Thomas Sowell interviewed on the conflict of visions, the conflict between the constrained vision of conservatives and the unconstrained vision of leftists. 

The constrained vision "sees the evils of the world as deriving from the limited and unhappy choices available, given the inherent moral and intellectual limitations of human beings."

"When Rousseau said that 'man is born free' but 'is everywhere in chains,' he expressed the essence of the unconstrained vision, in which the fundamental problem is not man or nature, but institutions."

Less than ten minutes, and WELL worth your time.

To paraphrase Sowell, for the leftist, when good things happen, they happen naturally; when bad things happen, however, it is due to institutions and civilization itself. 

When this is understood, a lot falls into place. One begins to understand why leftists are out to erase the historical record  by toppling  statues, destroying monuments, burning books and otherwise suppressing open inquiry and the free flow of ideas. One begins to understand why the Left is at war with the family and religious traditions. One begins to understand the leftist hatred and denial of reality itself below the level of social construction, and what drives their blather about 'systemic racism' and 'gender,' not to mention their celebration of freaks and losers and criminals and 'the other.'