Category: Constituent Ontology
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Bare Particulars versus Aristotelian Substances
In this entry I will attempt to explain the difference between a bare particular and an Aristotelian primary substance. A subsequent post will consider whether this difference is theologically relevant, in particular, whether it is relevant to the theology of the Incarnation. What is a Particular? Particulars in the sense relevant to understanding 'bare particular'…
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Christology, Reduplicatives, and Qua-Entities
For Dave Bagwill, who is trying to understand the Chalcedonian definition. ……………. Consider this triad, and whether it is logically consistent: 1. The man Jesus = the 2nd Person of the Trinity.2. The 2nd Person of the Trinity exists necessarily.3. The man Jesus does not exist necessarily. Each of these propositions is one that a…
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Peter van Inwagen’s Trouble with Tropes
Concerning tropes, Peter van Inwagen says, "I don't understand what people can be talking about when they talk about those alleged items." (Existence: Essays in Ontology, Cambridge UP, 2014, p. 211.) He continues on the same page: Consider two tennis balls that are perfect duplicates of each other. Among their other features, each is 6.7…
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Armstrong, Quine, Universals, Abstract Objects, and Naturalism
A Serbian reader inquires, I have read your latest post on truthmakers. Among other things, you mention [David] Armstrong's view on abstract objects. As I read elsewhere (not in Armstrong own works, I have not read anything by him yet) he was realist about universals and gives a very voluminous defense of his view. Does…
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Relational Ontology, Constituent Ontology, and Divine Simplicity
A Sketch of the Difference between Two Ontological Styles What it is for a thing to have a property? Ostrich nominalism aside, it is a Moorean fact that things have properties, but the nature of the having is a philosophical problem. The ordinary language 'have' does not wear it correct ontological analysis on its sleeve. …
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Reply to Ken Hochstetter on Divine Simplicity
Ken Hochstetter of the College of Southern Nevada kindly sent me some comments on my SEP Divine Simplicity entry. They are thoughtful and challenging and deserve a careful reply. My remarks are in blue. I have added some subheadings. Comments enabled.
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More on Sensible Properties and Constituent Ontology
A reader asks: Suppose I said that blue is not a Peter-van-Inwagen property, but a sensible property. Suppose also that I said that we see 1) substances and we see 2) their colors, and we see 3) the fact that substances are colored (and this last point amounts to not much more, if anything at…
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A Question About Constituent Ontology: Sensible Properties as ‘Parts’
The following from a reader. I've edited it for clarity. Here is a quick question for you: suppose someone were to grant you that there is the sensible character blue that you say that there is, a character of your coffee cup, but then still wanted to know why it is "in" or a "constituent"…
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Kenny, Geach, and the Perils of Reading Frege Back Into Aquinas
London Ed has informed me of the passing of Peter Geach. May he find the Unchanging Light that he sought through his long and productive life of truth-seeking in these shadowlands. One honors a thinker best by thinking his thoughts, sympathetically, but critically. Here is one of my attempts. Others referenced below. ………… I have…
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Existence Neither Accidental Nor Essential
This post continues my ruminations on the distinctio realis. If essence and existence are really distinct in a contingent being, should we think of its existence as accidental or essential, or neither? Max, a cat of my acquintance, exists and exists contingently: there is no broadly logical necessity that he exist. His nonexistence is broadly logically possible. So one may be…
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Is Socrates a Substance or a Cross-Categorical Hybrid?
0. I wanted to explore supposita in their difference from primary substances, but John the Commenter sidetracked me into the aporetics of primary substance. But it is a sidetrack worth exploring even if it doesn't loop back to the mainline. For it provides me more grist for my aporetic mill. 1. Metaphysics is a quest…
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What is the Difference Between a Substance and a Supposit?
I need to answer three questions. This post addresses the first. 1. What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)? 2. Is there any non-theological basis for this distinction? 3. If the answer to (2) is negative, is the addition of suppposita to one's Aristotelian ontology a case of legitimate metaphysical…
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On the Nature of Accidents: Objections and Replies
Lukas Novak comments and I respond. Bill, what follows is what I consider the most important objection against your theory. It seems to me that in order to keep the basic meaning of "universal" and "particular" the following definitions must be assumed: 1. A universal is that which is (truly) predicable of many particular instances. …
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Substance and Accident: The Aporetics of Inherence
1.If substance S exists and accident A exists, it does not follow that A inheres in S. An accident cannot exist without existing in some substance or other, but if A exists it does not follow that A exists in S. If redness is an accident, it cannot exist except in some substance; but if…
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Accidents of a Substance: Simple or Complex?
Dr. Novak is invited to tell me which of the following propositions he accepts, which he rejects, and why: 0. I have reservations about an ontology in terms of substances and accidents, but anyone who adopts such an ontology needs to provide a detailed theory of accidents. This post sketches a theory. It has roots in Aristotle,…