Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Consciousness and Qualia

  • Demarcation and Directedness: Notes on Brentano

    Here again is the famous passage from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874): Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not…

  • F. H. Bradley on the Non-Intentionality of Pleasure and Pain

    This is a re-do of a post from 13 April 2009. The addenda are new. …………………………………… I have argued at length for the non-intentionality of some conscious states.  Here is an entry that features an uncommonly good comment thread. None of the opposing comments made on the various posts inclined me to modify my view.  …

  • Popular ‘Phlegm Theories’ of Consciousness

    Michael Graziano demolishes several of them and then proposes his own which consists of hand-waving and promissory notes and is no better than the ones he dismisses.  See if you don't agree.

  • More Bad Philosophy of Mind by a Scientist

     Christof Koch: I was raised to believe in God, the Trinity, and particularly the Resurrection. Unfortunately, I now know four words: “No brain, never mind.” That’s bad news. Once my brain dies, unless I can somehow upload it into the Cloud, I die with it. I wish it were otherwise, but I’m not going to…

  • The Problem of Consciousness and Galen Strawson’s Non-Solution

    The problem can be set forth in a nice neat way as an aporetic triad: 1) Consciousness is real; it is not an illusion. 2) Consciousness is wholly natural, a material process in the brain. 3) It is impossible that conscious states, whether object-directed or merely qualitative, be material in nature. It is easy to…

  • Once More on Whether Consciousness Could be an Illusion

    The following just in from a Scandinavian reader: Thank you for your great blog, I’ve been a regular reader for some time! You have often made the point, that it is incoherent to say that consciousness in an illusion, because it is a presupposition to the distinction between appearance and reality. In an interesting article…

  • The Existence of Consciousness: An Aporetic Tetrad

    I tend to the view that all philosophical problems can be represented as aporetic polyads.  What's more, I maintain that philosophical problems ought to be so represented.  You haven't begun to philosophize until you have a well-defined puzzle, a putative inconsistency of plausibilities.  When you have an aporetic polyad on the table you have something to think…

  • The Hardening of Consciousness

    I read some of it but then decided it wasn't worth my effort. Your mileage may vary.

  • Papineau versus Dennett

    Some correspondence introduced by Tim Crane. Related: Nagel on Dennett: Is Consciousness an Illusion? Consciousness is an Illusion, but Truth is Not?

  • Anti-Natalism, Zombies, and the Role of Consciousness in the Question of the Value of Life

    Extreme anti-natalism is the view espoused by David Benatar according to which "it would be better if there were no more humans" (David Benatar and David Wasserman, Debating Procreation, Oxford UP 2015, 13). This is an axiological thesis. From it follows the deontic conclusion that "all procreation is wrong." (12) Procreation is obviously a biological…

  • Conscious Experience: A Hard Nut to Crack

    This is an addendum to Thomas Nagel on the Mind-Body Problem. In that entry I set forth a problem in the philosophy of mind, pouring it into the mold of an aporetic triad: 1) Conscious experience is not an illusion. 2) Conscious experience has an essentially subjective character that purely physical processes do not share.…

  • David Chalmers and the Purely Theoretical Conception of Philosophy

    John Horgan reports in Scientific American on a conversation with David Chalmers. (HT: the ever-helpful Dave Lull) There is some discussion of the so-called 'hard problem' in the philosophy of mind. The qualia-based objections are supposed to pose a 'hard' problem for defenders of physicalism.  The implication is that the problems posed by intentionality are, if…

  • Making Physicalism Safe for the Smell of Cooked Onions

    Too many of the academic philosophers of consciousness are overly concerned with the paltriest aspects of consciousness, so-called qualia, and work their tails off trying to convince themselves and others that they are no threat to physicalism.  While man's nobility lies in the power of thought whereby he traverses all of time and existence, our…

  • Consciousness is an Illusion but Truth is Not?

    From an interview with Daniel Dennett in the pages of The Guardian (HT: Dave Lull): I was thinking that perhaps philosophers are exactly what’s needed right now. Some deep thinking about what is happening at this moment? Yes. From everybody. The real danger that’s facing us is we’ve lost respect for truth and facts. People…

  • More Scientistic Bullshit

    Yet another exercise in silly scientism.  Shut up already with this stuff.  I've refuted this genre of crap too many times before. Here is a sample: Bull Meets Shovel: Could Consciousness be a Conjuring Trick? Related articles On the Scientism Front Angst and the Empty Set