Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Concepts

  • The Concept GOD as a Limit Concept

    The concept GOD is the concept of a being that cannot be constituted in consciousness in Husserl's sense of 'constitution,' a being that cannot be a transcendence-in-immanence, but must be absolutely transcendent, transcendent in itself, not merely for us.  It follows that there cannot be a phenomenology of God. At best, there can be a…

  • Singular Concepts Again

    Ed writes, Your counter-arguments are very useful but I find some of them puzzling. One argument that repeatedly occurs is that a concept cannot contain the object that it is a concept of. Our concept of Venus (if we have one) cannot contain Venus, for example. My difficulty is that I agree with this argument,…

  • A Proof of Individual Concepts?

    This just in from Edward: Proof that singular concepts (aka individual concepts) exist. 1. Common terms (‘cat’) and singular terms (‘this cat’, ‘Max’) exist. 2. These terms are meaningful, i.e. their meanings exist. 3. A concept is the meaning of a term. 4. Thus (from 1,2, 3) singular concepts, aka singular meanings, exist. QED This…

  • Intentionality, Singularity, and Individual Concepts

    Herewith, some notes on R. M. Sainsbury, Intentionality without Exotica.  (Exotica are those items  that are "nonexistent, nonconcrete, or nonactual." (303) Examples include Superman and Arcadia.) 'Jack wants a sloop' could mean three different things. (a) There is a particular sloop Jack wants.  In this case, Jack's desire is externally singular.  Desire is an object-directed…

  • Why I Reject Individual Concepts

    This entry was first posted on 24 July 2011. Time for a repost with minor modifications. I find that I still reject individual concepts. Surprise! ……………………………. Consider the sentences 'Caissa is a cat' and 'Every cat is an animal.'  Edward the Nominalist made two  claims in an earlier comment thread that stuck in my Fregean craw: 1)…