Category: Conceivability
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Is the Modal Ontological Argument Rationally Compelling?
I argue that it isn't.
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Intentionality, Singularity, and Individual Concepts
Herewith, some notes on R. M. Sainsbury, Intentionality without Exotica. (Exotica are those items that are "nonexistent, nonconcrete, or nonactual." (303) Examples include Superman and Arcadia.) 'Jack wants a sloop' could mean three different things. (a) There is a particular sloop Jack wants. In this case, Jack's desire is externally singular. Desire is an object-directed…
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Why I Reject Individual Concepts
This entry was first posted on 24 July 2011. Time for a repost with minor modifications. I find that I still reject individual concepts. Surprise! ……………………………. Consider the sentences 'Caissa is a cat' and 'Every cat is an animal.' Edward the Nominalist made two claims in an earlier comment thread that stuck in my Fregean craw: 1)…
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On God’s Not Falling Under Concepts
Fr. Deinhammer tells us, ". . . Gott fällt nicht unter Begriffe, er ist absolut unbegreiflich. . . ." "God does not fall under concepts; he is absolutely inconceivable or unconceptualizable. . . ." Edward the Logician sent me an e-mail in which he forwards a stock objection: Who is it who is absolutely inconceivable…
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On Conceiving that God does not Exist
In a recent post you write: The Humean reasoning in defense of (3) rests on the assumption that conceivability entails possibility. To turn aside this reasoning one must reject this assumption. One could then maintain that the conceivability by us of the nonexistence of God is consistent with the necessity of God's existence. I’m not…
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God, Probability, and Noncontingent Propositions
Matt Hart comments: . . . most of what we conceive is possible. So if we say that 1) In 80% of the cases, if 'Conceivably, p' then 'Possibly, p'2) Conceivably, God existsErgo,3) Pr(Possibly, God exists) = 80%4) If 'Possibly, God exists' then 'necessarily, God exists'Ergo,5) Pr(Necessarily, God exists) = 80%, we seem to get by.…
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A Modal Ontological Argument and an Argument from Evil Compared
After leaving the polling place this morning, I headed out on a sunrise hike over the local hills whereupon the muse of philosophy bestowed upon me some good thoughts. Suppose we compare a modal ontological argument with an argument from evil in respect of the question of evidential support for the key premise in each. This post…
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Does Inconceivability Entail Impossibility?
In an earlier thread James Anderson makes some observations that cast doubt on the standard entailment from inconceivability to impossibility. (I had objected that his theological mysterianism seems to break the inferential link connecting inconceivability and impossibility.) He writes, But even though we have no direct epistemic access to any other inconceivability than our own,…
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Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility
My disembodied existence is conceivable (thinkable without apparent logical contradiction by me and beings like me). But does it follow that my disembodied existence is possible? Sydney Shoemaker floats the suggestion that this inference is invalid, resting as he thinks on a confusion of epistemic with metaphysical possibility. (Identity, Cause, and Mind, p. 155, n.…