Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Bergmann, Gustav

  • External Relations and Bare Particularism

    K. V. writes, I am a first year Jesuit novice of the USA Midwest province. I'm from Cincinnati, OH. I have interests in philosophy. I know Thomism well. My hope is to do metaphysics and philosophical logic within the analytic tradition.    I saw that you wrote a paper on external relations and Bradley's Regress.…

  • From Positivism to Realism: The Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann

    By William Heald via the WayBack Machine.

  • Bare Particular as Limit Concept

    I have already shown that the concept prime matter is a limit concept.  The same holds for the concept bare particular. Both are lower limits of ontological analysis. I will be using 'bare particular' in Gustav Bergmann's sense. What is a Particular? Particulars in the sense relevant to understanding 'bare particular' may be understood in…

  • Bare Particulars and Prime Matter: Similarities and Differences

    This entry continues the discussion of prime matter begun here. That post is a prerequisite for this one. Similarities between Bare Particulars and Prime Matter S1. Bare particulars in themselves are property-less while prime matter in itself is formless.   The bare particular in a thing is that which exemplifies the thing's properties.  But in itself…

  • Van Inwagen: No Truck with Tropes or Constituent Ontology Generally

    Thanks again to Professor Levy to getting me 'fired up' over this topic. ………………………………………. Is the notion of a trope intelligible? If not, then we can pack it in right here and dispense with discussion of the subsidiary difficulties.  Peter van Inwagen confesses, "I do not understand  much of what B-ontologists write."  (Ontology, Identity, and…

  • Bare Particulars versus Aristotelian Substances

    In this entry I will attempt to explain the difference between a bare particular and an Aristotelian primary substance.  A subsequent post will consider whether this difference is theologically relevant, in particular, whether it is relevant to the theology of the Incarnation. What is a Particular? Particulars in the sense relevant to understanding 'bare particular'…

  • Does the Notion of a Bare Particular Make Sense Only in Constituent Ontology?

    The Dispute In an earlier entry that addressed Lukas Novak's argument against bare particulars I said the following: The notion of a bare particular makes sense only in the context of a constituent ontology according to which ordinary particulars, 'thick particulars' in the jargon of Armstrong, have ontological constituents or metaphysical parts. [. . .]…

  • An Argument for Mental Acts

    An earlier post explains the distinction between mental acts and mental actions.  But a logically prior question is whether there are any mental acts in the first place.  Suppose I hear the characteristic rumble of a Harley-Davidson engine and then suddenly think of Peter.  One cannot move straightaway from such a commonplace observation recorded in ordinary English…

  • Mental Acts Versus Mental Actions: Sellars and Bergmann

    I have been assuming that there are mental acts and that there are mental actions and that they must not be confused.  It's high time for a bit of exfoliation.  Suppose I note that the front door of an elderly neighbor's house has been left ajar.  That noting is a mental act, but it is…

  • Ontological Analysis in Aristotle and Bergmann: Prime Matter Versus Bare Particulars

    Hardly anyone reads Gustav Bergmann any more, but since I read everything, I read Bergmann. It is interesting to compare his style of ontological analysis with that of the great hylomorphic ontologists, Aristotle and Aquinas. The distinguished Aristotelian Henry B. Veatch does some of my work for me in a fine paper, "To Gustav Bergmann: A…

  • Truthmaking and the Ontological Assay of Concrete Individuals

    Could a concrete individual such as my man Peter function as the truthmaker of an accidental predication about him such as *Peter is hungry*?  Or must the truthmaker of such a truth be an entity with a proposition-like structure such as a concrete state of affairs or a trope?  Earlier posts have assumed and sometimes…