Category: Belief
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Is Conservatism a Belief System?
I should think so. But in an otherwise excellent entry, Tony M. writes, Conservatism is not really an ideology because it is neither a belief system per se nor a comprehensive social system. It is not a belief system because it does not take its foundational standards from belief but by reference to more basic…
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Ralph Waldo Emerson on the Trumpian ‘Flip-Flop’
Here is a famous passage from Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Self-Reliance" rarely quoted in full: A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you…
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Ten Impediments to Religious Belief
Why is religious belief so hard to accept? Why is it so much harder to accept today than in past centuries? Herewith, some notes toward a list of the impedimenta, the stumbling blocks, that litter the path of the would-be believer of the present day. Whether the following ought to be impediments is a further question, a normative…
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The Need for Doxastic Risks
There are truths we are not in a position to know that we need to believe for our own good.
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The Pyrrhonian as Epistemic Wimp
What is so bad about the strife of systems, controversy, conflict of beliefs? Are they always bad, never productive? Is it not by abrasion (of beliefs) that the pearl (of wisdom) is formed? At least sometimes? Doxastic conflict can be mentally stimulating, a goad to intellectual activity. We like being active. It makes us happy.…
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Political Acrimony: Can Sextus Help?
Our beliefs, political and religious beliefs in particular, divide us and ignite sometimes murderous passions. A radical cure would be to find a way to abstain from belief, to live without beliefs, adoxastōs. Is this possible, and if possible, desirable? No on both counts. Such is the interim conclusion of my ongoing series on Pyrrhonian…
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Anti-Pyrrhonian Haiku
The truth we needWe cannot know.So we must believeThat it is so.
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Is it Sometimes Rational to Believe on Insufficient Evidence?
I should think so. The notion that we should always and everywhere apportion belief to evidence in such a way that we affirm only that for which we have sufficient evidence ignores the fact that belief for beings like us subserves action. If one acted only on those beliefs for which one had sufficient evidence one…
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The Pious Pyrrhonian: Is Beliefless Piety Possible?
Is it possible to be a religiously pious Pyrrhonian? The Pyrrhonian skeptic, aspiring to tranquillity of mind, tries to live without beliefs. These of course include religious beliefs which are a prime cause of bitter and sometimes bloody contention. So one might think that a skeptic of the stripe of Sextus would have nothing to…
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Is it Psychologically Impossible to Assent to a Proposition for which the Evidence is Divided?
Seldom Seen Slim comments and I respond in blue: Enjoyed your Sunday post on Pyrrhonism. It’s been a while since I worked on Sextus, but it strikes me that your essay on the Skeptics’ route to adoxia passes by an important premise: the attainment of equipoise and proper role of philosophy. The skeptics don’t depend…
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Is Pyrrhonism a Doctrine? Can One Live Without Beliefs?
"Pyrrhonism is not a doctrine, but a way of intellectual life, a way of thinking, talking, and acting." (Benson Mates, The Skeptic Way, Oxford UP 1996, p. 66) Mates is a careful writer and his meaning is clear: Pyrrhonism is not a doctrine at all. It involves no beliefs or teachings or doctrines or dogmas.…
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Belief, Designation, and Substitution
Suppose it is true that Sam believes that Hesperus is a planet. One cannot substitute 'Phosphorus' for 'Hesperus' in 'Sam believes that Hesperus is a planet' and be assured that the resulting sentence will also be true. And this despite the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus. The reason is that Sam may be ignorant of…
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Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained
In belief as in action.
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God and Proof
This is an addendum to clarify what I said two days ago. My claim is that we have no demonstrative knowledge of the truth of theism or of the falsity of naturalism. Demonstrative knowledge is knowledge produced by a demonstration. A demonstration in this context is an argument that satisfies all of the following conditions:…
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Is ‘Justified Belief’ a Solecism?
Panayot Butchvarov, Anthropocentrism in Philosophy: Realism, Antirealism, Semirealism, Walter de Gruyter, 2015, p. 33: As used in epistemology, "justified" is a technical term, of obscure meaning and uncertain reference, indeed often explicitly introduced as a primitive. In everyday talk, it is a deontic term, usually a synonym of 'just' or 'right,' and thus 'justified belief'…